THE VĀKYAPADĪYA OF BHARTṚHARI

CHAPTER II

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER

K. A SUBRAMANIA IYER

THE VĀKYAPADĪYA OF BHARTṚHARI

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

K.A.S. IYER

THE VĀKYAPADĪYA OF BHARTṚHARI KĀṆḌA II

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

This English Translation of Kāṇḍa II of the Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with exegetical notes based on the commentary of Puṇyarāja and the Vṛtti of the author himself will, it is hoped, help in the understanding of an important and difficult work representing the final shape given by Bhartṛhari to the contribution of Ancient India to General Linguistics and the Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar. The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari has recently become the subject of study of several scholars working in India and abroad. It was a happy idea of Prof. Iyer to add this volume to his other publications centering around Bhartṛhari and the Vākyapadīya.

ISBN 0 8426 1032 4

Price : Rs. 40

THE VĀKYAPADĪYA OF BHARTṚHARI

THE VĀKYAPADĪYA
OF
BHARTṚHARI

KĀṆḌA II

English Translation With Exegetical Notes

K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER, M.A. (LONDON)
Sometime Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Lucknow University and Visiting Professor, Deccan College, Poona; Formerly, Vice-Chancellor, Lucknow University and the Vārāṇaseya Saṃskṛta-Viśvavidyālaya; Recipient of Certificate of Honour, awarded by the President of India.

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
Delhi : Varanasi : Patna

©MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
Indological Publishers & Booksellers
Head Office : BUNGALOW ROAD, JAWAHAR NAGAR, DELHI-7
Branches : 1. CHOWK, VARANASI-1 (U.P.)
2. ASHOK RAJPATH, PATNA-4 (BIHAR)

ISBN 0 8426 1032 4

First Edition : *Delhi*, 1977
Price : Rs. 40.00

Printed in India
BY SHANTILAL JAIN, AT SHRI JAINENDRA PRESS, A-45, PHASE-I, INDUSTRIAL AREA, NARAINA, NEW DELHI-28 AND PUBLISHED BY SUNDARLAL JAIN, FOR MOTILAL BANARSIDASS, BUNGALOW ROAD, JAWAHAR NAGAR, DELHI-7

CONTENTS

PREFACE

I have great pleasure in placing before Sanskritists this translation into English of the Kārikās of the second Kāṇḍa of the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari with exegetical notes, based, as in the case of my translations of the first and the third kāṇḍas, on the ancient commentaries; in the present case, the commentary of Puṇyarāja and the ancient *Vṛtti*. Though, logically, the text of the *Kārikās*, of the commentary of Puṇyarāja and of the *Vṛtti* should have been published before the publication of this translation of the *Kārikās* with notes, it could not be done due to various circumstances. But the manuscript of my edition of the text and the commentaries was before me when I was doing the translation. The quotations from the *Vṛtti* given in the notes accompanying my translation of the *Kārikās* are taken from my edition of it. The text of Puṇyarāja's commentary is more certain than that of the *Vṛtti*. It was, therefore, easier to write notes based on that. The text of the *Vṛtti* that we have is not complete. There are several gaps in it, big and small. On the first twelve *Kārikās*, the *Vṛtti* is not available at all. What we have, begins with *kārikā* 13 and goes on till *kārikā* 76 after which there is a very big gap up to *kārikā* 151. It is resumed with *kārikā* 152 and goes on till the end with minor gaps. In these circumstances, I do not claim that I will be able to bring out a critical edition of the *Vṛtti* on the second *kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*. All that I am attempting to do is to correct, as far as I can, the text of the only manuscript of the work now available to us, shown by me as M. in my account of the Critical Apparatus for my edition of the *Vṛtti* of *Kāṇḍa* II and publish it, so that the whole of the available text of the *Vṛtti* on *kāṇḍa* II is available to scholars interested in the subject. As it is, only the *Vṛtti* on *Kārikās* 13-76 and 152-183 has so far been printed and published, first by Pt. Charu Deva Shastri as long ago as 1934 and latter in 1968 by Pt. Raghunath Sharma, the then Professor of *Vedānta* in the Sanskrit University, Varanasi. The text of the latter is only a reproduction of the former, except for some proposed

emendations here and there. No correction based on some other manuscript can be made as only one manuscript of the *Vṛtti* is known to exist in the country, except for a fragment mentioned by me as P in my description of the critical apparatus of my forthcoming edition of the *Vṛtti* on *Kāṇḍa* II of the *Vākyapadīya* and preserved in the Hemacandrācārya Jain Jñānamandir, Patan. In the absence of other manuscripts of the work with the help of which one could correct the text of the only available manuscript, one had to rely on one's own judgment in making the corrections. I have done what I could and the text which will be published in my edition will be the corrected text. In this work of correction. I had the good fortune of being helped by Pandit K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastry, Śāstraratna, Senior Pandit in the Dictionary Department of the Deccan College, Post-Graduate and Research Institute. He went through the whole manuscript of the *Vṛtti* very carefully and being a profound Vaiyākaraṇa, was able to make corrections in many places which have made the text far more intelligible. I and all readers of the *Vṛtti* on *Kāṇḍa* II owe him a deep debt of gratitude for this help. I do not claim that the final text as corrected by us is free from mistakes. It only represents the best that we have been able to do. If, one day, one has the good fortune of discovering a complete manuscript of the *Vṛtti* somewhere in India (I have a feeling that a vigorous and systematic search may result in such a discovery or it may be discovered accidentally) it may be possible to make some more corrections and thus improve the text. Even as it is, some passages are quite clear and that is what has enabled me to add some notes based on the *Vṛtti* in this translation of the *kārikās* of the second *kāṇḍa*. Here and there, I have quoted the relevant passages themselves. I hope that these notes and the quotations will prove useful. Though I have been careful not to add any notes based on the *Vṛtti*, unless I was fairly sure of the text and the meaning of that portion of the *Vṛtti*, I find that, after all, I have added notes based on the *Vṛtti* to the translation of about 225 out of the total of 485 kārikās which is a fairly good proportion.

LUCKNOW : K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER.
January 12, 1977

ABBREVIATIONS

M. Bhā.	The Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (Kielhorn's edition)
Mī. Sū	The Mīmāṃsā Sūtras of Jaimini
Vā.	Vārttika of Kātyāyana
Vāk.	Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari
Tattvasaṅgraha	Published in the Gaekwad Oriental Series Baroda
Adh.	Adhyāya
P.	Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini
Bhartṛhari	Bhartṛhari, a study of the Vākyapadīya in the light of the Ancient Commentaries. Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series. 68. 1969.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Wilhelm Rau. Die handschriftliche uberlieferung des Vākyapadīya and seine kommentare. Wilhelm Fink. Verlag München (Abhandlungen des Marburger Galehrten Gesellschaft. Jahrgang 1971, N. R. I.
2. Pandit Charudeva Shastri. वाक्यपदीयं भर्तृहर्युपज्ञवृत्तिसनाथं द्वितीयकाण्डे प्रथमखण्डः। श्रीमत्या रामलालकपूरन्यासससमित्या प्रकाशितम्। परिष्कर्ता चारुदेवः शास्त्री पाणिनीयः।
विक्रमाब्दः १९९६ ॥
3. Pandit Raghunatha Sharma Vākyapadīyam pt. II with the commentary Ambākartrī by Pandit Raghunath Sharma. This contains the commentary of Puṇyarāja, the Vṛtti portion already published by Pandit Charudeva Shastri and the editor's own commentary called Ambākartrī on the kārikās, the commentary of Puṇyarāja and the published portion of the *Vṛtti*. Sarasvati-Bhavana Granthamala Vol. 91 Vārāṇasī 1968.

SYNOPSIS OF THE TOPICS DEALT WITH IN THE SECOND KĀṆḌA OF THE VĀKYAPADĪYA

The purpose of the second Kāṇḍa is to state the nature in detail of the expressive word, namely, the sentence. The eight ways in which the ancient Ācāryas looked upon the sentence are enumerated (1-2). Consideration as to whether the definitions of the sentence as given by the author of the Vārttikas and the Mīmāṃsakas can apply to the same case or have different scopes. The explanation of the Mīmāṃsaka definition of the sentence. The statement that the definition of the sentence given by the author of the Vārttikas does not suffer from the defect called *avyāpti*. The cognition of a picture is taken as an illustration to explain the cognition of the sentence—*sphoṭa*. The analysis of a sentence into parts is only a means of instructing the ignorant (10). The words analysed out of a sentence can do no more than resemble individual words (11). It is the ignorant person who analyses a sentence into parts and it may be done differently by different persons. The rejection of the *abhihitānvayavāda* view of the sentence. The explanation of the two views coming under *anvitābhidhāna* : (1) that the first word (2) that every word requiring the other words of the sentence is the sentence (17). The statement of the view of the integrated sentence in order to explain the different kinds of *pratibhā* (19). Explanation of the *vyaktisphoṭa* view (19). Explanation of the *jātisphoṭa view* (20-21). The statement that to talk about earlier and later phases of the indivisible *sphoṭa* is based upon contingent divisions (22). The indivisible sentence, like Time, has only contingent divisions. Criticism of the view that the individual word is real (28). The view that the sentence—Sphoṭa is an indivisible inner reality of the nature of Consciousness, consisting of the word plus meaning, externalised by the sounds (30). The sentence-meaning is of the nature of Intuition, it is indivisible and manifested by the meanings of the individual words. Word and meaning are two aspects of the same self and not different from each other (31). The inner word, of the nature

of Light is, depending upon its powers the illuminator (*prakāśaka*) or the illuminated (*prakāśya* 32). Criticism of the reality of the individual word (34-35). The individual word, whether isolated or part of a complex structure, has no fixed form (36). In one and the same word, there is some times a coalescence of two forms, conveying two different mean ings: *Śveta* example from the world, *Yasyeti ca* P.6.4.148 is an example from the *śāstra*. To look upon some words as having meaningful parts and others as having no such parts is a mere convention of the *śāstra* (37). The *śāstra* is only a means of learning the word and the means is always variable (38). Sometimes the whole sentence-meaning is understood from a single syllable (40). Explanation of the Mīmāṃsaka view that the sentence is a collection of words (42). That the sentence-meaning rests on each word is one view, that it rests on all of them taken together is another view (43). Explanation of the *saṅghāta* view from the standpoint of *anvitābhidhāna* (44-45). According to one view, the sentence is a collection of words or their utterance together in a given context, an utterance which particularises the meaning of each word and the resultant particularised meaning is the meaning of the sentence (46). Others declare that what is called a sentence is nothing more than a particular sequence of words. The *M.Bhā* sentence *na lakṣaṇena padakārā anuvartyāḥ, padakārair nāma lakṣaṇam anuvartyam* (*M. Bhā* on P. 3.1.109.) shows that the doctrine of the indivisibility of the sentence is approved by Pāṇini and Patañjali (57). The view of the up-holder of the individual word is stated (61-63). Vedic injunctions can be explained only on that basis. Other difficulties if the reality of the individual word is not accepted (64-76). The *Vaiyākaraṇa* maintains that all these difficulties can be overcome by resorting to analysis (*apoddhāra* 88,91,92). The limits of an individual word cannot be determined because its form is constantly changing (95). In one and the same word, there is sometimes the coalescence of two forms, conveying two different meanings. Example *śvetaḥ*—from the world, *yasyeti ca* P. 6.4.148 and ū in *ūkālo'jhrasvadīrghaplutaḥ*. (P. 1.2. 27). How *śveto dhāvati* can be an answer to two different questions at the same time if the individual word is not real

is answered by the *akhaṇḍavādī* on the basis of *tantra*. Even in the *akhaṇḍapakṣa*, intermediary sentences would not become useless. Defect in the view that *prayojana* is the meaning of the sentence. All words are the cause of a flash of understanding through practice (*abhyāsa*) even in the case of children and animals in their understanding of things as they are (117). Though the meaning of the sentence is indivisible it is divided for practical purposes on the basis of *śaktibheda*. When the division based on *śaktibheda* is done, the meaning of the individual word results and on the nature of this meaning, there are twelve views as follows—(1) All words convey a meaning which has no form or shape. If a form is understood sometimes, it is due to other causes and not to the word itself (120-121). (2) Something is the expressed meaning of words and something else connected with it is understood as an after-effect, (*anuniṣpādī*). Action is the expressed meaning and the particular means (*sādhana*) is the after-effect (122-124). (3) Everything that is understood from a word is its expressed meaning, though something in it may be the primary sense and the rest the secondary sense (125). (4) A word conveys whatever is understood from it without any inner alternatives or emphasis on the totality (127). (5) Some think that the word denotes the relation between a thing and its universal. This relation cannot be seen apart from it (127). (6)The word denotes the real conditioned by the unreal (128 ab). This is the view expressed in the *Dravyasamuddeśa*. (7) The word considered as *abhijalpa* is its own expressed meaning. The form and the meaning of a word are identified, the form is superimposed on the meaning. That is the expressed meaning of a word. (8) The object is what the word presents. It has no power of its own. (9) The object has potentialities. But, one of them, either action or accessory is presented by the word. (10) The word expresses whatever is mentally constructed on the basis of the external object. The external and the internal are identified and presented by the word as external and understood by the listener as external (132). (11) Some words denote an object having a shape and form. Others, like *dharma*, *apūrva*, *devatā* etc, denote formless things (133). (12) The meaning under-

stood from a word depends on the culture of the listener and can differ according to place and time (134, 135). There is no fixity about it. There is no fixity about the cognitions of men and so their words are unreliable. The cognitions of sages are beyond *vyavahāra*. Words are not based on them. At the *vyavahāra* level, sages are like ordinary men (139). No one can rely upon one's own perception.

The whole of the third *kāṇḍa* is devoted to a detailed consideration of these twelve kinds of meanings under some headings like *jāti* (universal 142). But for the grammarian the sentence—*sphoṭa* is the word and *pratibhā* its meaning. It cannot be explained to others and even the experiencer cannot explain it to himself. It is produced by the word itself or by impressions coming down from previous births. It exists in all, including animals. It is part of Nature. The word proximate or remote, is the cause of this Intuition. In being the cause of Intuition, the word is assisted by *bhāvanā*, that is, the tendency to act according to the nature of the class of beings to which one belongs. It is either inherited from previous lines or arises in this life. The causality is *bhāvanā*> *āgama*>*pratibhā*. By *bhāvanā* what is called *śabdabhāvanā* in the first *kāṇḍa* seems to be meant here. *Pratibhā* is of six kinds (152) depending upon its cause. The first kind is caused by *svabhāva*, Nature. The instinctive knowledge of animals which enables them to engage in activities appropriate to their species. Puṇyarāja gives the example of the monkey and its activities. Primordial matter (*parāprakṛtiḥ*) showing a pre-disposition to evolve into *mahat* is given as the example in the *vṛtti*. The second cause of *pratibhā* is *caraṇa*, that is one's own branch of the Veda. The Intuition of Vasiṣṭha and others who acquired special illumination by strictly observing the prescriptions of their Vedic school is given as the example. The next cause of Intuition is *abhyāsa* = practice. The knowledge of those who can tell where water can be found for digging a well or a tank is given as the example (152 and the *Vṛtti* thereon). It requires long practice before one can become an expert in such prediction. Another example of *abhyāsa* or practice is the knowledge of experts who can tell the genuineness of precious stones and of coins. The next cause of Intuition is

said to be Yoga. It is said that through yoga one can know what is going on in the minds of others. What is called *adṛṣṭa* is mentioned next as a cause of Intuition. It is an invisible power generated by one's own deeds in the previous lives. It determines many things in one's present life. Among them is its power to confer special knowledge on others. The example given in the Vṛtti is the power of Rakṣas and Piśācas which enables them to enter the bodies of others and to make themselves invisible. Lastly there is the intuition caused by the grace of a special person : *viśiṣṭopahitā*). The example given is that of the special knowledge which Vyāsa gave to Sañjaya and others at the time of the Mahābhārata war so that they could see the war, scattered over a big area, in its totality and in its details.

When we hear a word, we understand an object with some attributes only some of which are always found in that object. Only that which is always present is the meaning of the word (163). The word does not convey the whole object with all that it has any more than we can *see* the whole of an object (161).

The question whether parts of a word have a meaning or not is decided on the basis of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* by means of which one can divide a word as well as its meaning. There is no fixity in the way in which the word and its meaning are analysed. The question of the primary and secondary meaning of words is discussed (153 ff). A word denotes the universal of an object. Its form, shape etc. are implied. The word water applies to all water, irrespective of shape, size and quantity (156). Sometimes a word denotes one part of an object but a part identified with the whole (157). The universal in an object causes the application of the word to that object and not to other things which accompany it. In their absence, the word can be used but not in the absence of the universal (156-160). Not only does the word not express the whole object, even perception does not cover the whole object (161). From the word *jātigandha*, the smell of *jāti* flower is understood, but not the other qualities which accompany the smell (162-163).

Have parts of nouns any meaning ? Only the method of

anvaya and *vyatireka* can decide that. Where analysis leads to a distinct meaning it is not right to include the meaning of one word in that of another. Analysis should not be done if it will not lead to distinct meanings for the parts. It should not be used in the case of *kūpa, yūpa* and *sūpa*. There is no fixity in the method of analysis. Different scholars and different schools may use different methods. The same path can be shown through different landmarks. The word go 'cow' can be derived on the basis of any of the many attributes which co-exist in the cow with its universal. So it can be derived from *girati*, or *garjati* or *gavati* or *gacchati*. Others thought that the word is applied to a cow because of its form. All words are so applied, say some, (*avyutpattipakṣa*). Others think that both form and meaning are the basis of the application. This is the *Vyutpattipakṣa*.

Is a word having different meanings the same word? One view is that it is not the same word, though it may look the same. There is only resemblance but not identity. Grammarians adopt different methods of derivation and they have sometimes to assume difference even where there is none in order to do their job. For example, preposition (*upasarga*) plus root form one unit but they are treated as different in order to regulate the position of the augment *aṭ*. The root is first combined with the *upasarga* and then with the words expressive of the means (*sādhana*). Others held just the opposite view. Yāska has recognised four parts of speech : *Nāman*, *ākhyāta*, *upasarga* and *nipāta* (176-186). Next something is said about *upasargas* (187). Like *svārthika* suffixes, they express a meaning together with what they are joined to (190,191). Now about *nipātas* (192 *ff*) *Nipātas* can be *vācaka* (expressive) *dyotaka* (manifestors) or *sahakāris* (associates). Manifestors are verbal elements which are not used except in association with others. They are not considered to be *vācaka*, because though they are words, they are not used separately. This is not the case with suffixes. They are also not used separately, but then they are not words at all. Lastly, something about *karmapravacanīya*, not mentioned by Yāska at all. The final view about them is that they do not suggest an action, nor do they bring to the mind a missing

verb nor do they express a relation directly as the sixth case-ending does, but they qualify a relation, that is, they specify the particular relation between the two things connected by them (204). Really speaking, like other parts of a sentence they have no meaning at all. Like parts of sentences, parts of words are really meaningless. It is only in grammar that a meaning is attributed to them. The question whether individual phonemes have a meaning is discussed. They are meaningless. They are really not parts of a word. One must make a distinction between a collection of meaningful words and a collection of words not connected with one another. The two elements of a word, one meaningful and the other not so, do not enter into relation with each other, say some. Others say that they do. From elements having each a general meaning, a collection having a particularised meaning is produced, hold some. 'Not so,' say others. When divided, each element is separately recognisable and meaningful in some cases but not in all. Pure roots, stems etc. have no meaning in the world. Only analysis attributes to them a meaning. Meanings of bare primary and secondary suffixes are not worldly nor are those of words ending in them. Individual phonemes have a meaning when they happen to be roots or stems or suffixes or particles (216-220). The four undesirable consequences of the view that individual words have a meaning (218-220). Seven possible objections against the *akhaṇḍapakṣa* and their answer (221 ff). All divisions adopted by grammarians are only for the sake of convenience. They are not real. The existence of the individual word and its meaning is again denied. We seem at first to understand the meanings of individual words but when the meaning of the whole sentence is understood, the former look different. Unless the sentence meaning is taken as a whole, negation cannot be explained.

Up to this point, it has been shown that the sentence is indivisible and essentially *sphoṭa* and that its meaning is the indivisible Intuition. The individual word does not really exist, because (1) a meaning is understood even if either base or suffixes is absent (2) the meaning understood from two suffixes is sometimes understood from one, (3) there is no clear line of demarcation between base and suffix, (4) the

sentence-meaning is different from that of the word, (5) negation is inexplicable if the meaning of the individual word is real, (6) it does not exist, because we give it up in the end, (7) it cannot be true because the *Vṛtti* gives the opposite meanings, (8) The purpose served by individual words can be fulfilled by resorting to *apoddhāra*.

If the existence of divisions in the sentence on the basis of *apoddhāra* is admitted, certain questions arise. When a word denotes many things, is it the same word or a different word in regard to each meaning ? It is the same word which primarily denotes one of the things and secondarily the others.

When individual words are obtained by *apoddhāra*, the distinction between primary and secondary in their meanings is based upon *prasiddhi* or *aprasiddhi*. Some consider resemblance as the basis of secondary usage. Others think that a kind of misapprehension, real or pretended is the basis. To call mother-of-pearl silver is real misapprehension. To call a *vāhīka* a cow is pretended misapprehension. This is the context in which *ekaśabdadarśana*, *anekaśabdadarśana*, *śabdopacāra* and *arthopacāra* are discussed. The distinction between primary and incidental is discussed. A word conveys not only what is intended, but also what is mixed up with it. The word conveys not only an object but also its gender and number mixed up with it. That is the meaning of a word to convey which it was used. What is primary and what is secondary is determined in many ways. The doctrine of indivisibility though accepted, is challenged as follows. If the individual word is a collection of phonemes, if the phonemes have a meaning, if the word has a meaning, if the sentence is a collection of words and if the collection has a meaning, how can indivisibility be maintained ? The *vārttika saṅghātārthavattvāt* (vā. 12. M. Bha. I, p. 30, 1. 24) seems to imply this objection. It is answered thus : The phonemes are never felt to be meaningful. Nobody has the feeling that the meaning of the word is made up of the meanings of phonemes just as one seems to recognise in the meaning of the sentence the meanings of individual words. If phonemes have no meanings, they cannot be parts of words because the division of the sound part of a word must correspond to the division of the meaning part (205). A collection of meaning-

ful words, on the other hand is different, being expressive of a meaning different from that of the component words (when there is a connection between them and because of the absence of a connection between these words (206). Some say that when a word is analysed, its two elements, one meaningful and the other meaningless do not enter into any relation with each other while others declare that they do as there is the example of the word *kuṭīra*. The word *kuṭīra* is analysed into parts : *kuṭī* and *ra*. The former has a meaning while the latter has not. So they cannot be connected according to some, while others think that 'ra' suggests the idea of smallness and so the two can be joined (207). Taking compounds and words ending in *svārthika* suffixes respectively as their basis, some say that from elements having a meaning a collection having a meaning is produced while others hold that such a collection is not produced. The word *rājapuruṣa* is an instance of a compound having a meaning and made up of elements having a meaning. From a word made up of a meaningful stem and a *svārthika* suffix, no collection having a different meaning is produced (208). Some collections are made up of separately meaningful parts. When divided each element is separately recognisable and meaningful. Some (on the other hand) have to have their denotative power inferred by means of agreement and difference (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*). *Śamīvṛkṣa* and *dāḍimīvṛkṣa* are examples of the first kind and *saṃjñu* and *prajñu* are examples of the second kind. *Saṃjñu* is explained as *saṁgate jānunī asya* = "one whose knees are joined together". The word *jānunī* though seen in the analysis, is not easily recognisable in the compound word (209). It is only a meaning current in the Science of Grammar which is shown to prove that phonemes are meaningful. Pure roots, stems etc. have no recognised meaning in the world (210). See vā. 9. Ma Bhā I. p. 30, 1.2.) The question whether single phonemes have a meaning or not is considered in the M. Bhā on the *pratyāhārasūtra* : *Ha-ya-va-raṭ*. The conclusion reached there is that they have a meaning only when they happen to be roots, stems, suffixes or particles. Even this meaning is obtained by the analysis practised in the *śāstra*. It is not seen in the world. Similarly, the meaning of the bare *kṛt* and *taddhita* suffixes is not known in the world. Before the

inflectional suffixes are added, a word ending in a *kṛt* or *taddhita* suffix has no meaning (211). Objections to the doctrine of indivisibility and the answer to them. The science of Grammar really teaches *avidyā* (233). A word conveys a meaning according to usage and practice (235). The *śāstra* stands for error and through error it leads one to truth (238). The individual word's reality is again refuted. What is understood at the stage of the individual word is often abandoned at the sentence stage (239). Many meanings of individual words initially understood, are negated at the end. This is not right because it affects the eternality of the relation between the word and its meaning (240). If the individual word is real, one cannot explain how one first understands praise from a sentence and ends up by understanding blame (248). Consideration of primary and secondary meanings of words (250 ff). Once the sentence is analysed and we get the individual words, consideration of the meaning of the latter begins. Twelve views are mentioned : (1) that the word is the same in all its meanings, (2) that it is different with each meaning, (3) that the individual word and its meaning are unreal, (4) that they are real. Each one of these four views can be differentiated according to *śabdopacāra* and the two kinds of *arthopacāra*. *Śabdopacāra* means : the application of the word *go* to a cow or figuratively, the application of the same word to a *vāhīka* because of his resemblance to a cow in dullness. In both these cases the word is applied to an object which has *gotva* really or figuratively. *Arthopacāra* is of two kinds, When the form of the word whether applied primarily or figuratively is considered to be its meaning it is one kind. When an outside object is its meaning, whether applied primarily or figuratively, it is the second kind. When each of the first four views is combined with each of the next three views, one gets twelve views in all. But speaking broadly, there are two main views : *ekaśabdadarśanam* and *anekaśabdadarśanam*. Verse 250 begins the consideration of the former. If it is the same word which has many meanings, how is it that it does not convey all of them at the same time. The answer is that purpose, context and contact with another word determine which meaning is conveyed by a word on a particular occasion. In verses 315-316 other factors for deter-

mining the meaning of a word will be mentioned which help one to decide which is the primary meaning and which the secondary one. The other factors mentioned later help one to decide what is expressed and what is implied. Just as the word 'cow' denotes an object endowed with dewlap etc. so does it denote a *vāhīka* also. This is said according to *ekaśabdadarśana*, the view that when a word denotes different things, it is still the same word. The word cow denotes a particular class of animals through its power called *abhidhā*. When it is applied to a *vāhīka* who has not the physical characteristics of a cow, it denotes that object through the same power and not some other. The primariness or secondariness of a word having many attributes, that is, the power to denote many things, depends upon frequency of usage. Therefore the word *gauḥ* primarily denotes the cow and secondarily an object like *vāhīka* because of more frequent usage in the former case. It is the same word which denotes both. This is *ekaśabdadarśana*.

Commenting on 252 and 253 together, the *Vṛtti* says : the same word *gauḥ* sometimes denotes the universal as in *gauranubandhyaḥ*. Sometimes, it denotes the individual or substance as in *gaurānīyatām* or *gaur duhyatām*. Sometimes it denotes a particular individual as when one asks a cowherd seated in the midst of a herd of cattle : Do you see a cow in his herd of cattle ? *Astyatra kāñcid gāṃ paśyasi ?* Sometimes it is applied to a totally different object like a *vāhīka* because of the presence in him of qualities like suffering everything and eating a lot. Where it is used primarily and where secondarily depends upon whether it requires the help of other factors like context for conveying its meaning (253).

Another effect of *ekaśabdadarśana* is this : one and the same sacred hymn is accepted without any confusion as having many meanings and different powers according as it is considered from the point of view of the *ātman* or of the gods or of the ritual.

So far *śabdopacāra* according to *ekaśabdadarśana* has been shown. In *śabdopacāra*, the word now denotes one meaning and now another. That affects the eternality of the relation between the two. So the question is considered from the point of view of *arthopacāra*. Some hold that due to special circumstances

(in this case, the dullness and slowness of the *vāhīka*, the quality of being a cow is traced in a *vāhīka*. There has been a change in the external object but the word expresses its own meaning. In this context, two views have been put forward *ekaśabdadarśana* and *anekaśabdadarśana*. The first view means that when a word has many meanings, it is still the same word. The second view means that it is not but that it becomes as many words as there are meanings. In the former view, there can be *śabdopacāra* and *arthopacāra*. When the word *go* is applied to a cow primarily and to a *vāhīkam* one secondarily it is the same word. This is *śabdopacāra* within *ekaśabdadarśana*, there can be *arthopacāra* also and that has two aspects. The meaning of a word can be the form itself or an outside object. Whether the word *gauḥ* is applied to a cow or to a *vāhīka* its own form is understood first in any case. Whether applied primarily or secondarily, *gotva* is understood in both applications. Thus the form and the meaning are the same in both the cases. These are the two aspects of *arthopacāra*. As in *śabdopacāra*, the word is applied now to one thing and now to another, the eternality of the relation between the word and its meaning is affected. (254-255).

The point mentioned in this context is that a word never deserts its meaning consisting of its external form, namely, a particular pattern of phonemes. The *Vṛtti* attributes to some Ācāryas the view that the form of a word, specifically its own and internal to it, invariably associated with it and normally never shared with other words is its first meaning. It is superimposed on the object which it denotes. The two are identified (256). Those who follow the path of difference declare that a word used in a secondary meaning is different from the same word used in its primary meaning. This is the result of accepting identity as the relation between a word and its meaning. Once a word has been identified with its primary meaning, it cannot again be identified with another meaning. One wants a totally different word for it. A similar question is discussed in the M. Bhā on vā 4-10 and 11-12 in the second Āhnika. The question discussed is whether a phoneme in different contexts is the same. Here the question relates to words having different meanings. (257). It is thus that a Vedic hymn for kindling the fire becomes different by mere repetition. In the same way,

a Vedic *mantra* that is the object of usage or guess also becomes different. It is prescribed in the Vedas that a certain number of *mantras* should be recited for kindling the sacrificial fire. The number is sometimes eleven, sometimes thirteen and sometimes seventeen. Repetition of a *mantra* is also taught in this connection. It follows that a *mantra* repeated becomes a different *mantra*. It is by repetition that the required number is obtained. In the same way, a word used in a secondary meaning should be considered to be different from the same one used in its primary meaning. What is interesting to note is that the question of sameness or difference is thought of in connection with phonemes, words and whole *mantras*. The same phoneme comes in different contexts and becomes the object of grammatical operations, the same word denotes different meanings in different contexts; the same *mantra* is repeated in the same context and is counted as a different *mantra*. All this has been said to strengthen *anekaśabdadarśana* (258). The *mantras* actually handed down in the Vedas are only illustrative. They stand for others also which have not been handed down but which are also nonetheless Veda. As long as the sequence of the words is the same as that of the *mantras* actually handed down, it is also Veda. Not everything is actually handed down. Another way of looking at it is that what is actually handed down has no meaning other than its own form. So it is not *mantra*. Only that which has a meaning other than its form and bring to the mind what is connected with the actual ritual is *mantra*. It is only then that it is subsidiary (*śeṣa*) to the ritual (259). Some maintain that the outward form itself is the purpose of the transmission of the *Vedas*, so that everything possessing the form is different while those that are used in the ritual are different on account of their connection with what is actually handed down. If the outward form itself is the meaning of the Vedas, the mantras are different from one another because their outward form is different. Not only the mantras which have been handed down but the others also have an outward form and as that is always different, the mantras are also different. As far as the outward form is concerned, a word conveys it through *śakti* and not through *lakṣaṇā* (260). The *sāvitrī mantra* used on different occasions is a

different *mantra*. Used at the sacrament of initiation (*upanayana*) it is called the *saṁskārasāvitrī*. When one who has already had his *upanayana*, uses it at some other ceremony, it is a different *sāvitrī* altogether. When recited a definite number of times as part of an expiation ceremony it is again different. In other words, a mantra differs according to application. It is looked upon as the same for practical purposes only. As the *Vṛtti* says : *vyāvahārikam ekatvam* (261). Really speaking, the question of primary and secondary in regard to meaning cannot arise if the word becomes different with every meaning. As there are as many words as there are meanings, each word has one meaning only and that is its primary meaning. It has no secondary meaning at all. But the question does arise in the *ekaśabdadarśana* and then long usage of the lack of it is the basis for the distinction between primary and secondary. The point raised is : when a word has many meanings, what is the criterion for regarding one as the primary one and the other as secondary ? The verse 263 says that the criterion is *siddhi* or *asiddhi*. Others declare that word to be secondary which denotes a meaning with the help of the context or the presence of another word. The help of the context or of the presence of another word makes the meaning understood from a word secondary. This test is said to be common to both *ekaśabdadarśana* and *anekaśabdadarśana* (264). That meaning is the primary one to which the word can be applied without any impediment or hitch. That meaning is secondary to which the word is applied after some incompatibility is felt. When the word *gauḥ* is applied to a *vāhīka*, there is first incompatibility, but it becomes alright when *gotva* is attributed to the *vāhīka* (267). This is *arthopacāra*. This takes place when the word *go* is supposed to be the same in both cases. Though the same, it is looked upon as different on the basis of *śaktibheda* and so it is alright. There is difficulty in trying to take purpose or context as the guide for determining what is primary and what is secondary. The word *purā* denotes both the future and the past. Similarly, *ārāt* means both far and near. Only the context can tell what the actual meaning is. If the meaning determined by the context is the secondary one, the meaning of these words would become secondary, but

that would be wrong. Both the meanings of these two words are primary. Therefore context is not the correct basis for determining which meaning is the primary one and which the secondary one (268). When the sentence and its meaning are considered indivisible, there are no individual words and their meanings and so the question of primary and secondary cannot arise. And yet for practical purposes, the sentence is split up into words by a process of abstraction (*apoddhāra*). When this is done, the distinction of primary and secondary is based on long usage or the lack of it (269). When a word is sometimes used by itself with the verb *asti* understood, it is really a sentence. That is why it is not connected with any other word. What is meant is that the verb 'to be' is understood and added on mentally to a single word when it is used. Thus it is really a sentence and so no other word is connected with it (270-271). Nor can abundance or deficiency in the attributes be the basis of the distinction because some consider even abundance to be deficiency due to long usage. Dullness is associated with the cow when the word cow is applied to the animal, it is a case of primary application because, in the cow, dullness is found in a greater degree. When the same word is applied to a *vāhika*, it is a case of secondary application because dullness is found there in a lesser degree. But this criterion is unreliable as abundance and deficiency are relative terms. The *vāhīka* may be really duller but long usage considers that dullness exists in him in a lesser degree. So this is not a good criterion (272). Some speak about similarity as the basis of the distinction between primary and secondary. According to this view, the word 'cow' denotes the universal cowness (*gotva*). It exists only in the cow. But when the word is applied to a *vāhīka*. it is not because there is *gotva* in him, but because he resembles the cow in being dull. Resemblance in some attribute is, therefore, the cause of the secondary application of the word (273). Misapprehension is sometimes the basis of the distinction between primary and secondary. One can apply a word expressive of one thing to another either through misapprehension or deliberate superimposition. To call mother-of-pearl (*śukti*) silver after misapprehension in the dark is an example of the first case. To

apply the word cow to a *vāhika* on seeing some resemblance between the two and not because of misapprehension is an example of the second case. Here there is no wrong identification because one sees clearly the difference. That is why the word *iva* is used after *viparyāsāt* (274). Some speak about shape and power as the basis of the distinction between primary and secondary. A plough or a sword or a pestle, being endowed with a particular shape and power is understood as the fixed tool of a particular action, they have no power connecting them with other actions but are invariably understood as meant for the performance of particular actions because of their shape. Similarly a word endowed with a form and power from the very beginning has its purpose fixed. Through some power, it can also be applied to other things. These instruments and tools perform their particular actions on account of the particular shape with which they are endowed. One cannot cut grass with a plough nor fight a battle with it. In the same way, the power of a word to denote its meaning is fixed from eternity (275-278). This is the view not only of the grammarians but also of the Mīmāṃsakas (See Jaimini Mī Sū. I.1.5. and Vākya III Sambandha 29). Whenever a meaning, however contradictory it may be, is understood from a word, according to that understanding, that is its primary meaning. Whatever meaning figures in the mind when a word or sentence is heard is its primary meaning however unusual or contradictory it may be. This is based on the Mīmaṃsaka principle expressed in the Mī-Sū. IV. 1.6.15. : *śabdavattūpalabhyate, tadāgamehi dṛśyate tasya, jñānaṃ yathānyeṣām.* The *Vṛtti* gives the example of the mirages. The mirage looks like water from a distance. So it is mistaken for water and the word water applied to it. This application should be looked upon as a primary one because it is based upon the well-established meaning for the application of the word 'water'. It is shown that even if the meaning is what figures in the mind, there can be a distinction between what is primary and what is secondary. To show this, something is said about what is real and what is not.

Even though the determination of an object depends upon our understanding of it still all understanding of it does not

go in vain, our subsequent experience in regard to such objects brings out a distinction between the primary and the secondary. The point here is: Mere cognition is not enough for determining the existence of an object. We take a mirage to be water but there is no water there. Our perception of real water and our perception of mirage as water resemble each other. But the difference becomes clear when we go to the place and try to touch the water in the mirage, drink it or have a bath in it. So the use of the word 'water' to the water which we see in a mirage is only secondary usage. Even though there is similarity in the perception of a serpent and that of a rope, still their difference is obvious from their well-known special activities (that of biting in the case of a snake and that of binding in the case of a rope). We can conclude that the objection is non-existent if we do not see its special activity, even though it may figure in the cognition. The snake may figure in our cognition of the rope but as the rope does not bite, we can conclude that it is not a snake. Further, that our perception of it was wrong. Whatever difference is perceived as a result of any circumstance causing a contrary perception is a false perception. A defect in the senses or in the object itself may cause a false perception. What is seen because of such a defect is said to be false. The *Vṛtti* mentions darkness, defect in the eye, intoxication, poisoning and displacement as possible causes of wrong perception. When it takes place, it can be corrected by comparison with perception under normal conditions and by verification through touch etc. Two cognitions may be similar if their objects are similar and refer to their special property but they are really different. Even though one sees ups and downs in a picture similar to those of mountains, still it does not cause obstruction etc. as a real mountain does. Just as it is possible to have continuous contact of the hand with the wheel, that is not possible in the case of a torch-wheel whice can be touched only with interruption. While it is possible to have contact and protection in the case of cities by means of forts, walls and turrets, it is not possible to have these in the case of imaginary cities. As much work as it is possible to get from real animals cannot be got from earthenware images of them. That is why the affix *kan* has been taught by Pāṇini

after words expressive of imitations. It has been shown tha the distinction between primary and secondary on which some grammatical operation are based depends upon the reality or unreality of the objects denoted by the words in question. One can tell whether the objects are real or not from the nature of their cognition which, though similar, may be different because of difference in their nature. Sometimes difference between primary and secondary words is the basis for the use of the suffix '*kan*' P. 5. 3. 96 teaches the suffix *kan* after words expressive of images of objects. One thus gets forms like *aśvaka*, *uṣṭraka*, *gardabhaka*. As the objects are not real animals but only their images, the suffix *kan* can be added. Mere resemblance is not enough. It must be an artificial image. The use of the word *parvata* in the sense of the reflection of a mountain is secondary usage and so it takes the suffix *kan* and we get the form *parvataka*. To call an earthenware image of a horse *aśvaka* is secondary usage based on similarity of shape. To call a reflection of a mountain *parvataka* is also secondary usage based on resemblance, but resemblance due to the relation of original and reflection.

While real poison and other such things are the cause of death, the same things seen in a dream are not capable of causing the same. The implication is that the suffix *kan* can be added to words expressive of things seen in a dream, because they do not have the effect which the same things have in real life.

Things that seem to be otherwise as a result of changes relating to time, place or the senses are, however understood rightly by following worldly tradition.

The world does not regulate its verbal usage on the basis of knowledge arising from defective senses or which is of a supernatural character. Words are based on worldly tradition. Knowledge due to some defect in the senses is the opposite of truth and is illustrated by mirages and the seeing of two moons. Supernatural knowledge is that of *Ṛṣis*. Neither of them is fit for worldly transactions. Just as a lamp reveals in an object like a jar, through association or proximity other things than that for the illumination of which it was employed, in the same way, a word conveys from among the things which

are connected together those that are different from the one to convey which it was used. When a lamp is used to illuminate an object, it illuminates not only that object but whatever else is invariably associated with it. If a lamp is lighted to see a jar, one sees not only the jar but also the properties which are inherent in the jar. This is inevitable. The jar itself is the main thing, its properties are the invariably associated things. In the same way, when a word is used to convey a particular property from among the many which are connected with one another, it conveys not only that property but also others which are always associated with it. Puṇyarāja takes the word *bhāva* as an example. On the basis of its derivation, it can convey several connected notions such as the fact of being something finished (*siddhatva*) the masculine gender, singular number and so on. If it is used for conveying the idea of being something finished, it will not stop there. It will also convey the masculine gender, singular number etc. The illustration of the lamp and of the word *bhāva* go back to the *Vṛtti*. The former is mentioned in the verse 298 itself. The *Vṛtti* contains several references to the M. Bhā. on P. 3. 3. 18 (285-299). A word, meant to convey a particular meaning denotes by close association an unintended meaning also. The churning of the ignition sticks (*araṇi*) meant to light a fire, produces smoke also. It cannot be helped. But the unintended meaning plays no part in the action (300-301). That is the meaning of a word to convey which it was used (303). What is primary, what is secondary and what is inevitably understood can be determined on the basis of sentence, context, meaning, propriety, place, time and not merely on the basis of form (314). Some add connection, separation, association, opposition, meaning, context, indication and the presence of another word (315). These indications are useful whether one follows *ekaśabdadarśana* or *anekaśabdadarśana* (316). Having shown that individual words and their meanings are unreal and that only the sentence and its meaning are real, it is shown that the sentence is the source of the individual word. The relation between the meanings of words and that of the sentence is similar to the relation between the senses and the body (325). An incomplete sentence-meaning is no better

than word-meaning (325). If a single word (a noun) is pregnant with the idea of action, then, that also is a sentence devoid of a verb, because the understanding of action is seen to take place from a sentence only, So is a mere verb said to be a sentence if a definite means for the accomplishment of the action denoted by it is understood and its meaning thus becomes complete (326). It is a certain completeness of idea, separated and depending upon the words that are not used which through inference appears to be the cause of our understanding the meaning of the words not used. When we hear the bare noun *vṛkṣaḥ* 'tree' we understand a complete meaning such as: the tree stands or 'the tree is seen', It means that we supply the word *tiṣṭhati* or *dṛśyate* mentally to complete the sentence and the sentence-meaning. This is *śrutārthāpatti*. The point of the Mīmāṃsaka is that a single word cannot convey a complete meaning. We supply some word or other mentally to complete the sentence and the sentence-meaning. In other words the understanding of a complete meaning is separated from that of the incomplete meaning of the word actually used by the unused word coming to the mind. Whatever meaning is understood whenever a certain word is uttered, that meaning belongs to that word (and to that word only). There is no more correct definition of meaning than this. The point of the grammarian is that no part of the meaning should be attributed to any word supplied mentally. In other words, he does not admit *śrutārthāpatti*. His view is that the supplying of a non-existent word or words mentally is unnecessary. In the sentence *edhebhyo vrajati* the verb expresses an action meant for some other action, the word for which is not mentioned but is understood from *edhebhyaḥ* "for fuel", that is, for bringing fuel. The action of bringing is understood from the words 'for fuel'. That is why P. 2. 3. 14 has been declared to be unnecessary as the fourth case-ending in *edhebhyaḥ* can come by *tādarthye caturthī*. Similarly in *niṣkauśāmbiḥ niḥ* by itself can express the idea of *krantaḥ* (327-329).

If half a sentence can express the meaning of the full sentence and both are sentences, what is the use of ever using the full sentence? They are separate expressions and are like synonyms. The meaning of sentences consisting of single words

is determined by purpose and the context. *Vṛkṣaḥ* and *vṛkṣas tiṣṭhati* are both complete sentences and not that the former is the latter devoid of the word *tiṣṭhati*. Both convey a meaning, They are like the pair *vṛṣa* and *vṛṣabha* or *yāva* and *yāvaka* or *praparṇa* and prapatitaparṇa in which each of the two is complete and not that the former is an incomplete form of the latter. If only the sentence is real, the purpose of analysing it into words is to understand the integrated sentence. Even when no meaning is understood or when a wrong meaning is understood, words are still eternally connected with their meaning. The relation between word and meaning is eternal. That is not affected by the fact that the listener may not understand the meaning due to absent-mindedness or due to ignorance. When the word *dvāram* having the second case-ending is heard, then according to the context one understands either 'shut' (*badhāna*) or 'give way' (*dehi*). In other words, according to the context, one is entitled to supply mentally some word or other in order to complete the sentence. Otherwise one would not understand any meaning and the relation between the word and the meaning would be affected. Not to accept *śrutārthāpatti* would lead to a disadvantage. A word expressive of a finished thing (*sattva*) and standing for the means (*sādhana*) whereby an action is accomplished cannot also express the main meaning of a sentence, namely, action to be accomplished. The point sought to be made is that to avoid the disadvantage, the required word must be mentally supplied. In other words *śrutārthāpatti* must be resorted to, say the *Mīmāṁsakas*. But the upholder of indivisibility (that is, the Grammarian) points out that the word actually uttered cannot bring the word not uttered to the mind because its function is to convey its own meaning. Nor can its meaning bring the unuttered word to the mind because there is no relation between the two. Nor can the uttered word bring the meaning of the un-uttered word to the mind because there is no relation between a word and the meaning of another word. A fourth possibility is that the meaning of the uttered word brings the meaning of the un-uttered word to the mind but that would be a case of inference. The conclusion is that when a word, noun or verb is uttered, it brings to the mind without the

intervention of any other word but with the help of the context another meaning which is required to complete it. In this way the *Mīmaṁsaka* view is rejected (330-336). But the *Mīmāṁsaka* replies: In this way both action (*bhāva*) and the finished thing would acquire equal importance. But the grammarian himself believes that they cannot be equally important in the sentence (337-338). What he means is that the word *dvāram* is really a verb similar in form to a noun. The presence of the second case-ending in *dvāram* is only by analogy. In sentences like *bhāṇḍaṃ pidhehi*, *dvāraṃ pidhehi*, where both noun and verb are present, one sees that the verb denotes action primarily and the noun denotes substance and takes a case-ending. Where only the noun is used, but both action and substance are understood, the word takes a case-ending because it denotes substance also. If the word *dvāram* denotes more than one thing is not its expressive power thereby lost as there might be a doubt as to which meaning to take ? No, says the grammarian. Even though doubt arises on account of similarity of form, still its expressive power does not disappear as in the case of *arddham paśoḥ* where competence decides what the meaning is. Similarly where only the word *dvāram* is used context and appropriateness would help one to decide whether it should be taken as a noun or as a verb. If *śrutārthāpatti* is not accepted, the distinction between noun and verb and the four parts of speech recognised by Yāska would become invalid (341). This is not a valid objection because Vārttākṣa and Audumbarāyaṇa have declared on the basis of the eternality of the sentence in the mind and its connection in the world with its meaning that there are no four parts of speech. When the hearer grasps the indivisible sentence in his mind, he is not conscious of any parts in the form of individual words. Nor is he conscious of word-meanings when he grasps the sentence-meaning consisting of *pratibhā*. As the sentence is indivisible, the individual word does not exist and so the question of different parts of speech does not arise (342). For those who accept *śrutārthāpatti* the question does arise because they believe in divisions within the sentence and their being brought under four classes. If divisions are unreal, how is it that action and abstention from action based on them take place in the world ?

In the world, traditions of men are not always based on reality. Therefore, there is nothing beyond the sentence which is not a mere creation of the world. The point is that when we are trying to understand truth we cannot rely on the practice of the world. In the world, one sometimes reaches the real through the unreal. We can understand what kind of animal a cow is by looking at a picture of it. That does not mean that the picture of a cow is a real cow. Similarly we sometimes act on the basis of word-meanings but that does not mean that they are real. Even when the meaning of a sentence is made clear by means of indications found in other sentences that meaning is its own. It was not clearly noticed on account of identity of forms. The *śruti* says : *aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhāti*—he places sugar mixed with grease. It is not clear from this sentence whether the sugar is to be mixed with oil or clarified butter. But another *śruti* says: *tejo vai ghṛtam* = clarified butter is indeed lustre. That is a clue, an indication that sugar is to be mixed with clarified butter. The first *śruti* thus means—he places sugar mixed with clarified butter and this meaning belongs entirely to the first *śruti* in spite of the fact that the clue is found in the second śruti. Something is now being said about the relation of *bādhya* and *bādhaka* (what is set aside and what sets aside) between the original rules and their exceptions whatever is excluded implicitly, if not explicitly from the operation of the general rules, is explicitly mentioned in the special rules of exception and that is really part of the meaning of the general rule. A general rule does not really cover special cases though there is nothing in the rule itself to tell us so. But when the author of the general rule framed it, he knew about it. An example of the same from the world is now given. The injunction regarding the serving of curds to Brahmins operates by excluding *Māṭhara*. The word *Māṭhara* in the subsequent sentence *takram māṭharāya* because of connection with butter-milk, only confirms the correctness of the meaning of the previous sentence (*brahmaṇebhyo dadhi dīyatām*). What is pointed out here is that the sentence *takram māṭharāya* does not set aside the giving of curds to *Māṭhara* because that was never envisaged by the first sentence *brahmaṇebhyo dadhi dīyatām* which enjoins the giving of curds to Brahmins excluding Māṭhara. So there is no question of contradicting

something which was enjoined before. Serving of curds to Māṭhara was never enjoined. Thus what is called *bādha* of the first sentence by the second sentence is nothing more than the inferential understanding that curds were never meant to be served to *Māṭhara* (*aprāptyanumāna*). What was said in the previous verse was based upon looking on the two as two separate sentences. It is thus that *bādha* amounts to *aprāptyānumāna*. The second sentence becomes the cause of our inferring that the injunction in the first sentence was never meant to apply to Māṭhara. If the two sentences are treated as one, what would be the nature of *bādhya-bādhakabhāva* ? If they are looked upon as one sentence, the exclusion of the sphere of exception and the application of the original injunction to the rest would take place at the same time and so there would be no need for *aprāptyanumāna*.

Just as an exception is supplementary to the original injunction, in the same way, restrictions and prohibitions can be looked upon as supplementary original injunctions. That being so, restrictions and prohibitions are also supplementary to the original injunction. The 'aluk' which is taught in P. 6. 3. 1. has been declared to be supplementary to the 'luk' which is taught in P. 2. 4. 71. Exceptions, restrictions and prohibitions are looked upon as making one sentence with the original injunction on the basis of either *vākyaikavākyatā* or *padaikavākyatā*. The former is defined thus: *Upakāryaupakārakabhāvāpannabodhajanakatvam*. Without using these technical expressions, the *Vṛtti* explains the same ideas in its own word: *vidhikāla evotkṛṣṭasya punaḥśruter aprāptir anumīyate*. At the time of the original injunction itself, it is inferred that it would not apply to what would not come within its scope. Similarly when P. 2. 4. 71 teaches the elision of the case-endings of words which are to enter into a *samāsa*, it is understood that this elision does not take place when particular words become the second term in a compound. In other words, the original injunction and the later exception or restriction or prohibition are understood as one sentence and so understood together. *Yaśca supo dhātuprātipadikayor* (P. 2. 4. 71.) *iti dvitiyena lug anvākhyāyate tasya tasminnevādhivākye uttarapadaviśeṣam varjayitveti prathamameva vidhinā prakalpitaḥ śeṣo' numīyate*. Those who are against looking upon

them as one sentence argue that the sentences in question are complete in their meaning and so there is no relation of primary and secondary between them. The sentences in question are independent as they do not require one another when they convey their meaning. As they do not serve one another, how can they constitute one sentence? The *Vṛtti* points out that two separate sentences can make up one sentence only if there is some kind of dependence or mutual requirement between them. If each is self-sufficient, it is concerned with itself only. If they cannot render service to each other, there is no question of their making up one sentence. The upholder of the single sentence argues as follow :

As the original injunction requires the special injunction, the latter is taken to be supplementary to it. The special injunction also requires the other in the matter of determining what is excluded by it. Therefore mutual requirement is similar in each case.

What is pointed out here is that the original and special injunctions (*niyama*, *apavāda* or *pratiṣedha*) require each other in order to determine their own meaning. As their mutual requirement is equal, it is better to look upon them as constituting one sentence. Each requires the other in order to exclude the scope of the other from its own scope. While explaining verse 351, the *Vṛtti* takes a different kind of example altogether. It takes the *sūtra* P. 3.1.96, that is, *tavyattavyānīyaraḥ*=After a root can occur the suffixes *tavyat*, *tavya* and *anīyar*. It says that according to some the verb 'to occur' is one though it has three different agents. The verb being one, there is only one sentence here : *bhavater ekatvād ekavākyatvam.* According to others, the action denoted by the verb becomes different with each agent. With each agent, the action is self-sufficient, and so there are as many actions as there are agents and so as many sentences. Those who uphold the view that there is only one sentence say that each of the three suffixes is separately the agent of the verb *bhavati* while mutual requirement does exist. The agent-power (*kartr-śakti*) is one but it exists in three different suffixes : *ekavākyavādinastu manyante satyām apekṣāyām tavyadādayaḥ, pṛthak pṛthag bhavateḥ kartārovijñāyante. Bhinnādhārā vā tavyadādīnāmekaiva kartṛśaktir iti* (344-351). The question

whether individual words can also be analysed into parts is now discussed. There is no elision of the part of a name. A name with a particular sequence of phonemes has been given to something and that does not disappear. Devadatta is a name. Some people say only Deva or only Datta. That may happen in the world but the *Śāstra* does not teach the elision of either Deva or Datta. From Datta etc, a different name altogether that is, Devadatta cannot be understood. Nor can Datta bring to the mind the named, that is the individual Devadatta because he is the named of some other name. A part of a name can neither bring the full name to the mind nor bring the individual to the mind. When there is a relation between an object and a word another word cannot be expressive of that word, it cannot bring that word to the mind. All this has been said in answer to the suggestion that Datta first brings the name Devadatta to the mind and from the latter, the individual Devadatta is understood. The possibility of this process is denied. Others believe that the individual is connected not only with the full name but also with parts or abridgments of it. In other words, a part of the name can bring the individual to the mind as well as the full name can. Or rather, the whole and the parts bring the individual to the mind at the same time. At the time that a name is given, the individual is connected with the full name and parts of that name at the same time. Two defects are pointed out in this view. They are : (1) If a part of a name can denote the individual, why not each phoneme in it? (2) Whatever expressive power a part has exists only as long as it is part of the whole, not when it is separated from the whole. If the whole name together with its parts is expressive of the individual, then it is not possible for what looks like parts to be expressive of it. What is emphasised here is that what looks like a part is really not a part. It only looks like it. Parts which depend upon the whole cannot perform the same function apart from the whole. According to some from the part the whole is remembered. From the whole thus remembered, the meaning of the whole is understood. It is not merely a word that is actually uttered and heard which can convey a meaning. A word which is regularly inferred can also, like the word which is heard, convey a meaning. From

the parts, perceived apart from the whole, one does remember the whole, and the whole thus remembered does cause the cognition of the object named. But how can there be remembrance from the part of the whole which is different from it ? How can a word which is only understood and not heard be expressive of its meanings ? The whole is different from the part. So, on seeing the part one cannot remember the whole. Even if one does remember it cannot convey the meaning because the whole has not been uttered or heard. To believe that what has not been heard can convey a meaning would result in undesirable conclusions. What looks like a part can be a part of many wholes having different meanings. Which whole would one remember on seeing the part ?

When names are applied to objects words similar to their parts and endowed with their different characteristics arise later and are applied as names to the same object. When full names are given to objects, other names, similar in form to parts of the full names come into existence as by-products. The process is similar to the coming into existence of by-products when we try to obtain any main product. What is pointed out is that these words which arise later (*anuniṣpattiḥ*) are not really parts of the name but only look like them. According to the doctrine of indivisibility, they cannot be parts. These words which arise later and look like parts of names sometimes cannot invariably convey the individuals expressed by the names themselves. Deva which looks like a part of Devadatta can mean a god or a person whose name is Devadatta. The form is the same in both cases and so a doubt can arise. How the doubt is resolved is now stated. The form being common, their meaning is doubtful and their substratum (in the form of meaning) is determined through competence (*sāmarthya*). The *śāstra* teaches elision etc. in the case of those which are grammatically correct. Of the words which arise later, some like Deva and Datta are grammatically correct and the *śāstra* teaches elision (*lopa*) in their case. Others like *jye*, *drā*, *khā* are grammatically incorrect. It is in the case of the former that the meaning can be doubtful because of similarity of form. The doubt is resolved through context, taken in the widest possible meaning. The *śāstra* also says something about their deriva-

tion. But not about the derivation of *jye*, *drā*, *khā*, etc. which are rejected. Though there is similarity as far as arising later is concerned, *jye*, *drā*, *khā* are incorrect. Therefore, in the *śāstra* which explains derivation, they are not mentioned as Datta etc. The incorrect forms are *jye*, *drā* and *khā*, abbreviations of *jyeṣṭhā*, *ārdrā* and *viśākhā*, all names of stars. But these abbreviations are mere collections of phonemes and not words and therefore meaningless. Therefore the *śāstra* takes no notice of them. There were apparently some who believed that once the whole is taught as a name, its parts are also automatically taught as names. In other words, it is not necessary to derive the parts separately as names. A doubt as to the eternality of the relation between names and the named (individuals) is removed as follows :

Names like Kharanasa have ṇ instead of n eternally and as they denote a particular individual, they have been declared to be correct. The word kharanasa has this form when it is not a name but it becomes kharaṇasa when it is a name. They are really two different words. It is not that the word Kharanasa becomes Kharaṇasa when it is to be used as a name. So the question of the non-eternality of the relation between the name and the named does not arise at all. A doubt is raised here : If the word Kharaṇasa is formed before it was a name, then how did it get a form which depends upon its being a name ? If the word was Kharanasa when it was formed and it was changed to Kharaṇasa when it became a name, the eternality of the relation is affected. To resolve the doubt, it is stated that forms with n and forms with ṇ are both eternal. One is not a transformation of the other. Whether with n or with, they are both incorrect if used outside their scope: *ubhayeṣām ca viṣayaviparyaye sādhutvaṁ na vidyate.* (*Vṛtti* on II. 362).

What is meant here is that even though the word Kharaṇasa means one who has a sharp nose one does not look for a sharp nose in a person before giving him that name. It can be applied to anybody. The power to be a name exists in that word because of the ṇ in it. A word having a particular form is given as a name to an object irrespective of whether that object has any feature corresponding to the meaning of the name. The fact that names are given to objects by persons

according to their wish does not mean that the relation between the names and the named is not eternal. For the sake of worldly transactions some names are restricted to particular objects in particular places. But the relation in the case of a name like Ḍittha is as eternal as in the case of the name 'go'. Even though we see persons giving names to objects, it is not they who create the relation between these names and the objects. That relation, being eternal was already there. Persons only make use of it in particular places and times (364). Both in the world and in the śāstra, names are given mainly on the basis of their form. Sometimes a name is said to be *anvartha* when there is some circumstance in the object corresponding to the form of the name as when a person who is good at destroying his enemy is called *śatrughna*. But there is no need for it. For example the Ḍittha in the world and the names ṭi, ghu, bha etc. in the śāstra. Not only small names consisting of just one syllable but also big names are given in the *śāstra* on the basis of form only. But when there is some circumstance in the object, that is also inferred to be the basis of the name. When the form only is the basis of the name the meaning of its parts is not considered to be the basis. But when there is some circumstance in the object and it is expressed by the parts of the name, then the meaning of the parts also become the basis of the name. In the case of the long names found in the *śāstra*, three possibilities are envisaged : (1) it should be taken twice, once as a whole having a particular form and again as a whole made up of parts through the meaning of which it denotes the object, (2) it should be taken as two separate words, (3) it should be taken as one name having two distinct powers. Both the *Vṛtti* and *Puṇyarāja* speak about these three possibilities, the former in a somewhat obscure language and the latter a little more clearly (366-368). Sometimes a technical name is applied differently in different contexts. In the case of the name Saṃkhyā, both the technical and the non-technical meanings may be applied in the same context. In P. 1. 3. 14 the word *karma* has a non-technical meaning, namely, action but in P. 3. 2. 1., it has its technical meaning, namely, *karmakāraka* = the object of an action. In P. 5. 1.22 the word *saṃkhyā* has to be understood in both its

technical and non-technical meanings. Sometimes, a worldly name, when used, covers the field of the technical name also as the word *saṃbuddhi* in P. 1. 2. 33 where it should be taken both in the technical and non-technical senses. *Saṃbuddhi* in the world, means calling or addressing somebody. Technically, it is the vocative singular by P. 2. 3. 49. In P. 1. 2. 33, both the meanings apply according to this verse (369-370).

One point about a sentence which is discussed is whether the action conveyed by a sentence is carried out individually or by the group. Some declare that when expressions relating to the class are used or when there is retention of one (*ekaśeṣa*) or when the *dvandva* compound is used, the actions are related to each one of the agents because of the nature of the word itself. The action of eating having a particular form and a particular result rests in each person separately. Otherwise the meaning of the root *bhuj* would not be carried out. The action of eating, is not like the action of dramatic representation (*nāṭya*) which is a name applied to the different actions of many taking place at the same time. The name 'eating' is applied to a particular action of a person resulting in his satisfaction (*tṛpti*). If its part and its result are found in different individuals, it would not be called 'eating' at all. Names are also applied individually or collectively. For example, the names *samāsa* and *abhyastam* are applied collectively.

An action like eating can cover many agents only if each agent performs that action separately. But the action of seeing can cover many objects at the same time provided they are situated in the right place. Of course, each object can be seen separately also but the point here is that they can be seen at the same time also.

The question now arises as to whether the name 'cooking' is applied to one particular act or to a series of acts understood as a whole. Two views are mentioned about the action of cooking. One view is that it stands for the softening of the material to be cooked, that is, for *viklitti*. Another view is that it stands for all the activities taken together of the different accessories which play a part in the cooking, such as the cook, the fuel, the pot and so on (376).

In the *śāstra* also, sometimes the sentence-meaning is applied to each case separately. For instance, *Vṛddhi* is applied to *ā*, *ai* and *au* separately (377). Sometimes, in the world, the meaning of the sentence is applied to the group as a whole. For example, the order *Gargāḥ śataṁ daṇḍyantām*="let the Gargas be fined a hundred", is carried out by all of them being collectively fined hundred and not each one fined a hundred separately. Because the total fine to be realised is hundred and that is the main point in the order. If each one is fined a hundred the total would exceed a hundred and the order would be violated (378). In the *śāstra* also, sometimes, the meaning of the sentence is applied to the whole. As, in order to teach some grammatical operation, it is the name of the whole that is taught, the names *samāsa* and *abhyasta* are connected with the whole by *tantra*. *Tantra* means the power of a word, uttered only once to convey more than one meaning. The *sūtras saha supā* (P. 2. 1.4) and *ubhe abhyastam* (P. 6. 1. 5.) teach the names *samāsa* and *abhyasta* respectively. The words *saha* and *ubhe* show that the names are to be applied to all the items together (379). When a word standing for a certain property denotes many things in relation to a certain action, it does so severally and collectively. According to the order "Śūdras should not enter this home," their entrance is prohibited severally and collectively (380-381). When a collective prohibition in regard to earning and the like is expressed, merely because the prohibition is not stated severally, its application severally is not contradictory. What is pointed out is that the use of the singular or the plural number in prohibitory orders is accidental. In either case, it can apply severally or collectively. When the prohibition is collective, it is the collection or the group which is the object of the prohibition. As to the individuals, it is left to them to do what they like (382). An illustration from the *śāstra* is now given. In P. 8. 4. 2 *aṭ*, *ku*, *pu*, *aṅ* and *num* are causes of separation (*vyavāya*) whether they do so severally or collectively, they do not prevent the change of n to ṇ. P. 8. 4.2 does not say in so many words that *aṭ* etc. do not prevent the change of n into ṇ when they come between the *nimitta* and the *nimitti* individually or collectively. The fact is that either way, they do not prevent the change (383). Something is now added

to what has already been said about the action of eating. Whether it is one or many is now considered. When the action of feeding is done for favouring those who eat, then, if there is no difference in time, place etc. it does not favour them. It is not by feeding them irrespective of time and place that one favours them. One favours them either way by observing difference of time and place and by not observing it. If the feeding is for favouring the eaters, one has to act in such a manner that they are favoured by not observing difference or by observing difference accordiag to what is needed. The action of eating which is one has been declared to be many because of difference in vessels. etc. Or the action of eating which is really varied (because of difference in the satisfaction of the eaters is thought of as one (because of identity of time, place etc.) Thus there is difference of opinion in this matter. The final position is that the eaters mentioned separately and acting together eat their food served separately, but together (that is, at the same time). What has been said earlier about the payment of fine by the Gargas is now explained. The fine of hundred is to be applied to the group (of Gargas) because (1) there has been no separate mention of the persons to be fined, (2) otherwise the amount mentioned would conflict with the other amount, that is the amount actually realised, (3) the meaning of the sentence cannot be applied in a two-fold manner. If each *Gārgya* is fined a hundred the amount realised would far exceed hundred which is the amount mentioned in the order. Lastly, the order cannot be applied in two ways, individually as well as collectively. By 'two ways' Puṇyarāja understands that the verb cannot be connected with the main object (hundred) as well as the secondary object (the Gargas). The conclusions is stated by the *Vṛtti* which otherwise, is none too clear, as follows—*Tasmāt saṅghāta evaikam śatamavatiṣṭhate* A hundred has to be realised from the group (of Gargas) (387).

Sometimes, however, the meaning of the sentence is connected both individually and collectively. Sentences like the following are here kept in mind : *Devadatta—Yajñadatta—Viṣṇumitraiḥ saha bhoktavyam = Devadatta, yajñadatta* and *viṣṇumitra* must eat together. Here the action is ordered through the

dvandva compound. In, *brāhmaṇaiḥ saha bhoktavyam*—the Brahmins must eat together, it is done through *ekaśeṣa*. Here the root *bhuj* in *bhoktavyam* conveys the action of eating in a general manner. The word *bhoktavyam* must be repeated for fully understanding the meaning of the sentence (388). Some point out that major sentences apply individually and collectively. Therefore, they include minor sentences different from one another. The *Vṛtti* points out that the *dvandva* sentence ordering the action of eating quoted above should be split up into several sentences : *Devadatto bhojyatām, Yajñadatto hhojyatām, Viṣṇumitro bhojyatām,* this does not mean that the major sentence is expressive of the meanings of the minor sentences. The minor sentences do not become the expressed meanings of the major sentence but when the latter is uttered, one understands the other meanings of the minor sentences. The major sentence does not bring about minor sentences through the relation of *abhidhānā-bhidheya-bhāva* the relation of the word and its expressed meaning. The minor sentences which are, after all, words cannot be the expressed meanings of the major sentence. *Na tasya vākyasya śabdapadārthakatvam śakyamabhyupagantum.* All that is meant is that when the major sentence is uttered, the minor sentences, though not uttered and heard, come to the mind in regard to each of the eaters and thus the meaning of the major sentence is applied to each eater. *Tasmāt pratyekaṃ vākyāntaraprādurbhāvaḥ pratyekaṃ vākyasamāptir abhipretā.*

According to those who believe that the whole of the sentence-meaning is contained in that of the individual word, of what use then is the existence of the meaning of the remaining individual words ? If the whole of the sentence-meaning is contained in the meaning of any individual word in the sentence, of what use is the meaning of the remaining individual words ? *teṣām evambhūte, pratipadam avasthite'rthe kimavaśiṣṭenāpareṇa padārthena vikalpitena* as the *Vṛtti* puts it. The upholder of the indivisible sentence criticizes both the possibilities in the opposite view. If the sentence-meaning, produced by the meanings of the individual words exists in each one of them, it is either opposed to it or it co-exists with it. If the particularised and the non-particularised co-exist, there would be

opposition between the two. If the meaning of the individual word is abandoned, then the relation becomes impermanent. What is meant here is this. The individual words ultimately convey the sentence-meaning after having first conveyed their own meaning. If, once the sentence-meaning is understood, they abandon their own meaning, then the relation between the word and the meaning becomes temporary which is against the opponent's own belief. Therefore, according to this view, there cannot be real individual words and their meanings. The meaning of the individual words is of a general nature and it can become particularised only when its general nature ceases to be : *sāmānyarūpanivṛttyaiva hi viśeṣa ātmānaṃ labhate*. But if the general meaning which is first conveyed is abandoned then the relation between the word and the meaning cannot be considered to be eternal and that would go against the accepted view of both sides. *Atha tu pūrvam upāttārtham parityajati nityatvaṃ sambandhasya hīyate*. If the sentence attains completion in the collection is the sentence-meaning the meaning of the collection of words or is it the meaning of the individual words also ?

The one sentence-meaning is the common expressed meaning and it is related to each individual word. It is related to the collection and to each unit in the collection and it is understood when all the words are there. The *Vṛtti* brings here the analogy of the relation called *saṃyoga* = contact. When two things are united by the relation called contact, does this relation exist in each of the two objects or in both of them together. Some think that is exists in both ways. *Kecin manyante yathā saṃyogasaṃjñā dvayor dvayoḥ samudāye cā vatiṣṭhate tathā pratyekaṃ dvayoḥ samuditeṣu ca sa evaiko rthātmā vyavasthita eva*. In this connection the *Vṛtti* reminds us of the *dvandva* compound, when two words together form a *dvandva* compound, they stand for the group and that group is expressed by each one of them. Each word in the compound expressed the group in which the parts are also manifested. Each word conveys at the same time all the things meant to be conveyed by the *dvandva* compound as a whole. This principle is called : *yugapadadhikaraṇatā* (See Bhartṛhari p. 371 ff).

Saṃyoga and *dvandva* were brought in for the sake of

analogy. The point that has been sought to be made here is that both the sentence as a whole and the individual words become meaningful with the meaning of the sentence (390-394).

An illustration is now given.

Just as all have the feeling of ownership towards common property and enjoy the fruit of charity given out of the common property and all feel the same amount of joy, in the same way the meaning is related to its words (the individual words and their collection).

The following is an illustration from the *śāstra.*

Even if the phonemes are expressive of meaning and the stem having the phonemes also has the same meaning, the case ending expressive of the singular number comes after the stem which is a collection and not after each phoneme (see M. Bhā. I, p. 220, I.10-24). The particular sentence in the M. Bhā referred to here is *saṅghātasyaikārthyāt subabhāvo varṇāt*-As it is the whole group of phonemes which is expressive of meaning, the case-ending is not added to each phoneme (395-396). The same idea is explained by an illustration. Just as everybody sees common property by means of the same lamp, in the same way, by means of one case-ending, the number is understood. One case-ending added to the stem as a whole, expresses the singular number and there is no need for another case-ending. The *Vṛtti* says :—*Tatraikena supā prakāśitam ekatvaṁ sarvasambandhigate tasminnarthātmani pratīyamānaṃ na subantareṇābhidhīyate.* As far as meaningfulness is concerned, there is no difference between the individual word, the phoneme and the sentence. This procedure based on practice (tradition) is different and appears to contradict the accepted doctrine. It was stated in verse 396 that the case-ending added at the end of the stem indicates the meaningfulness, not only of the stem but also of the phonemes and of the individual words, if any, included in the stem. This seems to go against the accepted doctrine of the Grammarians that only the indivisible is real and expressive of meaning. Really speaking, there is no contradiction. It has already been said that the meaningfulness of the individual word is accepted for the sake of convenience. But as this question of convenience comes up on so many occasions, it appears to be taken seriously, but it is not so. It is accepted only for the sake of convenience.

Convenience includes also accommodation to other *śāstras* because *vyākaraṇa* is *sarvapārṣada*—common to all schools of thought, as so often repeated by commentators like *Helarāja* and *Puṇyarāja* (398). The function of the word in conveying its meaning is now considered. It is only when a word is applied by the speaker that it conveys a meaning (399-400). There is talk here about *viniyoga*, *ukti*, *abhisandhāna* and *abhidhā*. The power of a word to convey its meaning is called *abhidhā*. Some consider this *abhidhā* to be different from *pratibhā*, others not. *Pratibhā* when conveyed by the words *ukti* and *viniyoga* is a *vāgdharma*, a property of words. When conveyed by the words—*anusandhāna* and *abhisandhāna* it is a *manodharma*. When conveyed by the word *praṇidhāna*, it is a property of the vision. Here the word *pratibhā* is used in a sense different from its usual one. It only amounts to the conscious use of a polysemic word in one of its meanings. In other words it becomes a synonym of *ukti* and *viniyoga*. What is conveyed in this verse is that when a polysemic word conveys a particular meaning in a particular context, it is due to the deliberate application of that word in that meaning by the speaker. This is called *viniyoga* or *ukti*. Two new words *ukti* and *viniyoga* have been used in this context and they seem to have the same meaning : the use by the speaker of a word deliberately in a particular meaning. Puṇyarāja understands them in this way and for him *ukti* or *viniyoga* is necessary in the case of words having more than one meaning. *Iha eka eva śabdo bahvarthaḥ*, he says at the beginning of his all too brief remark. The *Vṛtti* also says the same thing. What the *Vṛtti* says on this topic amounts to this : When a word has more than one meaning, the speaker chooses one of them and decides that it should be expressed by that word : *anenāyaṃ vaktavyaḥ*. The word in the mind is applied to the meaning which is also in the mind. *buddhisthaśabdo buddhisthe yatra viniyujyate*. Then the capacity of the word to convey that meaning is brought out fully : *tatrāsya sāmarthyam avacchidyate*. The fact that conscious and deliberate application of a word to a meaning is necessary does not make the relation between the two man-made. It is eternal.

The power of the eye to see the object is natural and eternal but it does so only when it is consciously directed to

an object. Similarly, the power of the word to convey its meaning is natural, but it has to be deliberately applied to it, especially when it is a polysemic word Puṇyarāja uses the words *abhisandhāna, pratibhā* and *pracāra* in his commentary on verse 400. The word has the power called *abhidhā*, but unless the speaker has the desire to apply a word to a particular meaning, the *abhhidā* of the word will not function. So some identify the *abhisandhāna*, the deliberate application by the *speaker* with the *abhidhā* of the word. The *abhisandhāna* of the speaker is nothing more than *pratibhā* which becomes *praṇidhāna* when we direct our eye to aparticular object.

The analogy of the word to the eye is already given in the verse itself. While explaining it, the *Vṛtti* concludes : In the same way, a word, even though capable of conveying many meanings, whatever meaning it is directed at by the speaker, it embraces it, it becomes one with it and it illuminates it (399-400).

Something is said in this connection to explain the use of new words like *viniyoga*, *ukti*, *abhisandhāna* and *abhidhā*. One sees that the relation between the object and the instrument is through action. Similarly, the relation of expression and expressed between the word and the meaning is through the function called *abhidhā*. It is the function called *abhidhā* which is called *ukti*, *viniyoga* and *abhisandhāna*. The words may be new but they denote a well-known function. The *Vṛtti* makes the following points. The accessories of an action, like the steps of a ladder, are not directly connected with one another. But they are directly connected with the action and through the action indirectly connected with one another. In the process of the word conveying the meaning, the word is the *karaṇa*, the meaning conveyed is the *karma*. There can be neither *karaṇa* nor *karma* except in regard to an action or a process. It is the action or the process which brings about the result and not anything else : *Phalavatī ca kriyaiva, nānyasyārthasya phalavattā*. The process can be compared to that of unhusking grain in which the mortar and the pestle are the *adhikaraṇa* and *karaṇa* respectively and the grain is the *karma*. Raising and lowering the pestle is the action which produces the result, namely, the unhusking : *udyamana—nipātanarūpo'*

vahantiḥ. Some scholars who believe in the sameness of the word in all its meanings declare that at the time of the practice of learning the words of the Veda they are without a meaning, that they stand then for their form only when they are taught to others but that at the time of the performance of a sacrifice, they are expressive of different meanings because of difference in the expressive power based on difference of intention. The same Vedic passage is put to different uses and therefore functions differently. As the *Vṛtti* puts it (verse 404). *Ekaśabdatve hi nimittabhedād ekasyaiva tathā tathā vyavasthā manyante*. All this has been said according to the view that a word having many meanings is the same word. What particular meaning it conveys in a particular context depends upon *abhisandhāna, pratibhā*. the intention of the speaker and not the context itself. According to the view, that is, that there are as many words as there are meanings. The word *akṣa* for instance can mean a kind of fruit or playing dice or the axle of a cart and so on but it is a different word in each case. In such cases, there is no intention beyond utterance. As the power of the word is restricted to a particular meaning, it is attached to it. In the other view the intention of the speaker was given as the factor which makes a polysemic word convey a particular meaning in a particular context. In the present view, that factor is eliminated. As the form of the word resembles that of others having other meanings, only the context can tell us which meaning is to be understood. The *Vṛtti* holds that undue importance should not be given to the speaker's intention, because, sometimes meaning is understood from words uttered by children who do not know the many meanings of a word and who cannot, therefore, have the intention of conveying one of them. In this view, there is no such thing as one word having many meanings, what looks like the same word is really a different word. So each word has one meaning only which is invariably linked to it : *Yasya śabdasya yo viṣayaḥ sa tatrāvyabhicāreṇa vyavasthita eva*. As the word may look like another because of the sameness of the sequence of phonemes, the help of the context may be needed to get at the meaning invariably linked with it. The very fact that one has to have recourse to the context to determine the

meaning shows that it is a different word. The relation between the word and the meaning being eternal and not man-made a meaning once conveyed by its word cannot be abandoned nor can a meaning not conveyed by it be ascribed to it : *Na tu kadācid upāttasya svaśabdena punastyāgo' sti, anupāttasya vo-pādānam. Apauruṣeyo hyautpattikaḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ.* If context can determine the meaning of a word and if such a word is different from another having the same sequence of phonemes, the established doctrine of the indivisibility of the sentence and the sentence-meaning seems to be affected. But that doctrine stands. These considerations apply to a sentence consisting of a single word with the word *asti* mentally supplied and not to an individual word which is part of a sentence and which has been obtained by analysis. Just as the Mīmāṁsakas declare that the meaningless phonemes manifest the expressive word, in the same way, the meaningless individual words manifest the sentence having a particular meaning (405-409). We do seem to understand word-meanings before the sentence-meaning is understood. But that is only a means to the understanding of the sentence-meaning. As illustrations of the process of understanding something in the middle, the *Vṛtti* takes the words *bhavati* and brāhmaṇakambala. In the first case, before we understand the meaning of the full word we may understand something from *bhava* but that is not real. In the second word, we may understand something from *brāhmaṇa*, but in the meaning of the full word, it has no reality (410). The indivisible sentence and the sentence-meaning are not understood in the beginning. They are understood only through these errors Thus three points have been made: (1) a single noun can be a sentence if the verb 'to exist' is mentally supplied, (2) the *sphoṭa* is the sentence manifested by the meaningless words, (3) as the sentence and the sentence-meaning are not understood in the beginning, words and word-meanings are understood in the middle as a means to an end (410). So much for the sentence. Now for the sentence meaning. In *anvitābhidhāna*, the sentence-meaning is a well-connected one, understood at the very beginning, clarified and specified by each subsequent word. Another view is that action, fully specified as to its accessories and different from other actions, is the sentence-meaning. Or,

according to the grammarians, it is an indivisible entity in the nature of an Intuition. In *anvitābhidhāna*, the mention of the accessories in the sentence is for the sake of specifying the substrata of the powers called accessories (413). Action with specific accessories and different from other actions is understood from the very beginning (414). This is also *anvitābhidhāna*. The grammarians view is that from words which have a sequence the indivisible sentence and the sentence-meaning are understood (415). Individual words are like the senses which can perform their function only while in the body. words can convey their meanings only when they are part of the sentence (415-420). The sentence is like consciousness. Both appear as coloured by unreal things (422). Words and word meanings are unreal because they are unfit for communication. Only the sentence is fit for communication (423). No meaning is fit for communication unless it involves an action. Action and accessory require each other and until both are there, the requirement is not fulfilled (426). From the sentence the action is analysed first because it is the main thing. The accessories are employed for the sake of the action The result arrived at sets the action in motion (427). There is no fixity about action, acccessories and their relation. It depends upon the speaker's wish (430). According to that, the distant may be presented as the proximate, the united as separated, the separated as united, the one as many and the many as one. It is because an object has all powers or it has no essence at all that the speaker can make the word present the object as he likes (431-433). The word does not touch the essence of an object. It is only its adventitious mark which makes it known from a distance. Words never present an object in its true nature. What the word presents has no fixity (435-436). The sentence meaning, being always new is real (437). It cannot be determined as distinct from word meaning of which it is the soul because it makes them fit for worldly usage (437-438). Division is the means of knowing the indivisible (439). The sentence meaning is purely mental (441). When there are many verbs requiring one another, do they form one sentence ? (442). There is incompleteness only when there is verbal incompleteness (445). Two sentences may have the same meaning, but

the emphasis may be different (447). The same verb may denote an action having infinite varieties due to difference in mode of performance (448). A verb denotes action in general and not all its varieties (450). A Vedic example of the principle that even though the verb is the same and even though it is not repeated, through the very nature of things, a difference in action is understood (451). Though the verb is mentioned only once, the action denoted by it applies separately to each object concerned (452-453). This happens in the *śāstra* only as in *kartari kṛt*, P. 3. 4. 67 *harater dṛtināthayoḥ paśau*, P. 3. 2. 25 (454). If the general is connected with one special rule only it would be exhausted and it would not then be connected with the other special rules (455, 456).

Can action be looked upon as a universal and as a particular ? Where the accessories are mentioned in prohibitions and optional instructions, in accumulations, in expressions of excellence and praise, it is the individual aspect that counts. Where the accessories or time and place are not mentioned, it is the universal aspect that counts (457). Where actions differ from one another in their *jāti* etc. and are conveyed by different words and the accessories are also of the same number and are conveyed by the same word once uttered, the former are separately connected with the latter (454) as in *akṣāḥ bhajyantām, bhujyantāṃ, dīvyantām*. There are two ways of presenting things through words : sequence and simultaneity. Even when there is simultaneity, action follows sequence. They are two powers of words. Each word *akṣa*,, standing for one thing only, can be used in the singular or plural number. Normally one would use a separate word for every idea or object which one wants to express : *pratyarthaṃ śabdaniveśaḥ* which usually means : *artham arthaṁ prati = pratyartham*. But it can also mean : *arthāv arthau prati = pratyartham* or *arthān arthān prati = pratyartham*. In the last two cases, *pratyarthaṃ śabdaniveśaḥ* would mean : The same word can express more than one word or object. Those who hold this view are *abhedavādinaḥ* = those who hold that the word is the same even when it denotes many things. In other words, *abhedavādinaḥ* believe in *śaktitantra* and not in *śabdatantra*. The other view is that *akṣa* stands for separate words, all having the same form. This is the *śabdatantra* view.

Another way of putting the view of the *abhedavādin* is : Sometimes both the powers of the word are utilised, at the same time, just as fire is sometimes used for its light and for its heat. Even if, one of the condensed sentences is meant by the speaker, the other, being of the same form, comes to the mind. Without any intention on the part of the speaker, the other comes to the mind as a power. The same thing happens in the *śāstra*. The *sūtra* teaching *saṃprasāraṇa* through two indications, can be understood separately, as presenting either the phoneme or the sentence meaning as the named (474).

When due to decline in the intellectual powers of grammarians and due to taste for brevity and little effort, the study of the great *Saṅgraha* of Vyāḍi came to an end, the great Master Patañjali incorporated all its ideas in his *Mahābhāṣya* which was at once deep and lucid but the immature could not fully grasp it. People like Baiji, Śaubhava and Haryakṣa, mere logic-choppers played havoc with the work which was really an epitome of the great *Saṅgraha*. In this way, the great Grammatical tradition was lost by the disciples of Patañjali and only its mere text survived among Southern Scholars. Candrācārya and others, searching for the ideas of the Mahābhāṣya at last got the tradition from the Triliṅga country, near the Trikūṭa mountain. After studying those ideas and after doing his own thinking, Bhartṛhari's teacher (that is, Vasurāta, according to Puṇyarāja) composed this collection of traditions. Here, in this work, some mere samples of them have been given. They will be considered in detail in the third *kāṇḍa*. The Intelligence acquires wisdom by the study of the traditions. If one follows one's own reasoning only, how much can one really understand ? The learning of those who flit from one idea to another without knowing the old traditions and without sitting at the feet of the traditional scholars, cannot come to a happy ending (476-485).

CHAPTER II

In the previous chapter, the nature and purpose of the Word were briefly stated. It was stated, in a general way, that the Word is expressive of the meaning. There is difference of opinion as to whether it is the individual Word or the Sentence which is expressive. The purpose of this chapter is to expound in detail the nature of the expressive sentence.

1-2. In regard to the Sentence, opinion is widely divided among thinkers inasmuch as they declare it to be (1) the Verb, (2) the collection of words, (3) the Universal inhering in the collection of words, (4) the One indivisible Word, (5) the Sequence (of the words), (6) the Unification in the mind, (7) the first Word, (8) each Word requiring the others.

[These are the eight alternative ways of looking at the Sentence current among thinkers :—The Universal inhering in the collection of words, the One indivisible Word, the Unification in the mind, these three definitions of the Sentence come within the view that the Sentence is indivisible (*akhaṇḍa-pakṣa*). The Verb, the Sequence of the words, the collection of words, the first Word and each Word requiring the others—these five definitions come under the view that the Sentence has divisions (*sakhaṇḍapakṣa*). That the sentence is the collection of words or that it is their Sequence, these two views are held by those who accept *abhihitānvayavāda*= the view that the sentence-meaning is the inter-connection of the meanings conveyed by the individual words. That it is the Verb or the first Word or each Word requiring the others, these three views are held by those who follow *anvitābhidhāna*= the view that the word conveys a meaning already potentially connected with those of the others. These two theories result from interpreting the statement *padaprakṛtiḥ saṃhitā* (*Ṛk-prātiśākhya* II,1.) as a *tatpuruṣa* or as a *bahuvrīhi*. That the Verb is the Sentence is explained much later, in verse 326. The eight verses from

41 onwards explain that the collection of individual words constitutes the Sentence. Verses 7-14 and 19-27 explain that the indivisible Sentence is the *sphoṭa*. *Sphoṭa* is of two kinds: External and Internal. The former is either the Universal or the Particular. Five verses from 49 onwards expound the view that the Sequence of the words is the Sentence. Verses 47 and 48 elucidate the view that the first Word or each Word requiring the others is the Sentence. The Mīmāṃsaka definition of the Sentence would come under the *saṅghāta* (collection) view. Definition of the sentence naturally leads to statements on the nature of the sentence-meaning. If the verb constitutes the Sentence, then the sentence-meaning is in the nature of Action. If the collection of words or their Sequence constitutes the Sentence, then its meaning is the interconnection of the meanings of the individual words. If the first Word or each Word requiring the others is the Sentence, then the connected meanings make up the sentence-meaning. According to some, the sentence-meaning is in the nature of purpose (*prayojanam*). *Vidhi*, *niyoga* and *bhāvanā*, mentioned by others, are not different from Action (*Kriyā*) and so they are not given separately here. The Buddhist view of the Sentence is very near to Unification in the mind (*buddhyanusaṃhṛtiḥ*) and their view of the Sentence-meaning is very near to that accepted in this work, namely, that it is in the nature of Intuition (*pratibhā*). The *Nyāya* view of the Sentence and Sentence-meaning would amount to *saṃghāta* and *saṃsarga* respectively.]

The author now discusses whether the definition given by the author of the *Vārttikas* and by the *Mīmāṃsakas* would agree with the above definitions or whether they have a different scope altogether.

3. With the definition of a sentence given in this *śāstra* for regulating loss of acute accent etc. the (*Mīmāṃsaka*) definition does not fully tally.

[Kātyāyana gives the following two definitions of a sentence: *ākhyātaṃ sāvyayakārakaviśeṣaṇaṃ vākyam* and *ekatiṅ vākyam* (vā 9, 10. M.Bhā.I, p. 367, l. 10,16). The Mīmāṃsaka definition is contained in *Mī.Sū.* II.1.42 :—*arthaikatvād ekaṃ vākyaṃ sākāṅkṣaṃ ced vibhāge syāt.* It is referred to in verse 40. In *ayaṃ daṇḍo harānena*, there is syntactical connection (*sāmarthya*).

Therefore there should be loss of acute accent (*nighāta*) in *hara* by P. 8.2.28 but that is not desired because, according to the definition of Kātyāyana given above, there are here two sentences and *nighāta* takes place only if both the words, the *nimitta* and the *nimittī* are in the same sentence. In *nadyās tiṣṭhati kūle, śālīnāṃ ta odanaṃ dāsyāmi,* there is no syntactical connection between the first two words and yet *nighāta* in the first case and substitution of *te* for *tava* in the second case take place, because the two words are in the same sentence. To decide whether the two words are in the same sentence, one should know what a sentence is and Kātyāyana tells us what it is in the *vārttika* quoted above. If we follow the *Mī.* definition of a sentence, there would be *nighāta* in *hara* in the sentence quoted above and that is not desired. So here the two definitions do not tally. In *nadyās tiṣṭhati kule,* they do.]

The *Mīmāṃsaka* definition is now referred to.

4. A sentence is a collection of words which in isolation require one another for particularisation, which, as a whole, do not require an outside word, in which the verb is the predominant word, which has qualifying words and which serve one purpose.

[In this definition, the verb is said to be the most important word, but not the only word. That is why the sentence is said to be *guṇavat*. The verb is also essential. Otherwise, *nīlo ghaṭaḥ* would also be a sentence. Unless the words require one another, they would not form a sentence. All this is an elaboration of the idea contained in *Mī.Sū.*II.1.42.]

5. The word in the vocative case in the sentence *vrajāni devadatta*! (=let me go, Devadatta!) is a qualifying word. That being so, loss of acute accent results.

[In Kātyāyana's definition of the Sentence there is the word *viśeṣaṇa* which includes *kriyāviśeṣaṇa* also. So in *vrajāni devadatta*!, the word *devadatta* ! which is in the vocative case is a kind of *viśeṣaṇa* of the verb *vrajāni*. So it is in the same sentence and the suppression of the accent takes place according to the rules.]

6. Just as many words ending in the suffix *ktvā* can qualify (that is, can be subordinate) to a verb, in the same way, they declare, a verb can qualify another verb.

[In Kātyāyana's definition of the sentence, the word *ākhyātam* is in the singular number. That means that there can be only one verb in a sentence. There can be more than one verb if one of them is the main one and the others subordinate to it. Just as many words ending in the suffix *ktvā* can be subordinate to one verb and be in the same sentence, in the same way, more than one verb can be subordinate to the main verb which follows them in the same sentence. That being so, there would be *nighāta* in the verb *vrajati* in the sentence: *pūrvaṃ snāti pacati tato vrajati tataḥ*, because that is the main verb. The *sūtra* : *tiṅatiṅaḥ* (P. 8.2.28.) also implies that there can be more than one verb in the same sentence. More than one verb can result in more than one sentence if they are independent of one another. Thus Kātyāyana's definition is not too narrow.]

7. Just as the one entity, comprising the cognition of all objects is differentiated on the basis of distinction in what is cognised, so is the cognition of the sentence-meaning.

[Bhartṛhari really wants to set forth the following view: The sentence is the *sphoṭa*, either external or internal. It is external when it is clearly uttered. Till then, it is internal. In any case, it is indivisible. It has two aspects : the sound aspect and the meaning aspect which are identified with one another. It is essentially in the nature of knowledge or consciousness because it illuminates an object. Because of articulation, it assumes the form of sound. Though indivisible, it appears to have divisions just as our complex cognition, though one, appears to have inner differentiation because of the objects in it. The picture is one but we seem to see different colours within it. That is what happens with the sentence and the sentence-meaning. Both are indivisible like the flavour of a cold drink, or the juice in a pea-hen's egg, or the form of a picture, the *narasiṃha*, the *gavaya* and our perception

of a picture. The indivisible sentence is the *sphoṭa* and the indivisible sentence-meaning is *pratibhā*. But both appear to have divisions.]

8. Just as the One picture is explained through its different colours like blue which belong to its parts,

9. in the same way, the One sentence, entirely self-sufficient and complete, is explained through individual words which require one another.

[A colour-pattern is one but it is explained in terms of the different colours which figure in it. In the same way, the sentence is one and self-sufficient but it is explained in terms of individual words which appear to figure in other sentences and which require one another.]

10. Just as a word is analysed into stem, suffix etc. in the same way, the analysis of a sentence into individual words is also described.

[In the *vārttika* : *na vā padasyārthe prayogāt* (Vā.19 on P. 1.2.64.) it is stated that it is the word as a whole which conveys the meaning and that its division into stem, suffix etc. is artificial. In the same way, the division of a sentence into individual words is artificial. The words have no real existence.]

11. Just as one sees in phonemes parts resembling other phonemes, in the same way, one sees (in a sentence) parts which resemble other words.

[Just as the abstracted parts of diphthongs like *ai*, *au* seem to resemble independent phonemes like *a*, *ā*, *i*, *u* etc., in the same way, the abstracted parts of a sentence seem to resemble independent words. But that is not true because these parts have no real existence.]

12. The words *Vṛṣabha*, *Udaka* and *Yāvaka* have meaningless parts. Analysis through the method of agreement and difference is the basis of worldly usage.

[Everywhere the parts which we artificially make in a word are meaningless. If we make these parts and attribute meanings to them, it is only in an artificial sense. Words like *Vṛṣabha, Udaka, Yāvaka* contain meaningless parts in the form of *Ṛṣabha, Uda* and *Yāva* respectively. Similarly, words like *pacati, pācaka* have meaningless parts in the form of stem, suffix etc. But the splitting of a word into stem and suffix and attributing meanings to them atleast serve the purpose of teaching the formation of words to the ignorant. But the artificial parts *Ṛṣabha, Uda* and *Yāva* in *Vṛṣabha, Udaka* and *Yāvaka* do not serve any such purpose.]

13. The word has no division, how can the meaning have any? But the ignorant person sees division through artificial splitting.

[The available *Vṛtti* on the IInd *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya* begins from this verse and goes on till the end, with many gaps big and small, in the middle. On this verse, what it says can be summarised as follows—The sentence, the *Vākyasphoṭa*, is indivisible. Its meaning, namely, *pratibhā*, is equally indivisible. This has been stated also later on in verse 145. This artificial division of the sentence and the sentence-meaning is a means to the understanding of the indivisible sentence and the sentence-meaning. To understand the indivisible straightway is as difficult as learning each word of a language separately. As the *Vṛtti* puts it :—*guruprakramā tvatra saṃsṛṣṭarūpasya pratipattir avibhāgena, pratipadaṃ pāṭhavat*= "The understanding of the unified word without dividing it is a difficult process. It would be like learning each word of a language as a whole." A good student, however, knows that division is only a means to an end and that indivisibility is the truth. In any case, doubts sometimes arise as to how the division should be effected. For instance, in the case of words *haridru* and *dustara*. Even when it is effected, it is only a means to an end. The word is really indivisible.]

14. Just as, in the compound, *brāhmaṇakambala*, the term *brāhmaṇa* has no meaning, in the same way, in a sentence, words like Devadatta are without a meaning.

[In the compound word *brāhmaṇakambala*, the element *brāhmaṇa* has no meaning. Similarly, in the sentence : *Devadatta gām abhyāja daṇḍena*, the words Devadatta etc. have no separate meaning. Individual words are, therefore, meaningless. The truth is that the sentence is an indivisible self-sufficient unit, quite different from the individual words. Similarly, the sentence-meaning is an indivisible, self-sufficient unit. When the compound *brāhmaṇakambala* is uttered in isolation or after some words or sentences, even though the word *brāhmaṇa* is heard and some meaning understood from it, it is known to have no meaning. Similarly, even when the word is not uttered in isolation or after other words and sentences, parts of sentences which resemble individual words do not really exist and have, therefore, no meaning.]

15. The general meaning, having disappeared, cannot lead to the particular. How can what has already been conveyed be abandoned and where can what is already gone rest ?

[The *Mīmāṃsaka* view is that it is the individual words themselves which constitute the sentence and not anything beyond them. This is not sound. Words are uttered in a sequence. When the second word is uttered, the first one has already vanished. So its meaning which is of a general nature cannot become particularised in association with the meanings of the later words because it is not there at all. Even if it has an existence in memory, how can the general meaning which was first conveyed be abandoned ? To do that would go against the eternal relationship between the word and the meaning, which the *Mīmāṃsaka* would not accept. In any case, if the word gives it up, where would it rest ?

The *Vṛtti* points out that a word which, at the time of its utterance, conveys the general cannot denote the particular after its disappearance. Nor can the speaker mean to convey the general and the particular at the same time : *na ca sāmānyaviśeṣayor vivakṣā yugapat sambhavati.*]

16. If the sentence-meaning is not derived from the words (but from their interconnection), the meaning of the word would also be in the same

position. Thus the relation between the word and the meaning would be destroyed.

[The criticism contained in the above verse is answered as follows— After all, a particularised meaning is understood from the sentence. How to account for that? The Mīmāṃsaka view does not explain it either. If the particularised meaning does not come from the words which cease to exist after conveying the general meaning, it means that it does not come from words. It is *aśabda*. The same thing can be said about the meaning of the individual word. Because, the phonemes are uttered in a sequence and they disappear. So they do not co-exist and cannot constitute a word. So there cannot be a word-meaning. Thus, the relation of expression and expressed between word and meaning, accepted by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, would cease to be.

The *Vṛtti* argues differently to reach the same conclusion.

17. According to some, words expressive of the particular (*viśeṣa*), resembling those which are expressive of the general, become clear to listeners when they are (later) connected with the other words in the sentence.

[When a sentence is uttered, it is done in order to express a particularised meaning. So the very first word, even when it seems to be the same as in some other sentence, expresses, not a general meaning, but a particularised one. This becomes clearer when each succeeding word is heard. So the meaning of the sentence is the meaning of each word as connected with the meanings of the other words. No word conveys an unconnected meaning. It conveys an idea with its connection with other words implied. This is an explanation of the two views regarding a sentence, referred to as *padam ādyam* and *pṛthak sarvapadaṃ sākāṅkṣam*.

The *Vṛtti* explains this verse in one long and rather obscure sentence. It seems to say this : The very first word of a sentence denotes its meaning as qualified and delimited by the meanings of the other words of the sentence which are yet to come and when they do come, they do not say anything new,

they only make clear and patent what is already latent in the meaning of the first word. The very first word is as good as the sentence.]

18. According to them, the whole of the sentence-meaning is concentrated in each word. Hearers understand the meaning all the better when all the expressions are uttered.

[Nor can one object that if the very first word conveys the meaning of the whole sentence, the other words would be useless. The first word conveys the sentence-meaning only vaguely. The others make it clearer. But this view is not accepted because the utterance of the other words would be either for the sake of restriction or restatement. Neither is necessary if the very first word or any word in the sentence can convey the meaning of the whole sentence. As a matter of fact, neither the first word (*padam ādyam*) nor any word separately (*pṛthak sarvapadam*) can convey the meaning of the whole sentence. If the other words are uttered at all, no matter for what purpose, the *anvitābhidhāna* view falls.

What the *Vṛtti* says on this verse amounts to this: According to those who accept the use of many words to express one meaning, all the particulars, the whole of the indivisible sentence-meaning is concentrated on each word and on each phoneme. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*teṣām evamupagṛhītasarvaviśeṣa ekasminnarthe bahuśabdānabhyupagacchatām avikalpaḥ kṛtsno vākyārthaḥ pratipadaṃ prativarṇaṃ vā samāpyate*. Thus, when all the expressions are actually uttered, the sentence-meaning becomes clear to the hearer and not by its mere existence before all the words are uttered.]

19. The indistinct word which is uttered in silence appears to have sequence. The intelligence perceives it as having extension (that is, sequence) though it is really without any.

[The sentence is really indivisible. But it is manifested by the sounds and it seems to have divisions like the phonemes and individual words. This indivisible Word has an inner and outer aspect. As something existing within the speaker,

it is inner. As it is externalised by utterance, it is outer also. It is indivisible and eternal. It is this which is expressive of meaning. All distinctions such as spoken to oneself, spoken slowly, spoken quietly etc., are based on the sounds which manifest it and not its own. When one utters something well within, to be heard by oneself only, it is called *upāṃśu*. When no utterance takes place, that is, when the *prāṇa* plays no part but the word is thought of in one's mind and has assumed divisions and sequence, it is called *paramopāṃśu*. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*Tatra prāṇavṛttyanugrahe satyeva yatra śabdarūpam parair asaṃvedyaṃ bhavati tadupāṃśu. Antareṇa tu prāṇavṛttyanugrahaṃ yatra kevalam eva buddhau samāviṣṭarūpo buddhyupādāna eva śabdātmā tat paramopāṃśu.* When the activity of the mind is suspended and the divisions and sequence are not there but due to their impressions they are superimposed, it is *pratisaṃhṛtakramam.*]

The next two verses are meant to elucidate the view that the sentence is *jātiḥ saṃghātavartinī.*

20. Even though it is particular movement which is made the specific action is not cognised but when it is repeated, the universal of actions like turning is manifested.

21. In the same way in the case of (the *sphoṭa* of phonemes, words and sentences which may be different from another, the manifesting sounds appear to be the same.

[A movement like turning consists of a series of momentary movements. Each movement consists in coming into contact with a point of space and then disappearing. It is then replaced by the next movement which does the same. As these point-movements are momentary, they cannot co-exist and cannot form a whole of which they would be parts and in which the universal of the movement called turning can inhere. Such a universal, different from the wider universal called 'action' is accepted and if it does exist, it would inhere in the momentary movements relating to turning. Even though this universal exists in each point-movement, the latter is not

capable of producing the cognition ofthe universal because of too much resemblance between themovements of turning and the movements of another movement like, say, lifting. The movements of each movement are the result of a special effort to produce that movement and so they are the substrata of the universal of that movement. But that universal cannot be cognised until a series of point-movements has been cognised. It is not enough to cognise one or two such point-movements. The universal really inheres in each movement and it is also cognised. But the cognition is too vague and unfit for verbal usage. After a series of movements is cognised, the direction of the movement becomes clear and so the cognition of the universal, inherent in each movement also becomes clear. In other words, it becomes quite clear that the movement is turning and not, say, lifting. The process is similar in the perception of the Word (Sentence.)]

22. How can there be really priority or posteriority in eternal things ? It is the power of the One that it so appears.

[The Sentence is One and indivisible without any sequence involving priority and posteriority. But it has within it the power to appear as many, as having sequence. It is really the sounds which manifest it that have sequence but the *vākya-sphoṭa* itself appears to have it.]

23. Just as the cognitions 'slow' and 'quick' appear to have temporal difference even though they have none, in the same way do long and short vowels appear to have temporal difference.

[The cognitions 'slow' and 'quick' have, as cognitions, no difference in time, but appear to have it because of the difference in their object. In the same way, the *sphoṭa* has no distinction such as slow and quick but appears to have it because of the difference in the manifesting sounds.]

24. Time, which is eternal, cannot be differentiated through divisions belonging to something else. (According to the view that there is no eternal

entity called Time) the phenomena, being of a transient nature, cannot exist at the same time. How then can there be sequence?

[The latter half of the stanza is an answer to an objector who might say that he does not believe in Time as an entity separate from the phenomena. Time is nothing more than the phenomena themselves following one another, in succession. It is on the basis of these phenomena that we speak about sequence and simultaneity and not on the basis of a separate entity called Time.

The main idea in the *Vṛtti* on this verse may be expressed as follows—If Time is eternal, One and indivisible, it cannot have divisions on the basis of something external like action. Secondly, Time conditioned by some action, is a measure. Therefore, there cannot be something else to measure and divide it. If everything is eternal, it cannot bring about division in Time. If everything is momentary, there cannot be any sequence between any two non-simultaneous moments and, therefore, sequence cannot be attributed to time on the basis of the sequence of the momentary objects. As there is no sequence in the things or in Time, to see temporal difference in long, short and prolated which are temporally identical is not right.

The words of the *Vṛtti* say something like what I have said above but I do not claim that the idea is very clear to me.]

The idea that the notion which arises on the basis of these phenomena would explain Time is now answered.

25. The cognition which is produced by them is One and indivisible but through its own power, it seems to be differentiated and assumes sequence.

[Though *bhāgavartinī* is found in some editions and manuscripts, *bhāgavarjitā* is a better reading and is confirmed by Puṇyarāja's *nirvibhāgā* and the *Vṛtti's bhāgavarjitā*. The gist of the *Vṛtti* seems to be this:—Cognition is One because it is essentially in the nature of illumination. (*sā tvekā bhāgavarjitā buddhiḥ prakāśasvarūpatvāt...*). Therefore its homogeneous and heterogeneous divisions are one with it. Being of the nature of illumination, cognition is partless and sequenceless, but it

displays the sequence of the objects now mixed up with it within itself. Strictly, it (the sequence) should not be so displayed but the cognition displays it without dissociating it from the objects. Such indeed is the way in which cognition displays sequence.]

According to Puṇyarāja, the next verse is meant to refute the following view:—Even though cognition is one and indivisible, it appears to have parts and sequence because of the sequence of the objects which figure in it. The cognition appears to have the sequence of the objects. This is due to an immemorial and eternal predisposition of cognitions. This appearance of sequence in the cognition is not contradicted. It is of the nature of cognition itself. A cognition displaying sequence leaves a similar impression (*saṃskāra*) so that the next cognition also displays sequence. That is why in our cognition of short, long and protracted vowels or of words and sentences, temporal distinctions figure though these are eternal and have, therefore, no temporal distinctions.

26. It is not possible to explain as identical with the intellect or as different from it the seed which is sown in it by the display of sequence (in the cognition).

[The impression of sequence which is supposed to be left by the cognition in the intellect is either identical with it or different from it. If it is different from it, it cannot do any service to it. It cannot bring about temporal distinction in short, long etc. If it is identical with it, then intellect or cognition would remain one and indivisible and there would be no sequence at all. Therefore, it is futile to try to explain sequence in cognition through the impressions of the sequence of objects which figure in the cognition.]

Indivisibility is now set forth in a different manner.

27. This indivisible (Sentence) is understood as having the capacity for sequence (or division) at the time of the artificial separation (*bhāvanā-samaye*). Hence its meaning, though devoid of all division is perceived as having division.

[In the *Brahmakāṇḍa*, the nature of *sphoṭa* has been determined. It is the sentence as *sphoṭa* which is expressive. At the time of analysis, the sentence-meaning is understood as having sequence and division, but it really has none.

The *Vṛtti* gives the analogy of Dik to explain how the One appears as many. *Dik* (Direction, Space) is one but when we use expressions like *ūrddhvam, adhaḥ, tiryak*, we are speaking about it as though it had divisions, knowing that it has none: *ūrdhvam adhas tiryag ityekatve'pi diśāṃ yathāyathaṃ viniviṣṭabhāvanāviśeṣāḥ sarvaprāṇinaḥ*= All beings have an inner disposition to divide Dik (Direction, Space) which, though one, is regarded by them as being above, below, across and so on.]

The view that the sentence is nothing more than a collection of words and not an entity over and above them and that the word is nothing more than a collection of phonemes and not an entity over and above them is now criticized.

28-29. If the words in the sentence are those very ones (which are found singly outside the sentence) and if the phonemes in a word are those very ones (which are found singly outside the word) then there would be divisions like atoms in the phonemes also.

As the parts cannot combine (because of their non-existence) there would be neither phoneme nor word. As they cannot be determined what other thing could be determined as the expressive element?

The *Vṛtti* argues as follows—

[If it is held that the words in a sentence are the very ones which are found separately and if the phonemes which are found separately are the very ones found collected in a word and if it is held that there is no essence of the sentence or of the word apart from the phonemes, then there would be atom-like divisions within the phonemes also by going to the extreme limit of division. These divisions would have sequence and would never be simultaneous and would, therefore, never come into mutual contact. Thus there would ensue nothing called phoneme or the word. The final divisions being indefinable,

they would not enter into usage. Therefore what would be the verbal unit which would be clearly defined as 'this'? There cannot be any usage with a verbal entity the divisions of which are indefinable and which are not collected together in something different from knowledge. The idea is that the sentence is a collection of words and if the word is only a collection of phonemes, one can divide the phonemes also. Ultimately, there would be no unit at all which would be looked upon as the expressive element. Therefore, the sentence is an entity over and above the phonemes and words. This entity is described as something outside the mind. But the *śāstra* is of the view that the sentence is *buddhyanusaṃhṛtiḥ*.]

The view that the sentence is *buddhyanusaṃhṛtiḥ*, mentioned in the very first verse of this *Kāṇḍa* is now explained.

30. Others declare the Word (that is, the Sentence) to be the word-Principle which is within and One and is manifested by the sounds. It is that unity which appears in the manifested sentence.

[Others emphasize the inner aspect of the word. Its external aspect as *jāti* or *vyakti* has already been considered before. The chief characteristic of this inner aspect is that it is one and indivisible and without any inner sequence. It is an inner entity, consisting essentially of cognition or consciousness and an amalgam of word and meaning. When manifested by the sounds, wrongly thought of as its parts, it becomes the external sentence. The *Vṛtti* points out that this external sentence is like the written symbols (*akṣaracihnavat*) which are mistaken to be the word. The external sentence is only a symbol of the real sentence which is within and is an indivisible unity.]

It is now stated that not only the sentence but the sentence meaning also is indivisible and manifested by the word meanings.

31. According to them, the inner meaning, (that is, the Sentence-Meaning) is manifested by parts of it. Word and Meaning (that is, Sentence and Sentence-meaning) are inseparable (*apṛthak-sthitau*) divisions of one Inner Principle.

[Just as the Sentence is an inner entity, so is the Sentence-meaning. They are identical with each other and with the One Inner Principle but, externally, they appear to be different from each other. Puṇyarāja does not say anything more.

The *Vṛtti* interprets this verse in a deeper manner. From its terse and rather obscure language, one understands something like this:—

It is well-known that the Word-Principle is mainly the indivisible inner entity and that it is grasped through its indefinable and unreal parts. Similarly, the meanings reflected in the intellect are experienced as identical with the external objects. This is according to the view that the external object is transient. According to the view that it is eternal, it manifests itself according to the power of sequence of the intellect (*Kramaśaktirūpanirbhāsamātrayā*). An external object is not fit for practical purposive usage without the intellect with which it is wrongly identified. All worldly usage is done with objects which have been grasped by the intellect. Thus both the word and the object are in the intellect. Others, on the other hand, declare that as the intellect in which the object is reflected inheres in the Self, the latter which is essentially consciousness, assumes the form of the intellect which inheres in it and this explains the experience of the individual (*puruṣārthasya prasiddhim*). When the intellect which is transparent assumes the character of consciousness and of the object through their reflections, the powers of the enjoyed and of the enjoyer (*bhogyaśakti* and *bhoktṛśakti*) quite distinct from each other and not at all mixed up with each other, seem to attain the state of non-distinction in the intellect, which has apparently assumed the nature of consciousness and of the object and then distinctive worldly usage becomes possible. The power to experience is unchangeable and is not reflected anywhere but it appears to be reflected in the intellect. It is through the imitative transformation of the intellect in which the consciousness is reflected that one speaks of the operation of specific knowledge. The transformation of the intellect is said to be imitative (*anukāramātrā*) because, on the one hand, it imitates the object whose form it takes and, on the other, consciousness is reflected in it. In the background of all statements, there are three views :—

(1) The external word is transitory and is an unreal manifestation of the eternal inner word. (2) According to *satkārya-vāda*, all objects are eternal and they are experienced when manifested. (3) When the object is reflected in the transparent intellect (*Buddhi*), it is experienced. According to all the views, the inner word is One, with all multiplicity resolved. From it, meanings which are also inner and undivided, with all multiplicity resolved, are understood without their original division being abandoned. What then remains is the single entity Intellect in which multiplicity has been resolved, in which the distinct powers of being the conveyor and the conveyed are not separated (*pratipādakapratipattavyaśaktyor avibhāgena*) even though their distinction is not abandoned. In the view that both the word and the meaning are eternal, neither is adventitious, subject to increase and decrease and to change.]

If the word and the meaning are identical, how are they said to stand in the relation of expression and expressed to each other ?

32. Of that Word-Principle which is within, there is always this character of being the Illuminator as well as the Illuminated, the Cause as well as the Effect.

[The idea is that the Inner Word-Principle has got both powers : that of being *prakāśaka* and that of being *prakāśya*, that of being the Cause and that of being the Effect. The One inner Reality contains the seeds of all manifestations, as already stated in Vāk.I.4.

In explaining this verse, the *Vṛtti* emphasizes the nature of the *Śabdatattva* within. The inner word is endowed with two powers : the power of being the Illuminator and that of being the Illuminated. Though the latter is not separate from the former, it appears to be so. As they are mutually dependent, there is the relation of causality between them. As the Illuminator, it is the cause and as the Illuminated, it is the effect. The former power is constant and the latter occasional (*anapāyinī* and *apāyinī*). The Word-Principle is not associated with any particular place, but, because of its association with the intellect, it is spoken of as the inner word. Nor is it associated with

time, divisible into past, present and future. That is why the word *sarvadā* is used in the verse. The Word-Principle, being identical with Consciousness, is beyond existence and non-existence (*bhāvābhāvavibhāgābhāvāt*). The expressions past, present and future can be used only in regard to *bhāva* or *abhāva*.]

What other power the Word-Principle has is now stated.

33. It is that (the Word-Principle) which has the two powers of existence and non-existence which have no sequence but appear to have it and are the basis of all worldly usage.

[The inner Word-Principle has the two powers of existence and non-existence. These two powers cannot have any sequence because of the eternality of their substratum, but they appear to have it. The indivisible sentence appears to have the sequence of the phonemes and individual words. Their existence and non-existence seem to have sequence. All manifestation involving multiplicity and sequence is due to the powers of the Word-Principle and not merely its manifestation as the Illuminator and the Illuminated].

The view that the individual word has a reality is again criticised.

34. If the mere understanding of the word-meaning is taken as proof of the reality of the word and its meaning, as it is abandoned when it is mixed up with the meaning (of the following words) it would become useless.

[If the mere fact that the individual word and its meaning are cognised, are taken as proof that they have reality, there would be a difficulty. Each subsequent word of a sentence conveys its meaning as mixed up with that of the preceding word or words and so the meanings conveyed by the preceding word or words are abandoned as such. Thus the utterance of the preceding words becomes useless. Therefore, when the sentence-meaning is ultimately understood, it would not be due to the useless preceding words. The understanding of the

individual word and its meaning were only temporary and, therefore, unreal phases.]

It is now stated that, as the individual word is something indefinite, its reality should not be accepted.

35. (ab). The word *rājan* conveys the idea of 'king' through its different forms.

[The word *rājan* does not occur in speech in a particular form but in its different inflexional forms like *rājā*, *rājānam*, *rājñā*, *rājñe*, *rājñaḥ*, *rājñi* (or *rājani*). If the word had a reality, its form would not thus change.]

35. (cd). In a complex formation, a word (a noun) resembling a verb could mean something different (from what it ought to mean).

[The compound word *rājapuruṣa* could be understood to mean : Shine ! O Man ! and yet that is not its meaning. Which shows that what looks like an individual word has no reality.]

It is not only independent individual words which have no definite fixed form but as parts of compound words also they have no fixed form.

36. Just as the compound word *aśvakarṇa* conveys a special meaning without the part *aśva* conveying any meaning of its own, so do other compound words.

[We understand from the word *aśvakarṇa* a particular class of objects, having a particular universal inhering in it. The meaning of the part *aśva* does not contribute to it. The meaning comes from the word as a whole. It is better to believe that the same thing happens in all compound words. If the meaning of *aśva* plays no part in the meaning of the whole, it is wrong to think that there is a part called *aśva* in the compound at all. Similarly, there is no part called *karṇa* in it.

Here the *Vṛtti* points out that, for the purpose of grammatical derivation, one may explain the meaning of the compound *aśvakarṇa* as *aśvasya Karṇāviva parṇau yasya* = a tree of which the leaves are like the ears of a horse. But this is only *artha-*

pradarśikā = 'showing of an alleged meaning' and should not be taken seriously. It does not prove the reality of parts.]

If all compound words are in the same position, what would be the basis of the distinction between *rūḍhi* = 'conventional' words and *arūḍhi* = 'non-conventional' words?

37. While resemblance is postulated (between the meaning of the compound word and the analytical sentence which explains it) in the case of some compounds where the analysis conveys a totally different meaning, the Science of Grammar itself looks upon them as conventional words.

[A difference is pointed out between compound words like *rājapuruṣa* and *tailapāyikā*. The meaning conveyed by the former and the meaning obtained from its analysis are very similar. So it is not looked upon as a mere *rūḍhi* word. The meaning conveyed by the second compound is that of cockroach, a kind of insect. The meaning obtained by analysis is: "that which drinks oil" which is quite different from what the whole compound means. That is why it is a *rūḍhi* word. In regard to such words, grammar teaches some special operations as in P. 6.2.76, 77, 146; P. 6.3.53 etc. This is pointed out by the *Vṛtti*.]

38. Means (*upāyāḥ*) are so called because they are first accepted (*upādāya*) and then abandoned (*heyāḥ*). And no fixity necessarily exists in regard to the means.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that when correct forms are being taught in the Science of Grammar, as in the case of compounds, secondary derivatives, denominative verbs and *ekaśeṣa*, individual words are brought in for making analytical explanatory sentences. When the purpose of teaching their correct form is achieved, these individual words are abandoned. Similarly, some rules relating to accent (such as P. 8.2.4, 5, 6; P. 6.2.2, 65) teach correct forms of words on the assumption that there are individual words in compounds or sentences, that they have their own meaning and that they come in a certain order.

All this has to be understood in order to grasp the correctness of the forms in question. Once that is done, the rest is forgotten.]

39. One understands the facts in some way or another. Whether united or separated, the divisions are based on the sentence.

[One can understand the facts of the Sanskrit language either through Pāṇini's grammar or through some other. All of them have to analyse the sentence and sentence-meaning to do their work. The latter are, therefore, the real entities and not what is obtained by analysis.

The *Vṛtti* gives examples of the different ways in which the same word is derived, by different grammarians. The word *śrotriya* is one of them. According to some, it is a word expressive of the meaning of the whole sentence *chando'dhīte*= 'he studies the Vedas'. Others say that the word *chandas* becomes *śrotra* to which the suffix *ghan* is added in the sense of *tad adhīte* (P. 4.2.59.) or in the sense of action done by the ears. Similarly grammarians differ in their derivation of words like *uṣṭragoyugae* and *aśvaṣaḍgavae*. The *Vṛtti* also gives two explanations of the second half of the verse. The difference is chiefly in regard to the meaning of the words *saṃsṛṣṭāḥ* and *vibhaktāḥ*. In the first explanation, the former means 'united', that is, one word and its meaning united with another to form a compound. The second word means 'separated', that is, each word standing separately in the sentence. Whether a word combines with another to form a *samāsa* or not, its meaning is determined by the sentence as a whole. In the second explanation, the two words mean 'included' and 'excluded' respectively.]

It is now stated that the sentence-meaning can sometimes be understood even from a single phoneme.

40. Sometimes, when the relation of identity in the form 'it is this' is understood, then even a single phoneme can be expressive of the meaning of the whole sentence.

[When the identity of the sentence and the sentence-meaning is already in the mind of the speaker, then it is not necessary

that the sentence-meaning should be understood after the word-meanings have been understood in the sequence in which the words have been uttered. A mere phoneme without any inner sequence may sometimes be able to convey it. Puṇyarāja does not give any example. The *Vṛtti* does and ends by referring to the way in which the sages, those who are experts in *Vāgyoga*, grasp the integrated Word-Principle within.]

Now the view of the sentence referred to by the word *saṅghāta* in the very first verse is being explained.

41. It has been declared that a word, as part of a sentence, expresses the same extent of meaning as it does when it is in isolation.

[Puṇyarāja points out that this *saṃghāta* view is held by the *Abhihitānvayavādin*. The *Vṛtti* illustrates by saying that the isolated word *Vṛkṣa* conveys a particular universal, namely tree-ness. It does the same in the following sentences: *Vṛkṣo'sti*, *Vṛkṣo nāsti Vṛkṣaścchinnaḥ*. Because of its connection in these sentences with existence, non-existence and cutting, it does not become associated with another universal. In any case, these actions are not connected with a universal, but with the individual in which the universal inheres.]

42. Whatever extra meaning is understood when the words (in a sentence) are connected together is the meaning of the sentence and it rests on many words.

[According to this view, the sentence meaning is the interconnection (*saṃsarga*) of the meanings of the individual words.

The *Vṛtti* points out that the extra meaning which comes when the words are joined together does not play any part in determining the form of the individual words. They get their form on the basis of the meaning or meanings which they themselves express.

The words of somebody, referred to as *tatrabhavān*, are quoted in the *Vṛtti*. In the writings of Abhinavagupta, *tatrabhavān* always stands for Bhartṛhari. If that is the case here, it means that the *Vṛtti* is not by Bhartṛhari. But the title can very well stand for somebody else. Who is the question?]

Another view on the subject is now given.

43. Even though it rests on many words, it is found in full in each like the universal, or, like number, it is said to rest, by others, on the whole collection of words also.

[The universal is supposed to exist in every individual in full. Number is supposed to exist in all the units together. Similarly, the view that the sentence-meaning rests on many words is understood by some to mean that it exists in each part of it in full like the universal and by others to mean that it exists in the totality of words also. Those who hold the latter view go by the principle that what does not exist in the part cannot exist in the totality. As the Ambākartrī puts it: *na hyavayavāparyāptasya samudāye paryāptir asti*. Both Puṇyarāja and the *Vṛtti* speak about these two views.

The *saṃghāta* view is now explained from the *anvitābhidhāna* point of view:

44-45. Others declare the meaning of the word to be so general as is adaptable to all the particulars. When connected with the meaning of the other words, it assumes the form of the particular.

Contact (with the meaning of the other words) removes the vagueness which arises when it requires particularisation by fixing it to one particular.

[It was stated in verses 41 and 42 that a word in a sentence gives the same meaning as in isolation. When the meanings of the words are connected together, a qualified meaning emerges and that is the meaning of the sentence as a whole. In verse 43, it was stated that the meaning of the whole is contained in a single word according to some and in the totality of words also according to others. In 44 and 45, it is stated that the individual word conveys a general meaning which is potentially capable of being connected with the meanings of other words and when it is actually connected with the other words, it conveys a meaning actually connected with particular meanings of other words. The general meaning and the parti-

cular meaning are those of the individual word and not of the sentence and is not conveyed by *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *sannidhi*.]

46. The connection is to be inferred from its effect; it has no particular form. That is why some declare it to be absolutely non-existent (as distinct from the meanings of the individual words.)

[The effect referred to is the fact of the meaning of the individual word referring to the particular and not merely to the general. The connection inferred has no concrete shape or form. That is why it is said to be *asattvabhūta*.]

The same view is further explained.

47. An accessory (*sādhana*) necessarily presupposes an action to be accomplished (*sādhya*) and an action is necessarily connected with accessories. This necessity which is present becomes evident in the presence (of the meaning of other words).

[Action and accessory presuppose each other. It is only when the words expressive of them enter into the sentence that what is presupposed becomes manifest. So the sentence is nothing more than the individual words presupposing one another and the sentence-meaning is nothing more than the word-meanings presupposing one another.

The *Vṛtti* points out that this mutual requirement of action and accessory is one and indivisible. It is not felt in the absence of the other. It becomes manifest in the mere presence of the word expressive of the other and not because of the help of any other factor. As the *Vṛtti* puts it :

nityaniyatatvācca niyamo'pyatra vidheyaḥ, sanstu niyamaḥ prayoge sannidhimātreṇa padāntarāṇāṃ puruṣaṃ prati prakāśate, nānugṛhyate.]

If the mutual requirement of the meanings of the words of a sentence is equal, how to decide which is primary and which is secondary.

48. In it, (that is, the sentence), the noun, being secondary (to action) requires the verb. The

verb, being expressive of something to be accomplished, requires (the words expressive of) the means.

The meanings of the individual words of a sentence require one another. Some looked upon this mutual requirement as a property of the meanings while others looked upon it as property of the listener. The *Vṛtti* refers to this difference of view. It says that the listener understands mutual requirement (*vyapekṣā*) according to what the words convey, whether it actually exists or not in the meanings : *artheṣu satīm asatīṃ vā śabdavṛttyanukāreṇa puruṣo vyapekṣāṃ samīhate.*]

The view that the sentence is nothing more than the sequence of the words is now explained.

49. The particularisations which already exist in the word-meanings are understood from their sequence and there is no expressive sentence beyond that.

[If the sentence is nothing more than the sequence, it is not anything verbal, it is not something which can be heard. As the *Vṛtti* puts it : *nāparaṃ vākyaṃ nāma kiñcicchabdarūpam abhidhāyakaṃ vidyate.*]

The same view is further explained.

50. The mere sequence of the words being thus expressive, there is no other verbal element which is so. And sequence is a property of time. There is no separate entity called sentence.

[What is denied here is the existence of some verbal element characterised by sequence, which could be called the sentence. The sentence is nothing more than the sequence itself. Sequence which is a property of time is superimposed on the words. What is called sentence is a mere name without any reality behind it. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*tena vākyam ityavastukamevedamabhilāpamātram, padamevārthavaditi.*]

It is now stated that the same is not true of the sequence of phonemes.

51. The particularisations which already exist in the meanings of individual words but are not

evident become manifested in the presence of the other words. But such a (meaningful) sequence does not exist in the phonemes.

This point is now concluded.

52. The names Word and Sentence may be applied to the sequences of the phonemes and the words respectively but they are not the expressive element (*śabdatva*).

[The phoneme and the word are audible but mere audibility does not entitle them to be called *śabda*. For that, they must convey the meaning, they must be *vācaka*. They are not. Only sequence is so.]

53. Even though the fact of being word (*śabda*, something audible) is common (to both the phoneme and the word), the meaning is understood from the word (conceived as the sequence of phonemes) but not from each phoneme. Hence the meaning belongs to the word.

[As audible entities, the phoneme and the word are both *śabda* but the sentence-meaning is understood from the sequence of the words and not from the phonemes. So sequence is the sentence and interconnection of word-meanings is the sentence-meaning.]

The *saṅghāṭa* view is now restated.

54. Just as phonemes, parts of a word are devoid of any meaning, so is the case with the sentence.

[All the phonemes put together may have a meaning, but each one, taken separately, has no meaning. Each individual word, by itself, cannot express the sentence-meaning which is in the nature of a connection between the meanings of individual words. Only a collection of such words can do it and so that is the sentence.]

Now the sequence theory is restated.

55. Individual words, meaningless being only a means to an end or having their own meaning only when uttered in a sequence, convey the sentence-meaning which is different from the meanings of individual words.

[The meaning of a sentence is the meaning of the individual words in it as syntactically connected with one another. No single word can express this mutually connected meaning. There is not only temporal sequence between the words, but also syntactic connection.]

The *sphoṭa* view is now stated.

56. The sentences, looked upon as collections of words, being eternal or when the sentence-universal is postulated, it is the one sentence which expresses an inalienable meaning.

[The sentence may be looked upon as one unit. As uttered by different persons, it is something different and yet it is recognised to be the same. The different sounds uttered by the different speakers ultimately manifest the same sentence. Or the sentence may be looked upon as a universal which inheres in the different utterances of it by different persons. In whatever way it is looked at, it is one and it expresses a meaning in the nature of intuition (*pratibhā*) and is indivisible.]

57. According to the upholders of the (indivisible) sentence, unity precedes division which is fictitious. The upholders of the individual word, on the other hand, hold that the unities of the sentence are preceded by their divisions.

The statement *padaprakṛtiḥ saṃhitā* (*Ṛk-prātiśākhya*.2.1.) is now considered.

58. The fact of the *saṃhitā* (the connected text) being the source of the individual words is explained by resorting to a different complex for-

mation (*Vṛtti*). *padaprakṛtiḥ* can be explained either thus : 'the *saṃhitā* is the source of the individual words' or thus : the *saṃhitā* has the individual words as its source.

[The compound word *padaprakṛtiḥ* is taken as a *ṣaṣṭhī-tatpuruṣa* according to those who follow the *akhaṇḍapakṣa*. The others take it as a *bahuvrīhi*. If the Vedic sentences are indivisible and not composed by humans (*apauruṣeya*), then the individual words obtained by analysis are of human origin (*pauruṣeya*). On the basis of this very statement, the other view, namely, that the individual words are real and that the sentence is a fiction can be justified. It is like this: The individual words are eternal and not formed by men. Their connection is man-made. Each word conveys its own meaning, plus its connection in general with the meanings of the other words. In the presence of the other words, this connection becomes specific and is realised. Thus, the sentence-meaning is conveyed by the words themselves and not by the sentence.

The *Vṛtti* also refers to the statement of the *Ṛk-prātiśākhya* and says that some held the *padapāṭha* of the Vedas to be eternal and the connected text (*saṃhitāpāṭha*) to be of human origin while others held just the opposite view.]

A statement of Patañjali is now explained.

59. If the other tradition, namely, that of the separated words (*padapāṭha*) shows the way to the connected text and is eternal, how is the separated text to be constituted according to the rules ?

The very fact that Patañjali says that the authors of the *padapāṭha* have to follow the rules in doing their work shows that, according to him, that text is man-made. His words are : *na lakṣaṇena padakārā anuvartyāḥ*; *padakārair nāma lakṣaṇam anuvartyam*= "Rules are not to be framed according to the text made by the authors of the *padapāṭha* ; it is the latter who have to follow the rules." In other words, Patañjali is in favour of the *akhaṇḍapakṣa*. See M.Bhā. II. p. 85,l. 4.5.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that the word used in the world is eternal. It is for the rules to conform to the eternal word and not for the latter to conform to the rules: *ataḥ śāstreṇa nityasya lakṣyasyānuvidhānaṃ kartavya , na tu nityena lakṣyeṇa śāstram anuvidheyam.*]

60. Just as the meaning of the word is not understood from each phoneme, in the same way, the meaning of the sentence is not understood from each word.

[Here the *Vṛtti* makes an interesting observation. It says that the cognition of the sentence meaning is self-luminous, besides illuminating the external object. Being self-luminous, the cognition of the sentence-meaning is authority in itself. The sentence-meaning which its cognition grasps is one and indivisible and being authority, it confirms the unity and indivisibility of the sentence-meaning.]

To meet this, the upholder of the individual word says—

61. Just as the meaning of the sentence is understood when all the words are together, in the same way, the meaning of the word is understood when all the phonemes are together.

[The idea here is that each phoneme does denote the meaning of the word and so does each word denote the meaning of the sentence, but only when the other phonemes and the other words are also uttered in the same context. So the analogy brought forward by the upholder of the sentence is not valid.]

The point is now further elucidated.

62. Just as a minute perceptible object, when associated with something else, is perceived with it, in the same way, a phoneme becomes expressive (of a meaning) when it is associated with other phonemes.

[What is meant here is that a phoneme really has a meaning but that is understood only when the other phonemes of the word are uttered. All of them express the meaning together,

but each one has the potentiality to do so. The hearer cannot understand it unless the other phonemes are also uttered.

63. Just as some meaning is understood when a word is uttered, in the same way, when the phonemes are near one another, the same meaning is understood.

[The point sought to be made here is this :—Just as, when, the phonemes are together, they become expressive by pooling their powers (*parasparaśaktyāveśavaśāt*), so do individual words together convey the sentence-meaning. So there is no need to postulate a sentence apart from the phonemes and the words. The *Vṛtti* points out that the upholder of the meaningfulness of the phoneme can argue exactly in the same way as the upholder of the individual word.]

It is further pointed out that if the reality of the individual word is denied, it would not be possible to have substitutes if what is prescribed is not available.

64. The purpose of the text (the word *vrīhibhiḥ*) is restriction to one possibility which occurs to one (in any case) due to the power of the verb. Therefore, if the accessory in general is set aside by a particular accessory,

65. If mere substance which occurs to the mind through the power of the verb *yajeta* is set aside by the mention of the particular substance, there would be no substitute if rice (*Vrīhi*) is not available.

[If the verb *yajeta* in *vrīhibhir yajeta* brings to the mind substance in general and not the universal of any particular substance, then, if rice, denoted by the word *vrīhibhiḥ*, is not available, a similar substance like barley can be used. But if it is held that the mention of a particular substance sets aside substance in general also, then there can be no substitute at all, because the substitute barley would come under substance in general which has been set aside.]

Therefore, another view is adopted as follows—

66. Therefore, the word rice, bringing the additional idea of rice, has a positive meaning (*prāptyarthaḥ*) and does not set aside substance in general as there is no opposition between the two.

[According to this view, *vrīhibhir yajeta* is a positive injunction and not a restriction. It specifies and does not exclude other things. From *yajeta*, substance in general is understood because without some substance, *yāga* cannot be performed. From *vrīhibhiḥ*, we further learn that the particular substance is rice. If rice is not available, another similar substance is not excluded.]

67. When substance in general (*dravyatva*) is taken away by it (from other substances) with which it co-exists, other substitutes are not seen there (that is, in the sacrifice) because of impossibility.

68. The verb does not bring to the mind all particular substances as it does substance in general. A word indeed does not express all the meanings which it has.

[Here the *Vṛtti* explains as follows—

If the verb *yajeta* brings substance in general to the mind and not a particular substance and so the word *vrīhibhiḥ* is a positive prescription of rice and not an exclusion of other substances, it means that a substance like barley has not been excluded. That being so, why does it not come optionally ? The answer is that prescriptive words are of two kinds : (1) Some have a restrictive effect. They prescribe something and in effect, exclude others (2) Others do not emphasize the restrictive side. Some scholars of *Mīmāṃsā* say that, in some matters this becomes a kind of restriction through impossibility (*asambhavaniyamaḥ*) when, through the mention of the word rice, the universal of rice (*vrīhitva*) becomes an extra accessory of sacrifice, it is not possible for other universals like *yavatva* to become accessories though they have

not been openly set aside, because they cannot coexist with *Vrīhitva* in the same thing. If they could become accessories at all, it would be because they come to the mind due to lack of contradiction. They would then be combined with other things and not adopted optionally. Only, that which is openly stated by the words can become an option. The verb does not convey a particular accessory but only substance in general. A word does not express all that actually exists.)

Now an illustration is given.

69. Just as qualities like white, though present (in the rice) are not meant to be conveyed (by the word *vrīhi*=rice) in the same way, the universals of being particular substances which co-exist with substance in general (*dravyatva*) are not meant to be conveyed.

[A word does not express as its meaning everything that exists in an object. An object, to be expressed by a word, depends upon the desire of the speaker to speak about it. Even existing objects do not exist as meanings of words. The speaker's desire to speak about a thing depends upon the capacity of the form of the word to express it: *rūpasāmarthyanjbandhanā* as the *Vṛtti* puts it. Due to the natural power of words, the verb cannot denote the colour which exists in the substance in general which it brings to the mind. Similarly, the verb cannot denote all the particular substances in which *dravyatva* co-exists with their particular universal.]

The purpose of substitution is now stated.

70. A substitute is taught in the absence (of what is prescribed) in order that there may be no omission of a compulsory (*nitya*) ritual or of an optional one which has already been begun.

[What is pointed out here is that even in the case of an optional ritual, if what is prescribed is not available, it should be performed with a substitute. This is all the more so in the case of a compulsory ceremony, because its omission would result in sin. As the *Vṛtti* puts it : *Nityaṃ yat karma tasyākaraṇe pratyavāyaḥ*]

Thus it has been shown how a substitute becomes possible by taking the view that the verb brings only the substance in general to the mind and that the word *vrīhibhiḥ* is a positive injunction and not meant to exclude other substances. It is now stated that if the sentence is indivisible, a substitute would not be possible.

71. For him who looks upon a sentence as expressive of a particularised action, when a substitute is used for a substance which is not available, there would result a different action altogether.

[It is accepted by all that, while another substance may be substituted if the prescribed one is not available, the prescribed ritual, an act, should not be substituted by another. But if the sentence is looked upon as expressive of an indivisible meaning, what looks like substitution of material would really be substitution of ritual which is not allowed. The sentence being indivisible, it does not teach two things. It does not say: (1) One should perform the ritual, (2) One should do it with rice. That would imply that the sentence has two parts which the doctrine of unity and indivisibility does not accept. So the sentence teaches only one thing, a ritual to be done with a particular material. When that is not available and the ritual is done with some other material, it would not be a mere substitution of material, but of the ritual itself. But that is not allowed. When the Veda enjoins one ritual, it would be wrong to perform another.]

It is now stated that, if the individual word does not exist, one cannot explain why people sometimes enquire about the meaning of a particular word.

72. When the meaning of the known words (in a sentence) has been understood, why does one enquire about the meaning of an unknown word like *pika* ?

Puṇyarāja and the *Vṛtti* explain this *kārikā* in the same way, except that the latter gives two examples instead of one. It is well-known that listeners sometimes fail to understand the meaning of just one word in a sentence and enquire about it.

In *vanāt pika ānīyatām*, the word *pika* may be obscure to somebody, who would therefore enquire about its meaning. In the sentence *vārāṅgī jarjarā vṛṣalāya dīyatām*= let the torn *vārāṅgī*='turmeric-coloured dress' be given to the *śūdra*, somebody may not understand the meaning of *Vārāṅgī* and may just enquire about that. This shows that the enquirer has the consciousness that the individual word has a meaning. Nobody makes a similar enquiry about the meanings of *v* or Kin the words *Vṛṣabha* and *kāṇḍīra* after having understood the meaning of the remaining portions of the two words, *ṛṣabha* and *āṇḍīra*, showing that people have no consciousness that phonemes have a meaning.]

73-74. When what is implied is mentioned for the sake of clarity, it is a case of direct statement (*śruti*) and it sets aside indication (*liṅga*) and juxtaposition (*vākya*).

A quality like white, when not implied, is understood through proximity and is therefore conveyed by a special effort and is different from direct statement.

[If the individual word has no reality, the principle that when there is opposition between direct statement and juxtaposition, the former prevails would not work. Six principles are laid down by Jaimini in order to determine the meanings of doubtful sentences. Of them, each preceding one is stronger than the following one. In the sentence : *śvetaṃ chāgam ālabheta*='one should sacrifice a white goat' the connection of the act of sacrificing with the goat is conveyed by direct statement (*śruti*), namely, the second-case-affix. The quality white becomes connected with the act because the word expressive of it is in apposition to the word expressive of the goat. In other words, through juxtaposition. If both the words—*chāgam* and *śvetam*—are connected with the verb at the same time because of the second case-affix, then the connection in both cases would be through *śruti*, with the result that if either is not available, there can be a substitute.]

75. If the sentence is indivisible and its meaning also is indivisible, then everything would be

direct statement (*śruti*) and there would be no such thing as contradiction with direct statement.

[If the sentence and its meaning are indivisible, then one cannot, within the sentence-meaning, distinguish between what is conveyed by direct statement and what is conveyed by juxtaposition. Everything would be conveyed by direct statement. There could arise no conflict and what is more, there would be no substitute if what is prescribed is not available.]

It is now shown that if a sentence is indivisible, intermediary sentences would become meaningless.

76. There would be no sentence-meaning (in the case of a big sentence) consisting of a collection of minor sentences requiring one another and used for conveying one single meaning.

(If individual words do not exist and are meaningless, intermediary sentences would be in the same position. Also, a meaningful sentence can become a part of a bigger sentence and so become meaningless which is a contradiction.

The *Vṛtti* explains the same idea with an example : *gaur duhyatām, upādhyāyaḥ payasā bhuṅktvā māmadhyāpayiṣyati*= 'let the cow be milked, the teacher will eat (his rice) with milk and then teach me. Here a big sentence, having an intermediary sentence as its part, is expressive of an action which is qualified by another action having its own accessory. If the parts (in the form of intermediary sentences) requiring one another are not connected with the one main meaning, then the main sentence would also be meaningless. Besides there is no fixity in limits of intermediary sentences. Sometimes, *gām abhyāja*= 'drive the cow on' is the sentence, sometimes it is: *Devadatta*! *gām abhyāja* =O ! Devadatta ! drive the cow on. Sometimes it is : *Devadatta gām abhyāja śuklām*= O ! Devadatta, drive the white cow on ! That being so, one would have to accept the contradictory position that the same thing is sometimes meaningful and sometimes not. The first sentence is meaningful, while the same words are meaningless in the next, being only a part thereof.]

It is now pointed out that, if the individual word and its meaning are denied any existence, certain principles followed

in the world and in the *śāstra* would become inexplicable. These principles form the subject matter of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* of Jaimini.

77. That this action is *prāsaṅgika*, this is obtained through *tantra* (extension), this through *āvṛtti* (repetition) or *bheda* (difference), there is *bādhā* (suspension) here and combination there (*samuccaya*).

[The principle of *prasaṅga* is established in the twefth *adhyāya* of the Mī.Sū. Mādhava, in his *Jaiminīya-nyāyamālā-vistara* XII.1. defines it thus:—*anyoddeśena anyadīyasyāpi sahānuṣṭhānaṃ prasaṅgaḥ*= 'the single performance of a subsidiary action, accepted as helping a primary action other than the one to which it belongs.' For instance, *prayāja* and *anuyāja* offerings, taught as subsidiary to the *agnīṣomīya* animal sacrifice, serve as subsidiary to the cake-offering also. See Mī. Sū. XII.I, 1-6. This principle is sometimes followed in the world also. When a teacher is teaching one student and other students arrive and profit by the same teaching instead of asking the teacher to instruct them separately, it is a worldly example of the principle. It is sometimes followed in the *Vyākaraṇaśāstra* also. For example, P.1.1.27 not only gives the name *sarvanāma* to some words but tells us incidentally that in the word *sarvanāma*, n is not changed to ṇ, as it normally should. If individual words have no meaning, this principle cannot be applied.

The principle of *tantra* is established in chapter XI of the Mī. Sū. It is similar to the principle of *prasaṅga*. The difference is that in *tantra*, the single performance of a subsidiary rite is prescribed and it is intended by the sacrificer to help more than one primary rite, whereas in *prasaṅga* no such prescription or intention is discernible. The *prayājeṣṭi*, performed once before or after, serves all the six sacrifices. An every-day instance of the application of such a principle is that of many students using one lamp for their study. Pāṇini's use of the word *tapara* in P.1.1.70 in two meanings is an instance of *tantra* in grammar. The two meanings are : (1) *taḥ paro yasmāt so'yaṃ taparaḥ*, (2) *tāt paraḥ taparaḥ*. For a Vedic application of this principle, see *Mī. Sū.* 1, 14.

Each of these principles has its opposite which also goes

to prove the existence of the individual word. *Āvṛtti* or repetition is the opposite of *tantra*= extension. A Vedic instance of *āvṛtti* is the statement that there are seventeen *mantras* for kindling the sacrificial fire (*saptadaśa sāmidhenyo bhavanti*). This number is reached by repeating the first and the last of eleven three times. *Bheda* or difference is also an extension of *tantra*. A Vedic instance of it is *grahaṃ sammārṣṭi*= he cleans the vessels. As there are many vessels, each one has to be cleaned separately (*bheda*). The cleaning of one would not do for all.

Bādhā or suspension is the subject matter of *adhyāya* X of *Mī. Sū.* An instance of it would be the prohibition of the eating of the domesticated fowl (*abhakṣyo grāmyakukkuṭaḥ*) which would otherwise be possible, considering that it can also satisfy hunger. An instance from the world would be : After the statement: "Give curds to Brāhmaṇas," it is said 'and butter-milk to Kauṇḍinya'. The latter statement suspends the operation of the previous one as far as Kauṇḍinya is concerned. The opposite of this principle is *samuccaya*. Instead of one operation cancelling another, both become applicable to the same case. An instance of it would be the statement : Feed Devadatta with salt, ghee and vegetables. All are given to the same person.

These principles would not be sound if the individual word and its meaning did not exist.]

78. That *ūha* (modification) in this matter is justifiable, the relation here is not barred, that this is an instance of general transference and this of particular transference.

[*Ūha* is dealt with in chap. IX of *Mī. Sū.* In the Veda, this principle consists in the modification of the *mantras* prescribed for a *prakṛti-yāga* in order to suit the circumstances of the *Vikṛtiyāga*. In the *āgneya* sacrifice which is a *prakṛti*, one has to say : *agnaye tvā juṣṭaṃ nirvapāmi*, when one offers *vrīhi* to Agni. In the *Sūrya* sacrifice which is a *vikṛti* of it, one has to substitute: *Sūryāya tvā* while offering *nīvāra* (wild rice) instead of *vrīhi* (cultivated rice). Thus, we modify the mantra to suit different circumstances. The opposite of this principle would be not to make any modification. For instance, in the Vedic sentence *yajamānaṃ daṇḍena dīkṣayati, mekhalayā dīkṣayati*, the word

yajamānam is joined onto each one of the verbs without its case-affix being changed. It is clear that to pick out one word of a mantra and substitute another for it is an admission that the individual word has a meaning of its own.

Transference or *atideśa* is the subject matter of *adhyāya* VII and VIII of the *Mī. Sū.* It means the transference of the details of the *prakṛti yāga* to a *vikṛti-yāga*, as, for instance, those of the *Darśapūrṇamāsa iṣṭi* to other *iṣṭis*. In everyday life also, such transference often takes place, as, for instance, when one says: Behave towards this *kṣattriya* as towards a *brāhmaṇa*. In the Science of grammar also, there are many cases of such transference. For instance, the *sūtra*: *Sthānivad ādeśo'nalvidhau* (P.1.1.53.) actually teaches such transference. As such, transference involves the removal of a word or its meaning from its original context and placing it in a new place. It goes to prove the existence of the individual word and its meaning.]

79. That here candidature (for the fruits of the sacrifice) means the fact of being entitled to perform it, whereas no differentiation exists there in regard to the fruit, that one who gets his right to perform an action through the *śāstra* is prohibited from performing another.

[Only the *śāstra* can tell us who is entitled to perform a ceremony and who is not. This subject is discussed in the sixth chapter of *Mī. Sū.* The three factors which confer the right are: (1) Desire for the fruit, (2) Capacity, (3) absence of prohibition by the *śāstra*. Only the *śāstra* can determine capacity or the absence of it in regard to invisible matters.]

80. That here the sequence is understood through direct injunction, there through utterance etc., that the sequence is important here, insignificant there.

[How to determine the order in which the different minor rituals belonging to a major sacrifice are to be performed is discussed in Adhyāya V of the *Mī.Sū.* Many guides are given there. In the sentence: *hṛdayasyāgre'vadyati, atha jihvāyāḥ*, the two words *agre* = first and *atha* = 'afterwards' indicate the order. In the *sūtra* : *parasmaipadānāṃ ṇalatus..* (P. 3.4.82), the order of enumeration indicates the order of application.

This order is sometimes very important, as, for instance in the Vedic sentence : *prathamam bhojayitavyaḥ tato' bhyañjanam*= he should be fed first and then anointed. Sometimes, it is quite significant. Thus, though a *naimittika* sacrifice may be mentioned after a *kāmya* one, the two need not be performed in their order, because the two are not connected together by one purpose. Therefore, if the occasion (*nimitta*) arises earlier than the desire, the *naimittika* sacrifice may be performed earlier. See *Mī.Sū*. V. 3. 32-36. All this is possible only if the individual word and its meaning have a separate existence, because, the determination of the order involves picking a word out of a sentence.]

81. That this is connected with the subsidiary actions of another and, therefore, brings into existence the subsidiaries of the ritual in question, that this does bring into existence (the subsidiaries), that here, this is inevitable.

[The motive of actions is discussed in *adhyāya* IV of *Mī. Sū*. For the principles referred to in the present stanza, examples can be found (1) in the world, (2) in the Vedas, (3) in *Vyākaraṇa*. Puṇyarāja gives only one example. The king who sits on the elephant causes the umbrella to be held over him and thus brings into existence its shade. It is not for the elephant that the umbrella is held and so it does not bring it into existence, (*aprayojaka*), but as it also benefits by the shade, it also may be said to bring it into existence. Both the king and the elephant enjoy the same result, namely, the shade. This is an example from the world. An example from *Vyākaraṇa* is this : P. 4.1.92 and P. 4.1.95 produce the same result, namely, the form *dākṣi*= son of *dakṣa*. In these two examples, two things become *prayojaka*, because they lead to the same result or benefit by the same result.]

82. That this is primary and this is secondary, that this is the mode of procedure, that this is directly useful and this is indirectly useful.

[Much space is given in *Mīmāṃsā* to the question of what is primary and what is subsidiary. In the process of threshing

the corn, for instance, the threshing is subsidiary to the corn to unhusk which it is performed. Among the different actions constituting a Vedic sacrifice, some are directly useful while others are only indirectly so. For instance, the threshing of corn is directly useful for the performance of the *Darśa pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice while *prayāja* is so only indirectly. In *Vyākaraṇa* also, this distinction can be found. For instance, the stem is directly useful to the suffix; that which qualifies the stem as a preposition is only indirectly so. An example from the world is : the ornaments which a man himself wears are directly useful to him, while those worn by his wife and children are only indirectly so. This distinction between primary and secondary, directly useful and indirectly useful, presupposes the existence of parts of sentence and sentence-meaning.]

83. That here there is difference of power as well as of function, while there, there is a difference in the result, that here the distinction has arisen out of the (particular) relation while there the difference is insignificant.

[*Bheda* or difference among actions is dealt with in *adhyāya* II of the *Mī.Sū.* As in the other cases, difference can be illustrated also by examples taken from the world and the *vyākaraṇa-śāstra*. Lightning can be described as follows : *valāhakād vidyotate*= 'it flashes from the cloud', *valāhake vidyotate*= 'there is a flash in the cloud' *valāhako vidyotate*= 'the cloud flashes'. In these three sentences, the cloud is described as the starting point (*apādāna*), the abode (*adhikaraṇa*) and the agent (*kartā*) of the act of flashing. There is difference in power and, according to that, grammar prescribes different endings. This is the difference in function. Sometimes, there is only difference in power. For example, in *dhanuṣā vidhyati*= 'he hits with the bow'. Here there is only one case ending, the third one but there are two powers. The bow is thought of as an instrument of the act of hitting but it cannot be so unless it is the starting-point for the departure of the arrow. The bow is both *apādāna* and *karaṇa*, two distinct powers, but the former is not expressed. The making of a gift with a view to attain long life, health and prosperity is an instance of difference in result. When different

suffixes expressing different agents are connected with the same root, the action expressed by this root also appears to be different. For example, *pacati*, *pacanti*. In the sentence *paktvaudanaṃ bhuṅkte*-= 'he cooks the rice and then eats it', there really ought to be a difference in the actions performed by the agent and the object, but this difference is not emphasised. Hence, there is only one agent for both actions.]

In addition to the foregoing arguments, the Mīmāṃsaka wants to put forward some others based chiefly on *vyākaraṇa*, in order to prove the existence of the individual word.

84. That here the negative particle is connected with the verb while there it is connected with the noun, that this is secondary while that is primary, that this is pervasive while that is long or short.

[*Prasajyapratiṣedha* means a negation in which the negative particle is connected with the verb. *Paryudāsa* is a negation in which the negative particle is connected with the noun. *Brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ* is an example of the former and the *sūtra*: *āto'nupasarge kaḥ* (P. 3.2.3.) is an example of the latter. In the *sūtra*: *tatpuruṣaḥ samānādhikaraṇaḥ karmadhārayaḥ* (P. 1.2.42.) the word *samānādhikaraṇa* qualifies *tatpuruṣaḥ*. This is a secondary use of the word, because, primarily, it is not the *tatpuruṣa* but the component words which are *samānādhikaraṇa*. In *ekaśrutī dūrat saṃbuddhau* (P.1.2.38.), the word *saṃbuddhi* should be taken in its pervasive (*vyāpi*) worldly meaning. All this is possible only if words are taken out of the sentences and that means that they have a separate existence.]

85. That this is secondary to many severally while there the options are numerous, that this is restricted while that becomes entitled to such a thing under these circumstances.

[When one verb is connected with many nouns in a sentence, we have an instance of one thing being secondary to many severally. The options sometimes allowed in the application of the rules of Pāṇini are explained by commentators in their remarks on the *sūtra*: *na veti vibhāṣā* (P. 1.1.44.) An example of restriction in Grammar is that contained in the *sūtra*:

patiḥ samāsa eva (P. 1.4.8.) which means that the word *pati* gets the name of *ghi* only when it becomes one of the members of a compound. When one syllable in a word gets the *udātta* accent, the others become entitled to *nighāta* = suppression of the acute accent, by the *sūtra*: *anudāttaṃ padam ekavarjam* (P. 6.1.158.)

86. That the distinction here is understood from indications found in another sentence while the meaning of the word there is obtained by analysis.

[When one reads of *aktāḥ śarkarāḥ* = 'sugar mixed with fat' in the Veda, one wants to know mixed with what fat. From the sentence : *tejo vai ghṛtam* = ghee is indeed splendour, one understands that the sugar is to be mixed with clarified butter (*ghṛta*). This is an instance of a distinction being understood from an indication found in another sentence. When one says : *rājapuruṣaḥ*, to ask 'of which king' and to get the answer 'of king Śūdraka' is an instance of analysing the meaning of a sentence.]

87. Such properties of sentences which depend upon the meaning of individual words would be incompatible if the individual words were considered to be inexpressive (*avācaka*).

The above arguments of the *Mīmāṃsaka* are now answered.

88. What has been pointed out above is not inexplicable if one analyses a big sentence into minor sentences, even though its meaning is really indivisible.

[The idea is that just as a big sentence is divided into small sentences on the ground that these latter express minor ideas, in the same way, though the meaning of a sentence is really indivisible, we can recognise within it the meanings of individual words also. Once this is done, all the objections raised by the *Mīmāṃsaka* are answered.

The upholder of the individual sentence may argue in one of the two following ways :—

Even if meanings of individual words and of subordinate sentences exist, one does understand a sentence-meaning in addition to them. It does exist as a cognition, if not in reality.

Such a sentence-meaning can be analysed on the basis of difference in power (*śakti*) and the meanings of individual words and of subordinate sentences obtained. The Buddhists believe in the *svalakṣaṇa* only, something which is absolutely unique, having nothing in common with anything else in the world. And yet, they talk about *jāti* on the basis of *apoha*, that is, difference from everything else. In the same way, the upholder of the sentence believes in its indivisibility. And yet, on the basis of analysis through difference of power, individual words and subordinate sentences and their meanings are recognised as taking place in cognition, though not having reality.]

An analogy is now given for seeing differentiation where there is really unity.

89. Just as the same scent appears to be different when it is found (in different objects like) flowers, in the same way, differentiation of meaning can be made within the sentence also.

[One speaks of the smell of a flower or of sandal-wood as though they were totally different from each other, not realising that they are really the same. The idea here seems to be that scent is one and all-pervasive, even though it may seem to be different according to the substance where it is found.]

Another analogy is now given.

90. It is like the perception in a *gavaya* or in a man-lion, grasped by a single cognition of a part that is similar to a universal external to it.

[In a *gavaya*, there is no universal called *gotva*, in a man-lion (*narasiṃha*), there is no universal called *naratva* or *siṃhatva*. Whatever universal there is in these two objects is totally different from these two universals. But the average man thinks that the universals *gotva*, *naratva* and *siṃhatva*, similar to those existing in a cow, a man and a lion, exist in a *gavaya* and *narasiṃha*. They do not, but mind creates the fiction. In the same way, the mind creates the fiction of word-meaning within the indivisible sentence-meaning.]

91. When one sees the unseen and unfamiliar portion (in them), it is the whole thing which has

become unintelligible to the man of feeble intelligence.

[When one sees in a *gavaya* a part that resembles the cow and another part that resembles some other animal, the fact is that one does not see correctly the object at all.]

92. In the same way, in sentences that become totally different by the addition of the word *pika* (cuckoo) and other elements, what appears to be similar is really non-existent.

[Though apparently the only difference between *vanād vṛkṣa ānīyatām* and *vanāt pika ānīyatām* is that, in the latter sentence, there is the word *pika* instead of the word *vṛkṣa*, still it is held that the latter sentence is totally different from the former. The portion that appears to be common, namely, *vanād ānīyatām* is really non-existent as a sentence is indivisible. When there appears to be a doubt about the meaning of one word, it is really the meaning of the whole sentence which is in doubt.]

93. Just as one indivisible knowledge appears to resemble another indivisible knowledge in one part and to differ in another.

94. In the same way, even though the sentences are indivisible and differ from one another completely one perceives difference (between them in parts).

[The knowledge of blue resembles the knowledge of green in that both are knowledge but differs from it inasmuch as the contents of the two are different. Or the point might be illustrated by taking two pictures, the colour of one of which is green and blue while that of the other is green and yellow. The two pictures would resemble each other in parts and differ in parts but in reality they are two different partless wholes. Similarly, two sentences which appear to resemble each other in having a common word and word-meaning are really two different indivisible wholes.]

95. How is one to determine the limits of an individual word considering that its form changes. If its limits are not determined, how can its meaning be fixed?

[In the sentence *dadhy ānaya*, the word *dadhi* has changed its form into *dadhy* because of what follows.]

If a sentence is indivisible, how can the sentence *śveto dhāvati* be the answer to two different questions at the same time? This is answered as follows—

96. In the other view (*anyatra*=that of indivisibility) there is a kind of coalescence of forms in such words as *śvetaḥ*; by the law of extension (*tantra*), it is to be taken as different for these two different forms.

[By *tantra*, the same word stands for both the forms. For the meaning of *tantra*, see the notes on Kā.77.)

97. In one and the same word (*śveta*) there is a coalescence of different forms. Though not really different from each other, they are separated (because they convey different meanings.)

(In Kā.96, it is said that *śvetaḥ* brings two separate expressions to the mind : *śvāitaḥ* and *śvetaḥ*, each of which conveys its own meaning. Here we are told that *śvetaḥ* directly conveys the two meanings.]

It is now shown that, in grammar also, one verbal form sometimes conveys two things.

98. In this Science, sometimes there is an equality of number between the conveyor and the conveyed and sometimes there is difference.

99. In the *sūtra*: *ūkālo'jjhrasvadīrghaplutaḥ* (P. 1.2.27) it is on the basis of equality of number that mutual correspondence is established; but in the

sūtra : *syatāsī lṛluṭoḥ* (P. 3.1.33.) a difference in the number as between the conveyor and the conveyed is present.

[The *sūtra* P. 1.2.27 means : vowels having the duration of u, ū and ū are called short, long and protracted respectively. Thus, this *sūtra* teaches three names to be applied to three different things. There is equality of number between the names and the named. P.3.1.33 means : let *sya* and *tāsi* be added to roots when followed by *lṛ* and *luṭ* *lṛ* stands for *lṛṭ* and *lṛṅ*. Thus there are two conveyors and three conveyed.]

100. *Ya* in the *sūtra* : *yasyeti ca* (P. 6.4.148.) denotes the two vowels (*i* and *a*) and stands for all the named (*saṃjñinaḥ*) through identity (*abheda*). Because the bare thing which is understood cannot convey all of them.

[*Yasyeti ca* (P. 6.4.148) means : *i* or *a*, belonging to a stem called *bha* is dropped when followed by *i* or *a* of a *taddhita* suffix or by long *ī*. *Ya* in the *sūtra* stands for *ī* and *a*. In the same way, the word *śvetaḥ* stands for *śvā*+*itaḥ* and *śvetaḥ*.]

101. The form *ū* (in P. 1.2.27) though indivisible, is the cause of the understanding of three separate 'u's through separate sentences. This separate application is just like the latter element (*pararūpa*) standing for itself and the preceding element (*pūrvarūpa*) when it becomes the substitute for both.

[Pāṇini often teaches that when two vowels meet, the latter should remain and take the place of both. For example in P. 6.1.94—*eṅi pararūpam*= when a preposition ending in *a* is followed by a root beginning with *e* or *o*, the latter vowel takes the place of both. This is an exception to P. 6.1.88 which requires *vṛddhi* in such cases. The sound which comes in the place of both is called *pararūpa*. It stands for both. Similarly, *śvetaḥ* stands for both : *śvā itaḥ* and *śvetaḥ*.]

All this has been said on the basis of *abheda*. It is now stated that Kātyāyana believes in *bheda* and not in *abheda*.

102. By rejecting the prolongation of a particular portion (of a diphthong) in connection with protraction (*pluti*) and by rejecting the combination of two vowels, he (the *vārttikakāra*) has adopted difference.

[The *sūtra* : *plutāv eca idutau* (P. 8.2.106.) = when *e*, *ai*, *o* or *au* is to be protracted, it is their first element, namely, i or *u* that is protracted. Puṇyarāja apparently quotes the following : *aṅgavivṛddhir nopapadyate, na hy aico'vayava akāra, ikāra, ukāro vā* = This protraction of a part of the diphthongs in question, that is, *e*, *ai*, *o*, *au*, is not right because *a*, *i*, or *u* is not a part of *e*, *ai*, *o*, or *au*. This passage is not found in the *vārttikas* or the *Mahābhāṣya*.

While considering the *sūtra* : *samāhāraḥ svaritaḥ* (P. 1.2.31.) Kātyāyana says :—*samāhāro'coścet, nābhāvāt* = if it is said that it is the vowels which are combined, it is not right, for there is no such thing. Thus Kātyāyana rejects the idea that here there is a combination of vowels.]

Tantra is the accepted view. That is now explained.

103. Just as there are different forms for *ardharca* and other such words on the basis of the sequence (of their elements) in the same way, according to the view that they are one, different forms can be understood otherwise (that is, as one).

[The compound word is *ardharca* (P. 2.4.31.) but its analysis is : *ṛco'rddham*. Thus, the same thing has two forms on the basis of the sequence of its elements. Similarly, two different things can be combined into one on the basis of *tantra* as in *śvetaḥ*]

104. The phonemes, in themselves unchanging, become different by taking on new powers when there is connected speech (*saṃhitā*).

[The one word *śvetaḥ* appears to have the power to convey more than one meaning. When it is looked upon as the result of the unification of artificially analysed elements (that is,

śvā and *itaḥ*) it acquires the power to convey another meaning. Really speaking, there is no unification of separate elements.]

105. Objects, without giving up their real form are perceived differently as a result of some defect in our senses. The same is the case with words.

[A defect in our eyes makes us see the same thing in different forms. In the same way, on account of artificial analysis, the same word can take on many forms.]

106. As a result of the mode of pronouncing it, the same word appears to be different though no change has taken place in it.

[The word *śvetaḥ*, while remaining the same, appears to consist of *śvā* and *itaḥ* on account of a particular mode of pronunciation.]

107. What is called *sāman* is either the *ṛk* sung in a particular manner or it is the song itself. It is not a separate entity. These very transformed hymns (*ṛks*) differ from one another according to the particular method in which they are sung.

[It is well-known that the hymns included in the *Sāmaveda* are found in the *Ṛg-Veda* also. They are collected together separately only for the purpose of singing them in a particular manner. This is what is meant by the *sūtra* : *gītiṣu sāmākhyā* (*Mī. Sū.* II. 1.3.6.)]

The principle of *tantra* is again explained.

108. Many forms, different from one another, resembling those of which only one will be retained, are, in this way (*upāyāt*) coalesced into one. Being uttered in a compressed form, it is considered to be correct in the *śāstra*.

[*Tantra* means compressing several forms into one. The compressed form stands for all of them. In the verse, the word *ekaśeṣiṇām* is used because of the resemblance of the process adopted in *śvetaḥ* to what happens in an *ekaśeṣa* like *devau* which

stands for *devaśca devaśca*. A real *ekaśeṣa* is the retention of one out of many identical forms. In *śvetaḥ*, there are no identical forms, but there are many forms which are coalesced into one. There is only resemblance and not identity.]

109. By accepting it (the word *śvetaḥ*) to be a form common to different phrases, it should be used for conveying more than one meaning. Otherwise, such forms would not be correct.

[*Śvetaḥ* is an indivisible word having the meaning of 'white' or it is a combination of *śvā* and *itaḥ* and, therefore, divisible. It is really two words but because of the identity of the phoneme sequence, it is looked upon as one. That is why it can be used to convey two meanings. Ordinarily one word conveys one meaning only.]

110. By means of compressed utterance, one correct form is obtained for sentences that are similar to one another.

[Just as Pāṇini has taught the retention of one of many identical individual words, he has not taught the retention, in the same manner, of one among many identical sentences. But *padatantra*, *vākyatantra* and *vākyaikaśeṣa* do play a part in grammar. *śvetaḥ* is an example of *padatantra*: the use of adjectives and verbs in a sentence in such a manner that they can be taken in the singular or dual number. What is called *tantra* by the grammarians is *śabdaśleṣa* and *arthaśleṣa* is *ekaśeṣa*. There is *vākyaikaśeṣa* when a general statement sums up several special statements. For example : *Yaśo vidhātuḥ kathayanti khaṇḍitam*= 'they declare the glory of the Creator as marred'. This general statement sums up the previous special statements found in the same verse. See *Ambākartrī* on Vāk. II. 110.]

An example is now given.

111. Just as one and the same sound appears to be different according as it is produced by a flute or some other musical instrument, in the same way, different forms are reduced to one.

[What is pointed out here is that just as one can become

many through some conditioning factor, in the same way, through compression (*tantra*) many can become one as in *Śvetaḥ*.]

The author now refutes the view that if the doctrine of indivisibility were true, intermediary sentences would become meaningless.

112. Just as the intermediary sentences (forming part of a big sentence or passage) and resembling words (forming parts of a sentence) are recognised as separate, in the same way, these sentences may be recognised as separate (even when they do not form part of a sentence.)

[The idea here seems to be that by resorting to analysis (*apoddhāra*) we ascribe meanings to intermediary sentences which form part of a big sentence. When these intermediary sentences are independent, they would have a meaning all the more. So the objection raised in verse 76 does not hold good.]

The author now points out a defect in the view that purpose (*prayojana*) is the meaning of a sentence.

113. He who holds that the expressed sense belongs to the word and that the sentence denotes purpose cannot establish any connection between one sentence and another.

[Puṇyarāja, in his commentary on verses 1-2 enumerates six views on the nature of the meaning of a sentence. That is, purpose (*prayojana*) is one of them. This is supposed to be common to all the views on the nature of the sentence-meaning. According to this, what is understood on hearing a sentence, that is, its *abhidheya* is not the sentence-meaning but the purpose to fulfil which the speaker utters it. But if the sentence has no *abhidheya*, an expressed meaning, there would be no connection between sentences because such connection is always through the expressed meaning.]

But the defect can be removed according to the *anvitābhidhāna*.

114. It is only verbs which have mutual re-

quirement and a relation based on such verbs is understood between sentences (even if purpose is taken to be the meaning of a sentence).

[According to *anvitābhidhāna*, the verb which expresses action brings the means (*sādhana*) to the mind. Words expressive of the means do not bring action to the mind in the same manner. As between action and the means, the former is primary and the latter secondary. In this view, the verb brings the means to the mind and the relation between the two is the expressed meaning of the sentence (*abhidheya*). Thus sentences are not devoid of *abhidheya* and so there can be connection between them.]

It might be said against the *anvitābhidhāna* that, if the very first word expresses the particularised meaning, the remaining words would be useless. This is answered as follows—

115. Repetition or restatement tends to make the meaning of the word clearer. All the words belonging to a sentence being present the meaning of (the whole) sentence is present in each of them.

[The defect mentioned is removed by pointing out that the other words would serve the purpose of restricting and specifying the other words with whose meaning the meaning of the first word is connected. It is also pointed out that even when the other words are not yet uttered, they are already present in the mind of the speaker and so they serve to determine the meaning of the first word, to give it a certain completeness. See verse 18.]

It is now stated how the indivisible sentence is divided by some.

116. Even though the meaning of a sentence is without differentiation, divisions are brought about by the difference in the background of their authors. On this subject, there have been many views among ancient thinkers.

[What is pointed out here is that thinkers are influenced, by the systems of thought to which they belong, in their view about the nature of the meaning of a sentence. They try to make it conform to their other doctrines.]

117. Others have declared that all words are the cause of a flash of understanding through practice (*abhyāsa*), even in the case of children and animals in their understanding of things as they are.

[All words, of whatever kind, are the cause of a flash of understanding according to some. This is as true of those who know the language as of those who do not, like children and animals. That is why fixed words are used by men in their dealings with animals, so that they may have this understanding through practice. After they get this flash of understanding, they act in particular ways. What is meant by practice or long usage is the repeated use of the same word for the same purpose or in the same situation. It is a kind of predisposition. When the horse hears the sound of the whip, it understands something and acts in a particular way. The relation between that sound and the action of the horse is natural and spontaneous.]

118. That practice is not the result of *āgama* (transmission of tradition in this life). Some look upon it as convention. It is in the form of : this should be done after that.

[The *abhyāsa* mentioned in the previous verse is not the result of the transmission of tradition to the child in this life. It is something which the child has inherited from its previous life. The word *āgama* in that verse may not mean anything more than cause. As we cannot see its cause in this life, the practice is called *anāgama*. As it comes from previous lives, it is as good as eternal. Others look upon it as a result of convention, established by man or god.]

Thus, it has been concluded that the sentence is indivisible and that its meaning is Intuition which is also indi-

visible. But, for practical purposes, we analyse a sentence into words and word-meanings. The nature of these meanings is now set forth. There are twelve views. The first view:—

119. All words have a meaning amounting to : 'something exists'. This meaning is the characteristic of the thing denoted by each word. In the case of words like *go*, they say, it is similar to what is denoted by such words as *apūrva*, *devatā* and *svarga*.

[The meaning of a word is in the nature of a generality, having no particular form. When we hear the words *apūrva*, *devatā* and *svarga*, we visualise no definite shape or form. This is what Puṇyarāja says. Kamalaśīla also says the same thing in his *Pañjikā* on *Tattvasaṅgraha* 886. It is true that we visualise a form when we hear such words as *gauḥ*, *aśvaḥ* etc., but that is due to the concurrence of the senses. From these three words, we just understand a meaning, without any shape or form.]

Why not include shape and form in the meaning of a word wherever they are understood ?

120. The perception of a particular form which takes place as a result of our seeing a word used constantly for a particular object does not come within the range of a word. That is the result of a special effort.

[The special effort is the experience of the repeated use of a word for a particular object. It must be distinguished from the normal power of a word.]

The second view

121. Certain distinctive features are revealed by the words expressive of them while others understood subsequently are also considered to be this meaning.

[What is expressed directly by the word is the universal. Whatever else is understood with it is not the expressed meaning of the word. But some consider what is subsequently understood also as the meaning of the word.]

This is now refuted

122. The word expressive of the universal does not express the varieties of the particular which is necessarily understood when the word expresses the universal (primarily).

[A universal must have a substratum. The particular is the substratum of it and so it is necessarily understood, but not its varieties and peculiarities. What is necessarily understood cannot be considered to be its meaning.]

123. An expressive word (like *ghaṭa* = a jar) does not denote the shapes and forms of a jar as it rests only on the general idea (that is common to all the jars). One, however, inevitably understands them.

[When we hear the word *ghaṭa*, we understand only what is common to all jars and not all the possible forms and shapes of a jar.]

An illustration of this inevitability is now given.

124. An action expressed by a word is never seen except with (the means necessary for) its accomplishment. The understanding of the means (*prayoga*) happens subsequently. The same is true of the meaning of words.

[The word *prayoga* which means execution or accomplishment is understood by Puṇyarāja in the sense of association with the means of an action. The idea is that when one thinks of an action, one necessarily thinks of the means of its accomplishment.]

The third view

125. Others accept as the expressed meaning of a word both the fixed actions as well as the means necessary for their accomplishment.

[In this verse, the word *prayoga* seems to be used in a different meaning. It cannot mean *sādhana* as in the previous verse, because it is mentioned separately. Puṇyarāja does not discuss it. It appears to mean action or application. What is emphasised here is that all that is understood from the word, action as well as means of action, the universal as well as the particular, is its expressed meaning. There is no ground for distinguishing between what is expressed and what is implied. The different elements may stand in the relation of primary and secondary to each other.]

The fourth view

126 (ab). According to others, the particular forms taken as a whole but without choice or combination are the expressed meaning of a word.

[If a word denotes all the forms and shapes taken on by the individuals coming under it, it would always have to be put in the plural number. If, on the other hand, it denotes an indefinite number of such forms and shapes, there would be indefiniteness in regard to number. That is why the author says : *avikalpasamuccayaḥ*. What it appears to mean is that the exact number of forms and shapes is not present to the mind. See *Tattvasaṅgraha*, 887, with *Pañjikā*. Puṇyarāja says that this matter will be discussed in detail in the *upamāsamuddeśa*. There is no such *samuddeśa* among the fourteen which make up the third *kāṇḍa* . Can it be a lost *samuddeśa* ?]

The fifth view

126 (cd). Still others think that it is the unreal connection (of things with their universal).

[The view is that a word like *ghaṭa* denotes the relation between the object and the universal etc. which inhere in it. As this relation cannot be perceived apart from the things which it unites, it is said to be unreal. See *Tattvasaṅgraha* 887 with the *Pañjikā*.]

The sixth view

127 (ab). The real, conditioned by the unreal, is the meaning of the word.

[See Vāk. III. *Dravyasamuddeśa* where it is declared that all words denote the ultimate Substance as conditioned or limited by some unreal thing, just as all gold ornaments stand for gold, conditioned by the particular shape of that ornament. See *Tattvasaṅgraha*, 888 with *Pañjikā*.]

The seventh view

127 (cd). Or the word itself, when it becomes the *abhijalpa*, is its meaning.

[What *abhijalpa* is becomes clear from the next verse. See *Tattvasaṅgraha*, 888, with the *Pañjikā*.]

128. When the form of the word is identified with the object, in the form : 'that is this', the word is called *abhijalpa*.

[The word is superimposed on the object. The object is, as it were, hidden by the word. The two are identified. This identification itself is called *abhijalpa* and the word which is superimposed on the object is also called *abhijalpa*. See *Tattvasaṅgraha*, 889, with the *Pañjikā*. It is the word which is superimposed on the object and not vice versa. That is why the object is said to be hidden.]

129. Word and meaning, being thus invariably identified with each other through long usage, one

of them assumes predominance over the other on occasions.

130. In the world, a word is known chiefly as identical with the meaning (object): in the Science of Grammar, on the other hand, there can be importance of both, according to the speaker's intention.

[Word and meaning are so intimately united that to separate them and to consider one of them to be more important than the other is difficult. In the world, the meaning (object) is more important than the form of the word. In Grammar, sometimes the word as in P. 4.2.33. and sometimes the object as in P. 4.1.92. assumes importance.]

The eighth view

131. Either because it (the object) has no power or because it has all powers, it is through words that it is presented in a fixed form such as action.

[An object is as the word presents it. A word can present it emphasising its action aspect or its universal aspect or its qualities. The object has no power of its own. It is as the word presents it.

The ninth view

Another way of looking at it is that a thing has all powers, but the word emphasises one of them according to circumstances.]

The tenth view

132. Others declare that the meaning is something mental but resting on an external object and is looked upon as the meaning of the word when it is externalised.

[See *Tattvasaṅgraha* 890 with the *Pañjikā*. There it is pointed out that as long as the meaning or the object is purely mental, it does not become connected with action. A word must convey something capable of being connected with action. So what is mentally grasped must be externalised. It is only then that it becomes the meaning of a word.]

The eleventh view

133. The external forms conveyed by some words are based upon distinct reminiscences. The meaning of others is in the nature of bare understanding.

[Words like *ghaṭa, paṭa, go*, convey a meaning having a shape which is the residual trace of the actual experience of the corresponding external object having a shape. Words like *apūrva, devatā,* and *dharma* convey a meaning which is not characterised by any shape or form. A bare understanding takes place.]

The twelfth view

134. Just as our senses perceive the same object in different ways, in the same way, an object is understood from words in different ways.

[Puṇyarāja attributes the difference in our way of perceiving the same thing to defects in our senses. It may be due to other causes such as distance and the absence of sufficient light.]

135. The meaning of words, intended by the speaker to be one thing, is understood by different listeners differently, according to their own background.

[Puṇyarāja points out that everybody, in using and understanding a word, is influenced by his own background. A *Vaiśeṣika* may use the word *ghaṭa* to convey a whole but the

Sāṅkhya will understand from it a mere combination of qualities and the *Jaina* and the *Bauddha* a collection of atoms.]

136. With regard to the same thing, one's views undergo change. The same person sees the same thing differently at different times.

[Puṇyarāja attributes the difference to the study, by the same person, of different *śāstras* at different times.]

137. To one and the same word are attributed many meanings by one and the same person or by many persons according to undefined circumstances.

[The same person understands different meanings from the same word at different times according to the different disciplines under whose influence he comes. On the other hand, many persons, trained under the influence of different systems of thought, understand different meanings from the same word at one and the same time.]

138. Therefore, cognitions and words of people who have not seen the truth, being full of mistakes and deceptions, are unreliable.

139. Nor can the vision of the sages, based on truth, be brought into human transactions, for it is not the basis of the use of words.

[In the empirical stage, the sages are on the same level as ordinary men. They perceive things with their senses and the mind and use words according to what figures in their mind. See Vāk III. Saṃ 53.].

140. The sky is perceived as a surface and the firefly as fire. There is no surface in the sky nor is the firefly fire.

[*Tala* is explained in the *Bhāmatī* and in the *Ratnaprabhā* as a big frying pan made of sapphire. *Naiva cāsti talaṃ vyomni* = there is no *tala* in the sky leads us to take the *vat* in *talavat* as a *matup* suffix and not as the suffix *vati*. If this is correct, *tala* may mean nothing more than a part or division. See *Ambākartrī* on this stanza. See *Mahābhārata*, *Śāntiparvan*, adh. 112 for this verse and Nīlakaṇṭha's commentary thereon.]

141. Therefore, the wise man should examine by reasoning even an object apprehended by direct perception. He should not form his idea of the object on the authority of the perception itself.

[An object is not necessarily as we see it. A little reflection may convince us that it is otherwise.]

142. In regard to objects which are difficult to define, the wise man should not deviate from the definitions of them adopted by men of the world in their usage.

[According to Puṇyarāja, what is emphasised here is that the indefinability of worldly objects being understood, it is better to follow in practical life the worldly conception of them. To try to have another worldly conception of them would be useless repetition (*piṣṭapeṣaṇa*) of work already done.]

The author now continues his statement on *pratibhā*.

143. When the meanings (of the individual words) have been understood separately, a flash of understanding takes place which they call the meaning of the sentence, brought about by the meanings of the individual words.

[Even though the meanings of the individual words are not real or rather have only a practical reality, they serve the purpose of bringing the sentence-meaning to the mind. They are the manifesters of the sentence-meaning.]

144. It cannot be explained to others as such and such. It is experienced by everyone within himself and even the subject (of the experience) is not able to render an account of it to himself.

[The difficulty of defining the special taste of a drink made up of many ingredients is usually given as an example of the difficulty of defining the meaning of a sentence.]

145. It is something indefinable (*avicāritā*) and it brings about a kind of amalgamation of the meanings of individual words, covering the whole sentence as it were, it becomes its object.

[Even though this flash of understanding called sentence-meaning is indefinable, its affect can be indicated : it brings about a kind of amalgamation of the meanings of the individual words. One can also say that it is the meanings of the individual words which manifest it. Otherwise, the understanding of the meanings of the individual words before the final understanding of the sentence-meaning would be useless.]

146. None can avoid in one's activities that (flash of understanding) produced either through words or through the working of one's predispositions.

[All activity of living beings is preceded by this *pratibhā*, which is either produced here and now or is inherited from previous births. It is words which we hear from others that produce it here and now (in addition to other factors). In the case of children and animals, they are born with a predisposition. *Pratibhā* and *itikartavyatā* are not the same. The latter is the result of the former.]

147. The whole world considers that to be the authority (in daily life). Even the activities of animals develop because of that.

[Puṇyarāja compares this intuition to the conscience of good people which is able to decide what is right and what is wrong quite instinctively. He quotes Kālidāsa's famous verse : *satāṃ hi sandehapadeṣu vastuṣu pramāṇam antaḥkaraṇa-pravṛttayaḥ*=in matters of doubt, one's own conscience is the guide of good people.]

148. Just as some substances acquire the power to intoxicate and the like by mere maturity, without the help of any special effort, in the same way are intuitions produced in those that possess them.

[The Intuitions are caused, says *Puṇyarāja* by predispositions, peculiar to every living being of every species. Instead of *mada*, another reading is *manda*. Puṇyarāja obviously had *mada* which seems to me to be a better reading.]

149. Who transforms the voice of the male cuckoo in spring ? Who teaches living beings to build nests etc. ?

[It follows from the way in which the subject is treated that in the case of human beings also, the Intuition produced at the moment when we hear words is not only caused by the words but also by something inherited from previous lives.]

150. Who goads beasts and birds on to actions like eating, loving, hating, swimming etc. associated with particular species and pedigrees ?

[*Plavana* can mean floating, swimming, jumping etc. which animals and birds do well instinctively.]

151. This Intuition is the result of Tradition (*āgama*) accompanied by *bhāvanā*. The Tradition is differentiated inasmuch as it is proximate or remote.

[The words *āgama*, *bhāvanā*, *āsatti* and *viprakarṣa* are not clear. They can mean many things. The difficulty is to decide what Bhartṛhari meant. Puṇyarāja understands by *āgama* the word. Did he have the words of the Veda in mind ?

The word, proximate or remote is the cause of Intuition. As such, it is assisted by *bhāvanā*, that is, the tendency to act according to the nature of the different classes of beings. This tendency is either inherited from previous births or it arises in this very life. From the *kārikā*, it appears that the relation of causality is *bhāvanā*>*āgama*>*pratibhā*. By *bhāvanā*, does Bhartṛhari mean what he calls *śabdabhāvanā* in Vāk. I. 114 (122)?]

152. This Intuition is of six kinds according as it results from nature, adherence to one's own *Veda*, Practice, *Yoga*, Invisible factor, intervention of specially qualified persons.

[The *Vṛtti* and Puṇyarāja differ widely in their examples of *svabhāva*. Puṇyarāja cites the behaviour of a monkey as an example of Intuition caused by Nature (*svabhāva*). The *Vṛtti*, on the other hand, mentions the natural tendency of *Prakṛti* to evolve into *mahat* etc., our natural tendency to awake after sleep. The knowledge of Vasiṣṭha and others is given as an example of *pratibhā* resulting from adherence to one's Veda. Intuition resulting from practice is exemplified by the knowledge of well-diggers as to the exact location of water in the ground. Yogis have Intuition of what is going on in other people's minds. The power of Rākṣasas etc. to enter into other people's bodies and to disappear suddenly is attributed to *adṛṣṭa* (Invisible factor). Lastly, the knowledge which Sañjaya and others got of the progress of the widely scattered fighting in the *Mahābhārata* war was due to the intervention of specially qualified persons like Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana.]

The author now begins the consideration of the question of what is primary and important and what is secondary and implied in the meaning of a word.

153-154. Just as the word *go* (cow), though it

might be applied to an animal adorned with articles which cling to it, cannot be said to be expressive of these articles.

In the same way, a word, though applied to objects which are characterised by shape, colour and parts, cannot include these characteristics (in its denotation).

[A word denotes either the universal as Vājapyāyana thinks or it denotes the particular as Vyāḍi thinks, though both are understood. Even the shape, colour etc. of an object are not included in the expressed meaning of a word, what to say of external objects like ornaments, temporarily associated with an object.

The *Vṛtti* says the same thing slightly differently. Both for one who considers the individual to be the meaning of the word and for one who considers the universal to be it, the other things which are different from the real meaning of the word are just understood, that is, they are not part of the denotation of the word—*nābhidheyatvena śrutibhiḥ prakāśyante.*]

Something is now said about words whose primary meaning is form, shape or colour.

155. A word which is applied to an object as qualified by a shape, colour and parts, cannot be considered to denote only a portion thereof.

[Words like *sthūla*, *hrasva*, *karbura*, *śabala* do express particular shapes and colours directly. They are not merely implied. Some shape or colour is the very basis of their application. They do not denote a part of these shapes or colours. Hundred may include fifty as its part but the word *śatam* does not denote fifty.

The *Vṛtti* says the same thing but gives its own illustrations. Words like *parimaṇḍala*, *dīrgha*, *caturaśra* denote things having these shapes and not parts of these shapes. Similarly, words like *muṣṭi*, *granthi*, *sandhi*, *kuṇḍala* denote things having that shape and not parts of that shape. Words expressive of colour such as *citra*, *kalmāṣa*, *sāraṅga* do not denote parts of these colours. Words like *śatam*, *sahasram*, *prastha*, *droṇa*, *māṣa*,

saṃvatsara are expressive of wholes and do not denote their parts.]

Apart from such words, ordinarily a word denotes the universal.

156. A word denoting water applies equally to a drop and to a large collection of it, irrespective of number, size and shape.

[The *M. Bhā* says that the word *ghṛta* = clarified butter, can be applied to a drop or to a whole gallon of it. (See *M. Bhā.* I. p. 184, line 19. and on P. 5.1.115.)].

157. A word (like *taila* or *ghṛta* applied to oil etc, particularised through improvement etc. really denotes a part of it, identified with the whole. It is, therefore, really a word expressive of a part.

(Both improvement and pollution of substances like oil mean their particularisation. Still, we use the general word to denote the improved or polluted substance. Thus used, it denotes a part of it only, but a part identified with the whole. This is a reference to *M. Bhā.* I. p.12, l.18-20. The context is the explanation of the *vārttika* which says that *Vyākaraṇa* stands for both the forms tc be explained (*lakṣya*) and the rules which explain them (*lakṣaṇa*). And yet, sometimes, we apply the word to the rules only. In the world also, a word which means the whole is sometimes applied to the part. *Pañcāla* is the name of the whole country but when we say: *pūrve pañcālāḥ*, it is applied only to its eastern region. When we say *tailaṃ bhuktam*, though the word *taila* stands for all the oil that has been medicated, here it means only the dose which has been taken. In other words, the word for the whole has been used for a part.]

158. A word, the use of which is connected with a particular meaning, ceases to be used if that meaning is absent.

[This *kārikā* gives the fixed definition of the cause of the application of the word (*prayojana*) of what is conveyed by the word (*abhidheya*).

It is given as verse 160 by Dr. R. Pillai but the *Vṛtti* gives it here.]

159. A word which is used after including in its denotation attributes which happen to be present does not invariably depend upon the presence of these attributes before it is used.

[There may be certain things which are not the cause of the application of a word to something, but accompany the cause, are connected with it and are understood at the time of the use of the word, as though they are part of the meaning of the word. But their presence or absence does not affect the application of the word. As the *Vṛtti* says : *teṣāṃ sānnidhyam asānnidhyaṃ vā śabdapravṛttāvakāraṇam.*]

160. Even though the word 'cow' may be used even in the absence of hair, hoof etc., it cannot be used when 'cow-ness' itself is absent.

[Here also, a distinction is made between that which is the real meaning of a word and causes its application to an object and that which may ordinarily accompany it. The latter is not included in the meaning of the word. A part is included in the whole but the word which denotes the whole does not necessarily express its parts. Similarly, a particular shape or colour may accompany the universal but it is not the meaning of the word as the universal is.

The *Vṛtti* points out that it is the presence or absence of the universal which determines whether a word can be used to denote an object. When the universal is understood from the word, its substratum is also understood. One does see the use of a word expressive of the original material for its modification (*vikāra*) also. Similarly, a word expressive of the whole is used for a part also. In the words of the *Vṛtti*—

Dṛṣṭā ca vikāre ca prakṛtau ca prakṛtiśabdapravṛttiḥ. Avayave ca samudāye ca samudāyaśabdapravṛttidarśanam.]

161. It is difficult for anybody to see all the parts of an object. From the few parts which are perceived, the whole object is inferred.

[Here a kind of analogy is made between perceptive knowledge and knowledge obtained through words. It is well-known that the word expresses what is understood through the senses. It was said before that it expresses the universal and not the things which may accompany it. In other words, it does not denote the whole object. Similarly, perception also does not cover the whole object.

The *Vṛtti* points out that sometimes, after seeing a part of an object, one cannot infer the whole. A doubt may linger : *kvacittu sandeho naiva nivartate. tadyathā dadhimātradarśane.* The example, however, is not clear. The text may be wrong. Or it may mean that when we see curds only, we cannot decide from which milk (cow's or buffalo's, for instance), it has been made.]

162. In the same way, it is seen that one understands (from the words *jātigandha, utpalagandha* etc.) those qualities which accompany and are always associated with the smell (of these two flowers).

[The idea here is that though the qualities which accompany the smell are understood, they cannot be looked upon as the meaning of these two words. The *Sāṅkhyas* who look upon an object (substance) as nothing more than a combination of some qualities and not as an entity over and above them may hold that the words express the qualities. The *Vṛtti* is probably referring to them in its last sentence on this verse.]

163. Therefore, even though qualities which happen to be present are understood from a word,

it is that which is invariably present which is intimately connected with the word.

[A possible accompanying quality is not recognised as the expressed meaning of a word. A natural relation of such a meaning with the word is not acceptable:—*Na hi tathābhūtenārthātmanā śabdasya sambanddho 'pi yujyate*, as the *Vṛtti* puts it.]

Now begins the consideration of the meaning of parts or nouns.

164. Case-endings are either expressive or suggestive of numbers like two. Or it might be considered that the whole (consisting of stem and suffix combined) denotes an object qualified by number etc.

165. Or it might be considered that words like 'cow' denote objects possessing number according to their nature, without (actually) expressing this number.

[Three views are expressed in the above two verses : (1) the case-endings express or suggest (illuminate, manifest) number, means etc., (2) the stem and the case-ending together denote number etc., either by itself being meaningless, (3) words ending in case-endings denote objects qualified by number, etc. without being actually expressive of them. Such discussions are the early forms of the discussions in later grammatical literature as to whether the stem (*prātipadika*) denotes one, two, three, four or five things. See *M.Bhā.* on P. 1.2.64.

As usual, the *Vṛtti* is written in rather obscure language and here and there the text is also doubtful. Its contents may be summarised somewhat as follows—Just as worldly usage is done by dividing the sentence into words and word-meanings, in the same way, *śāstraic* usage is carried out by abstracting stems and suffixes from individual words. In this matter, some think as follows—If the method of agreement and difference is adopted there is, in a word, only as much

meaning as can be obtained by this method and nothing beyond that for the whole. Whatever additional meaning is understood from the whole does not come from the word itself. The *Mīmāṃsakas* argue as follows—Stems and suffixes have been mostly put forward on the basis of analysis by the cultured and their meanings, the basis of the *śāstraic* work of the *Ācāryas*, are analysed by the practical method of agreement and difference (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*). This analysis is for the purpose of showing that these two meanings are only a means of conveying the whole. In the world, for the cognition of the meaning of the whole, there is no division into stem-meaning and suffix meaning. Therefore, according to some, the stem conveys its own meaning (*svārtha*) the individual (*dravya*), gender, number and case. The case-endings only illuminate the cases like the object (*karma*). According to others, the stem expresses only its own meaning, the individual, and gender and the case-endings denote number and case. The expression of number and case by the stem is only optional, according to possibility. According to some, gender is an expressed meaning while according to others, it is only illuminated. Illumination is of two kinds : (1) conveying something which has no verbal element of its own (*anāvirbhūtāvirbhāvanam*), (2) eliminating one and retaining the other. For example, in *pratiṣṭhate*, *utpucchayate* and *abhimanāyate*. Retaining one takes place in the case of words the usage of which is well-known or not well-known. For example, *upāste prapacati*, *adhīte*, *adhyeti*. Or the stem and the suffix together convey a single idea as in *pācaka*, *gopāyitā*, *brāhmaṇādhīna* and *jugupsate*. In these words, the suffixes *aka*, *āya*, *kha* and *san* do not convey any separate meaning.

Alternatively, the whole, undivided into parts, endowed with many powers, closely linked with one another, expresses a meaning having a number. Without directly expressing a number at the time of the use of the word, meanings determined by different numbers which are transitory, are conveyed by words having different forms.

The *Vṛtti* says that the different numbers are transitory like carpets round the neck of a crow :—*saṃkhyāviśeṣaiḥ kākakaṇṭhe guṇakambalavadanityaiḥ*. The analogy is not clear.]

166. The meaning of those words whose relation with meaning is eternal and whose power to denote their meaning has been understood by analysis, can also be understood by agreement and difference.

[Words and their meanings are analysed by the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. That is, recurrent parts of the meaning are ascribed to recurrent parts of the word.]

167. The meaning of a particular part of a word (stem or suffix) is to be taken as settled only if these (agreement and difference) can be applied without fail. That is not the case (for instance) in *nuṭ* and *śap*.

[The last point in this verse can be illustrated as follows —In *bhavatām* (genitive plural of *bhavat*) there is no *nuṭ*, still it expresses the sense of the genitive plural just as well as *devānām* where *nuṭ* is present. Can we say, therefore, that *nuṭ* has a meaning ? In the same way, in *atti*, third person singular form of the root *ad*, there is no *śap*. But in *pacati*, there is *śap*. Can we say that *śap* has any meaning of its own ? All that we can say is that it just helps the other elements to express their meaning.]

168. Where there is a possibility (of the stem and the suffix) having each its own meaning, it is not right to include the meaning of one in that of the other. The powers of words, when in contact with one another, are fixed and dependent upon one another.

[One does see that stem and suffixes can express a meaning when the other is absent. The word *kim* has no suffix and yet it denotes a meaning. In *iyān*, *iyat*, there is no stem and still they are expressive. In *aleṭ*, there is no suffix to see and yet it is expressive. Though ordinarily, stem and suffix

come together in usage it is possible, by using the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, to isolate the meaning of each and ascribe it to it. It would be wrong to include the meaning of each into that of the other.

The *Vṛtti* says something like this :—If the stem and the suffix have their own meaning, anybody would accept that the latter is expressed by the former. To consider it as included in something else would not be right because that would affect the natural power of words. That would lead to all meaning being considered as included in something else according to one's fancy. Therefore whatever meaning is understood from a word in usage should be ascribed to that word. Even though when words are used, stems and suffixes are not used in isolation and so their meanings are found to be mixed up, still it is accepted that stems and suffixes are expressive of their meanings separately. Because the powers of words have been handed down in the *śāstra* as distinct on the basis of regulation arrived at by the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*pratiniyamena kṛtapravibhāgā vyavasthitāḥ śabdānāṃ śaktayaḥ pratijñāyante*].

Where analysis would not result in a distinct meaning for the different elements, it should not be resorted to.

169. In the words *kūpa*, *yūpa* and *sūpa*, one does not see any recurring meaning (for the recurrent word element). Therefore, it is the whole word which expresses a different meaning.

[*Kūpa*, *yūpa* and *sūpa* have *ūpa* in common. The remaining element is peculiar to each word, but the meaning of the word is not due to its peculiar element. It belongs to the whole word. (See. *M. Bhā.* I. p. 32, lines 2-7.)]

170. In the derivations of words, one resorts to many ways of explaining them. Where many meanings are possible, a particular one is taken as the basis of derivation.

[The *Vṛtti* argues as follows—When experts put forward

derivations of words, either by giving them readymade (*nipātana*) or by giving rules of word-formation, one sees various kinds of explanations of correct words on the basis of some characteristic which is either fundamental (*savyāpāra*) or secondary, the worldly meaning of the word being invariable. Among the many powers of an object, any one may be resorted to as the basic characteristic and used as help in derivation : *anekaśaktiyukte'rthe yā kācinnimitabhāvenāśrīyamāṇā śaktiḥ sādhutvānvākhyāne 'ṅgatvaṃ pratipadyate*. For example, the derivation of the word *taṇḍula* is given in the *Uṇādisūtra*—*Vṛñluṭitanitādibhya ulac taṇḍaśca* (U.S.5.8). It is possible to derive the word *taṇḍula* by adding the suffix *ulac* to other roots and substituting *taṇḍa* for those roots.].

171. Words like *vaira*, *Vāsiṣṭha*, *giriśa* and *ekāgārika* have been explained by some on the basis of a variety of meanings.

[*Vaira* can be explained as *vīrasya idam* or as *vīrāyā idam*, *Vasiṣṭhasya idam* or *Vasiṣṭhena kṛtam proktaṃ vā* can result in *Vāsiṣṭha*. *Girīśa* can stand for *girav śete* or *giriṃ śyati*.

In addition to the words mentioned in the *kārikā* itself, the *Vṛtti* points out that the *Vārttika* : *tap parvamarudbhyām* on P. 5.2.121 is used to explain *parvata* and *marutta*. Similarly the idea of giving or what has happened (*Vṛtta*) is used to explain various forms. Thus various meanings and various limits of stems and suffixes are used by grammarians in order to explain forms without any restriction.]

172. Just as there is no contradiction in showing the same path in relation to a tree, an anthill or a mountain, in the same way, words like *go* can be derived through different accompanying attributes.

[The word *go* really denotes the universal *gotva* but it can be derived on the basis of any one of the many attributes which co-exist in the cow with its universal. These attributes may be actions or qualities.]

173. People who observe the different conditions of the object (denoted by the word in question) explain a word like, say, *kiṃśuka* by taking hold of one particular condition.

[Puṇyarāja points out that somebody might explain the word *kiṃśuka* which means the *palāśa* tree by reference to its state when it is devoid of all fruit and, therefore, of parrots. The tree is called *kiṃśuka*=what ! parrot! meaning something where there is no parrot because there is no fruit. Objects have many powers or states according to time and place. Man observes them and applies a word to it according to any one of these powers or states. The two become closely associated.

The *Vṛtti* points out that there is no contradiction in fixing the form of a word on the basis of one particular power as in the case of the word *kiṃśuka* for *palāśa*, arrived at on the basis of the absence of any parrot (*śuka*) on it when there is no fruit : *kiṃśukānām iva kālabhede śaktau kasyāñcicchabdasya vyavasthāyāṃ na virudhyate*.]

174. Some have derived the word *go* from *girati* (to utter) or *garjati* (to roar) or *gami* (to go) or *gavati* (to sound or) *gadati* (to articulate).

[The purpose of the verse is to show the extraordinary variety that there can be in the derivation of the same word by different scholars. Here the word *go* is taken as the example. Though usually it is derived from *gacchati*, it is possible to derive it from any one of the other roots mentioned in the verse. Both the sound of the verb and its meaning have something to do with the derivation.]

175. Others have declared that the word *gauḥ* is applied to a cow because of its form (and not because of any meaning). All words are devoid of any derivation. Others take both (the form as well as the meaning) as the basis.

[If the meaning of the root is the basis of the derivation of a word, one can think of several alternative roots as the basis of derivation. But there was another view on the subject, namely, that the form of the word itself is the basis of the derivation. This view is attributed to the *Aukthikyas*. Words are devoid of any derivation based on meaning. This is the *avyutpattipakṣa* = the view that words are not made up of smaller meaningful elements. The opposite view is that both form and meaning are the basis of the application of a word to an object. This is the *Vyutpattipakṣa*.

The text of the *Vṛtti* is not clear in some places. It also connects the *avyutpattipakṣa* with the *Aukthikyas* : *Apare cācāryā aukthikyādayo gauḥ kasmād gaur ityeva gaur iti nirvacanam āhuḥ*].

The next question is : The same word or sound is found in different contexts in the language. Is it the same everywhere ?

176. For the sake of simplicity, instruction in grammar is based on what is generic. The particular forms are expressive of this common element as in the case of the other universals.

[The *Vṛtti* says something like this : In the Science of Grammar, whatever can be taught on the basis of what is generic, of what recurs in the form or the meaning in the midst of changes is so taught. But the particular relating to the form or the meaning conveys another universal, as it were. The root *gam*, expressive of its conventional meaning, does not express the real meaning of the word *gauḥ*. The verbs *sravati*, *syandate*, *plavate*, *patati* are taught in the sense of motion in general (*gatisāmānye*) also, but they denote naturally particular movements coming under motion in general. In the same way, the word *gauḥ*, also denotes a particular motion. In the word *gauḥ* the root *gam* does not stand for mere shifting of the legs. Roots being polysemic, there is nothing to prevent the root *gam* from denoting all movements coming under motion in general. It is actually seen that the root *gam* stands for other activities as in *gurutalpaga*. Thus

from conventional words, not only is the generic meaning understood, but also the particular meaning.]

177. The same stem used in another meaning is considered to be a different one. Though it has the same form in usage, it is not reckoned the same in the other case.

[This verse further explains the idea contained in the previous one. A separate word is applied to every separate object (*pratyarthaṁ śabdaniveśaḥ*). The root *gam* in the word *go*, standing for a particular kind of movement, is different from *gam* standing for motion in general. The root *pac* in *taṇḍulaṃ pacati* is different from the root *pac* in *pacyate taṇḍulaḥ svayam eva*, because there is a difference in meaning. The two roots look alike, but they are not the same.

The *Vṛtti* also points out that a root must be considered to be different when it is used in a *karmakartṛ* formation. Even though there may be resemblance in form and meaning, there is difference also and so there is no trace of the conventional roots in the non-conventional ones and vice versa : *Karmakartṛviṣayavat satyapi tulyaviṣayarūpatve 'tyantabhedānna rūḍhiviṣayāṇāmarūḍhiṣvarūḍhiviṣayāṇām vā rūḍhiṣu kaścid anuṣaṅgo vidyate.*].

178. *Iji* and *Yaji*, two different roots, each restricted to its own scope, are explained differently by different people. There is indeed much variety in the process of derivation.

[Puṇyarāja points out that some grammarians teach the root *yaj* and its samprasāraṇa (change of *y* into *i*) when followed by a *kit* suffix. We would then get *iṣṭah*, *iṣṭvā* etc. When followed by *tṛc* or *tumun*, no such thing takes place and we get *yaṣṭā*, *yaṣṭum* etc. Others say that the root is *ij* and when followed by *tṛc*, the *i* is changed into *y*.

The *Vṛtti* says the same thing but gives different examples. It says that in *staḥ* and *santi* the root is different from what it is in *asti* and it consists of *s* only and has its own

special scope, that is, when followed by a *ṅit* suffix. All these views about words are of a practical character and only resemble reality. In fact, there is no such thing as a root. It is only a practical postulate resorted to by scholars : *na hi dhāturūpam paramārthena kiñcid vidyate, vyavahārastu-kaiścit kriyate.* Some declare that the root in *asti* consists of *s* only and that, when followed by a *pit* suffix, it takes the augment *a*. Some teach the root *āhi*='to speak', 'to explain' the five forms *āha* etc.]

179. Thus one should do as in the case of *bālavāya* and *jitvarī*. There is no contradiction in taking identity or difference as the basis.

[*Vaidūrya* is explained as something coming from *vidūra*. In reality, it comes from *bālavāya* and is only polished at *vidūra*. It is, therefore, assumed that *bālavāya* and *vidūra* are the same. Or, it may be that among grammarians *bālavāya* is known as *vidūra*, just as *Vārāṇasī* is known as *Jitvarī* among merchants. Likewise, *Viśravaṇa* and *Ravaṇa* are the same. The *Vṛtti* adds that grammarians consider *vidūra* to be a substitute for the stem *bālavāya* when the suffix *ṣyañ* follows. What the *Vṛtti* and Puṇyarāja say is based upon the following *ślokavārttika* on P. 4.3.84:—

Bālavāyo vidūraṃ ca prakṛtyantaram eva vā /
na vai tatreti ced brūyāj jitvarīvad upācaret//

180. It is for such purposes as the fixing of the position of the augment *aṭ* that roots and prepositions are regarded separately in the discipline. In reality, the root itself is like that (that is, joined to an upasarga).

[The whole or unity is real and not differentiation. But grammar has to adopt differentiation in order to do its work. *upasargas* and roots together constitute a unity and convey one idea. But the *śāstra* treats them as different in order to regulate the position of the augment *aṭ* and reduplication and so on.]

181. The word *saṃgrāmayati* is an instance where (the augment *a* and the reduplication) are taught (not before the pure root) but before the root and the preposition combined. Particular actions are conveyed by particular combinations (of root and preposition).

[The forms *asaṃgrāmayat* and *sisaṃgrāmayiṣati* can be explained only if the augment *aṭ* and the reduplication are taught before the root preceded by a preposition. See *M. Bhā*. II. P. 23, lines 7-8.

The *Vṛtti* remarks—Roots are taught as separate elements, expressive of particular actions. In the verbs *nivāsayati*, *āsphoṭayati*, *jugupsate*, *mūtrayati*, the suffix *lyap* and reduplication would get their proper place when the preposition and the root are regarded as separate elements. It is the combination of *sam* and *grām* which is taught as expressive of the particular action called 'fighting'. It has been made clear again that derivation must take place from the root *saṃgrāma* with the preposition included in it.]

182. The grammatical operation relating to the combined root and preposition is of an inner nature (*antaraṅga*). It is such an action (conveyed by root and preposition together) which becomes associated with the means of its accomplishment.

[Puṇyarāja quotes the following passage from the *M. Bhā* on *Vā* 11. on P.1.3.1 and *Vā*. 5. 6. on P. 6.1.135.

> *kārakāṇāṃ pravṛttir viśiṣṭakriyāyām, anyathākṛtvā māṁsaudane pravarttante, anyathā ca śuṣkaudane.*

It is only after the action is fully determined that the means are employed for its accomplishment. In other words, the root is first united with the preposition. Thus united, it expresses a fully determined action and such an action is united with the means. As the *Vṛtti* puts it : *tasmād viśiṣṭaprakṛtirūpavācyā viśiṣṭakriyā tathābhūtaiva sādhyā satī sādhanasambandham pratipadyate.*]

Now the opposite view is explained.

183. It is only when the meaning of roots, fit to be used, is fully determined that it is qualified. Before being connected with the means of its accomplishment, an action does not attain its form at all.

[The view expressed here is that it is only when the action denoted by a root is connected with the accessories denoted by other words in the sentence that it attains its full form and becomes fit to be qualified by prepositions.

The *Vṛtti* puts it as follows—When an idea has attained its full form and is to be qualified and there are several possible ways of doing so, the qualification is actually done by words actually used and then the relation of qualifier and qualified is attained. As an action is to be brought about, its relation with the accessories takes place first. Therefore, before that, action is formless (*nirātmikā*) and cannot enter into the relation of qualifier and qualified with the prepositions which only manifest what is already there. According to some scholars, a root first enters into relation with the words expressive of the accessories : *pūrvaṃ dhātuḥ sādhanena yujyata ityekeṣāṃ matam.*]

The other view is now further explained—

184. Just as the quality of being a root and the object of an action are assumed on the basis of a future connection with the means of its accomplishment, in the same way, a similar process can be seen elsewhere also.

[The reference here is to P. 3.1.7. which teaches the formation of the desiderative verbs. The suffix *san* is added optionally, to a root when it becomes the object (of 'to desire') and when it has the same subject as the action of desiring. We are here asked to add *san* to a root which is a *karma*, but it becomes a *karma* only when *san* is added. What is going to happen is assumed here to have taken place. The same

thing can be done in regard to association of a root with prepositions.]

185. Just as lac and other dyes applied to the seed at the time of sowing prove useful to the fruit by changing its colour,

186. in the same way, a distinction introduced on account of the connection in our minds between a root and a preposition appears at the time that words develop.

[These two verses are meant to explain the view that a root first enters into relation with preposition and then only with words expressive of the accessories. The analogy of dyeing the seed with lac in order to bring about some difference of colour in the fruit is used here. Root and preposition together express a particular action. That particularity cannot be expressed by the root alone, no matter with how many accessories it is connected. The particularity which exists in the action, expressed by the root and the preposition together, may be made cleaner by association with the accessories. In all this discussion, a distinction is made between mental connection and actual connection in speech. The former naturally always takes place first. The *Vṛtti* also refers to this previous connection in the mind.]

The author now proceeds to speak about the other parts of speech, now that something has been said about the noun and the verb (*nāma* and *ākhyāta*).

187. Distinctions already existing in some (roots) but not expressed (by them) are brought out when they come into contact with preposition like *pra* and *parā*.

[The view about prepositions mentioned here is that they only reveal (*dyotaka*) a meaning and are not expressive of it.

The *Vṛtti* refers to the author of the *Saṅgraha* in support of this view, namely, that the preposition reveals a meaning

already present in it and is, therefore, not expressive of it. As the *Vṛtti* puts it :—*Śabdāntaropagraham antareṇa sambhavī sannalabdhaniyamo yo'rthas taṃ dyotako niyamayan vācakatām atikrāmatīti Saṃgrahkāra āha.* According to the author of the *Saṅgraha*, the function of the preposition is to specify one of the peculiarities or modifications which are all potentially present in the action denoted by the root. Because it specifies (*niyamayan*) it is called *dyotaka*, revealer, manifestor and so it is far from being expressive (*vācakatām atikrāmati.*]

Are prepositions only *dyotaka* or are they *vācaka* also ?

188. A preposition is expressive of some distinction in the action. It is also possible for it to be a manifestor of it. Or it is used as a help to give strength to the root (to express its meaning).

[Thus, this verse mentions three views about prepositions—(1) that they are expressive (2) that they are manifestors of something which exists elsewhere (*dyotaka*) (3) that they are helps, that is, they and the roots together express a meaning.

The *Vṛtti* clearly says that three views regarding the upasargas are held by the Ācāryas : *Vācakatvaṃ dyotakatvaṃ sahābhidhāyitvam ityupasargeṣu trividhā pratipattir ācāryāṇām.* If, due to association with a preposition, a meaning which a root cannot have is understood, then it is said to be expressive of it (*vācaka*). If it manifests a meaning which the root can have but does not convey, it is said to be a manifestor (*dyotaka*). If the root and the preposition together convey a particularised action, then it is like a *svārthika* suffix.]

The reasoning which establishes that prepositions manifest and do not express is now given.

189. The ideas of going etc. which are not expressed by the bare roots *sthā* etc. are manifested by the prepositions *pra* etc. as can be established by the two kinds of reasoning.

[The root *sthā* conventionally means : to stay, to stand. When the preposition *pra* is placed before it, it means 'to go', 'to start'. So it is the preposition which expresses the idea of going. This is refuted by the present verse and the double reasoning referred to is as follows—

(1)	*Praśabda ādikarmadyotakaḥ praśabdatvāt pūrvoditapacyādidṛṣṭapraśabdavat*	= The word *pra* reveals the beginning of an action. Because it is the word *pra*. Like the word *pra* seen elsewhere.
(2)	*Tiṣṭhatir anekārthaḥ dhātutvād ubhayavādisammatānekārthayajatyādidhātuvat*	The root *sthā* is polysemic. Because it is a root. Like the root *yaj* etc. admitted to be polysemic by both sides.

These two kinds of reasoning called *sāmānyato dṛṣṭenānumānam* and *viśeṣato dṛṣṭenānumānam* are referred to by the *Vṛtti* also.

It is now stated that the root and the preposition together convey the meaning. Neither by itself can do it.

190. When *adhi* and *pari* are not used some other action is expressed by the root. The root, by itself meaningless, expresses the meaning together with them.

[In *adhyāgacchati* and *paryāgacchati*, *adhi* and *pari* are meaningless because what these two words mean is conveyed by *āgacchati* by itself. Whatever additional meaning we attribute to *adhi* and *pari* can be understood from the context without the help of these two prepositions. They are used only for the sake of clarity. The root by itself is also meaningless. So the meaning is conveyed by the two together. See *M. Bhā* on P. 1.4.93.

The *Vṛtti* points out, following the *M. Bhā* that when P. 1.4.93 says that *adhi* and *pari* are meaningless, what is meant is that they do not convey a meaning different from that of the root. Whether they are used or not, the same

meaning is understood. As a result of grammatical tradition, the root and the preposition are looked upon as separate.]

As *upasargas* are joined to roots, so are *svārthika* suffixes to stems. The latter are now considered.

191. In the same way, some *svārthika* suffixes, finding themselves in other combinations (and, therefore) connected with a meaningless element express, with the help of the latter, a meaning belonging to this element considered separately.

[*Yāva* means a certain food prepared from *yava*=barley. *Yāvaka* also means the same thing. Here the suffix *ka* is found in a combination (*yāvaka*) which is different from *yāva*, a separate word altogether. It is, therefore, natural to ask : What is the use of *ka* in *yāvaka*? The answer is that in *yāvaka*, the *yāva* portion is really meaningless, though the word *yāva* has a meaning. This very meaning is expressed in *yāvaka* by the *yāva* portion plus the *ka* portion. *Prakṛtyarthānuvādinaḥ*= the *prakṛti* in *yāvaka* is *yāva* which has no meaning. As it looks like the meaningful word *yāva*, the suffix is said to express the meaning of the *prakṛti*. This is a mere grammatical tradition : *arthavadbhiḥ saṃsṛṣṭā iti śāstravyavahāre vyapadiśyamānāḥ*, says the *Vṛtti*.]

Now something is said about *nipātas*, the fourth part of speech recognised by Yāska.

192. Some *nipātas* (particles) manifest a meaning, some are expressive of a separate meaning, some, like augments (*āgamāḥ*), express a meaning together with other elements.

[It is stated in this verse that *nipātas* can be *dyotaka*= manifestors of meaning existing elsewhere, or *vācaka*, directly expressive of meaning or lastly, they can express a meaning in cooperation with other elements. Puṇyarāja does not give separate examples of each kind. The *Vṛtti* quotes some Vedic passage in the course of the explanation but the text is not clear. Those *nipātas* are *dyotaka* which are not used except

in association with other words. Such are *ca*, vā and so on. Those are called expressive which can convey a meaning by themselves like *śaśvat*, *yugapat*. There is no restriction as to the position of the former in the sentence.]

193. It makes no difference to the manifesting nature of particles whether they are used before or after the associated words from which they differ in meaning.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that even though, logically, the general precedes the particular in speech, one may sometimes put the particular before the general as in *Gārgyo brāhmaṇa ānīyatāṃ*=let Gārgya, the *brāhmaṇa* be brought or *Śiṃśapā vṛkṣaś chidyatām*=let the *Śiṃśapā* tree be cut.]

It is now stated why some *nipātas* are said to be *dyotaka* while others are said to be *Vācaka*.

194. A suffix, though expressive, is not used by itself. Particles *ca* etc. though they are separate words, are not used by themselves.

[What is *dyotaka* is sometimes not used by itself; what is *vācaka* is also not used by itself sometimes. The difference is that if a particle, even though a *pada*, is not used by itself, it is *dyotaka*. If it is a *pada* and expresses a meaning by itself, it is *vācaka*, like *śaśvat*, *yugapat* etc.]

195. Even if they denote the things collected (and not the collection), there is no diversity (which is the basis for the use of the sixth case-ending). It is a thing which is not an entity (that is expressed by the particles). Action is expressed by other kinds of words.

[It might be said that if *ca* denotes *samuccaya*, then the noun used with it would take the sixth case-ending as it does when used with the word *samuccaya*. One says *Vṛkṣasya samuccayaḥ*, *plakṣasya samuccayaḥ*. So it must be deemed to denote

not *samuccaya*=collection but the *samuccita*=things collected, which, when expressed by *ca* is *asattva*, something which is not an entity. This is due to the nature of words (*śabdaśakti*). The main idea in this verse is that words denote meanings according to their nature. It is the nature of particles like *ca* to denote the *asattva*, the non-entity. *Pacati* and *pāka* both mean cooking, but the former conveys cooking as *asattva*, not a concrete entity but a process, whereas the latter conveys cooking as a thing, an entity, not as a process. This difference in the power of words is natural and not the result of teaching.

The *Vṛtti* had the reading : *tiṅpadair abhidhīyate*, instead of *kriyānyenābhidhīyate* adopted by Puṇyarāja. The translation follows the latter.]

196. Only such words as denote qualified objects are connected with attributes. *Ca* and other such particles are always dependent on others even if they denote the collected.

[Words which denote objects in which the universal and other properties inhere have a certain independence and they can be qualified by adjectives with some qualifying property. As far as particles like *ca* are concerned, they denote by their very nature, non-concrete things and are always dependent upon the use of other words. They have no independence and so they cannot be qualified by adjectives like independent words. Therefore, though particles denote non-concrete collected things, they are not used independently and are not connected with adjectives. This is their nature.

The *Vṛtti* also emphasises what has been said above and adds that in the different types of *dvandva* compounds, it is the collection to which the collected are subordinate which is expressed : *karmasādhane'pi samuccīyata iti samuccitopasarjanaḥ samuccaya evābhidhīyate.*]

The author now says something about *karmapravacanīya.*

197. Sometimes an action creates a relation and disappears (that is, it is not mentioned). Some-

times, a relation is produced while the verb is actually heard.

[*Rājapuruṣa* is an example of an action producing a relation and not being mentioned. In *mātuḥ smarati*, an action is mentioned and it brings the relation of mother and child to the mind. In *vṛkṣaṃ prati vidyotate vidyut*='the lightning flashes towards the tree', *prati* is a *karmapravacanīya*. It specifies that the relation between the tree and the flash of lightning is that of aim and what aims (*lakṣyalakṣaṇabhāvā*). It does not manifest the action because the verb *vidyotate* does it. Nor does it denote a relation in general because the second case-ending in *vṛkṣam* which comes in place of the sixth, does it. Nor does it bring some other action to the mind, because it is not understood. What it does is to specify the general relation. All relation is brought about by a previous action. It always subsists between two things which were *kārakas* in relation to some action. In *rājā puruṣaṃ bibharti*='the king supports the man' the king is the agent and the man the object in relation to the act of supporting.

The *Vṛtti* also speaks about two kinds of relation and claims that it is based on the *Saṅgraha*. The two kinds are : (1) that which is understood when no verb is used and (2) that which is understood when a verb is used: *tirobhūtakriyāpadaḥ* and *sannihitakriyāpadaḥ*. While explaining these two terms, it seems to quote a passage from the *Saṅgraha*. As this passage is in prose while some other quotations from the same work are in verse, it appears that this famous work was partly in prose and partly in verse. Here the two kinds of relation are illustrated by *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* and *mātuḥ smarati*.]

198. It is for the sake of preventing compounds that the sixth case-ending has been taught in some cases. The third case-ending comes after *guṇa* in order to show that it is the instrument (and not the object).

[There are eight *sūtras* which teach the sixth case-ending in special cases (P. 2.3.52ff). No compound can be made of

the two words connected by the sixth case-ending in the examples of these rules. For example, P. 2.3.52 teaches the sixth case-ending in *mātuḥ smaraṇam*. One cannot make the compound *mātṛsmaraṇam*, because the *karmakāraka* is here thought of as a general relation : *karmaṇi śeṣatvena vivakṣite*. If the compound is made, the sixth case-ending would have to be elided. No other *kāraka* is thought of as a general relation according to this rule. So the case-ending would be used according to the *kāraka*, as in *mātur guṇaiḥ smarati*. P. 2.3.52 teaches a restriction which is understood in two ways. The*Kā śikā* understands it thus : —*karm'ṇyeva śeṣatvena vivakṣi te ṣaṣṭhī, na tu kārakāntare*. Bhartṛhari understands it thus : *karmaṇi ṣaṣṭhyeva, na tu samāsalugādi*. Thus one can have a *mātur guṇānāṃ smaraṇam* and *mātur guṇasmaraṇam*.

The *Vṛtti* also discusses why the eight *sūtras* prescribing the sixth case-ending with particular roots have been given and why the same purpose could not have been served by the general rule *Ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe* (P. 2.3.50). Its view is that it has been done to prevent compounding : *pratipadaṃ punar ārabhyate, samāsapratiṣedhaḥ kathaṃ syād iti*.]

199. When the verb is not mentioned, a relation created by it is specified in some places by the post-position.

[In *vṛkṣaṃ prati vidyotate vidyut*='the lightning flashes at the tree', there is, first of all, the action of flashing. Secondly, there is the action of aiming. The lightning aims the flashing at the tree. The tree is the aim. Between the aim and the action of aiming, there is the relation of *lakṣya-lakṣaṇabhāva*. This relation is created by the action of aiming which is not mentioned in the sentence. The second case-ending after *Vṛkṣa* tells us that there is a relation. What it is and by what action it is brought about is specified by *prati*, the post-position (*karmapravacanīya*). Its function, therefore, is to specify the particular relation brought about by the action which is not mentioned. It does not manifest the action of aiming because this action creates this particular relation between the tree and the action of flashing and is not mentioned. Nor

does it manifest the action of flashing, because the verb is mentioned. It only specifies the relation already expressed in a general way by the second case-ending.

The *Vṛtti* contains a quotation defining the function of the *karmapravacanīya*. Can it be from the *Saṃgraha*?]

Why not say that the post-position brings to the mind the action which is not mentioned?

200. That which brings the action to the mind would be connected with *kāraka* case-endings, just like *vi* (in *viparilikhati*). *vi* is not a preposition of the root *likh*.

[In *prādeśaṃ viparilikhati*, the *vi* brings to the mind the action of measuring (*vimāna*) and when it is connected with *prādeśaṃ*, it is connected with a *kāraka* case-ending, *prādeśaṃ* being a *karmakāraka*. Thus, it is not *parilikhati* which would be connected with *prādeśam*. *Vi* would become the *upasarga* of *mā* and not of *likh*. Similarly, if the post-position brings the action to the mind, it would be connected with a *kāraka* case-ending and there would be no need for the *sūtra* P. 2.3.8. But if the view is that it does not bring an action to the mind, then the relation between *vṛkṣa* and *dyotana* would be a general one and the sixth case-ending would result. To prevent it, P. 2.3.8. teaches the second case-ending.]

201. In the word *apratyajayan*, it is seen that the preposition *prati* brings to the mind the action denoted by *tiṣṭhati*. *Abhi* by itself is used in the sense of direction in connection with the verb *sunvati* (that is, in *abhiṣuṇvanti*).

[In the word *apratyajayan*, the preposition *prati* suggests the action denoted by the verb *tiṣṭhati*. The sentence in which it occurs is, according to Puṇyarāja: *Devā asurān apratitiṣṭhataḥ pratiṣṭhām alabhamānān ajayan* = the gods defeated the asuras who were not firmly established. *Aprati* is understood as *apratitiṣṭhataḥ*, that is, *prati* brings to the mind the action of *pratiṣṭhā*. It is not connected with the root *ji* in *ajayan*. In

abhiṣuṇvanti, *abhi* by itself denotes direction. It is not that the root denotes its action qualified by direction and that *abhi* merely manifests it (*dyotaka*).

The *Vṛtti*, while explaining *apratyajayan*, quotes *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*. V, 4.6.3.4. to which probably the verse refers.]

202. When they are connected with an action, the name *karmapravacanīya* is given to *su*, *ati* etc. which are really of a different nature in order to prevent the change of *s* into *ṣ*.

[*Su* becomes *karmapravacanīya* by P.1.4.94 and *ati* by P.1.4.95. But for P.1.4.54. *su* would be *upasarga* and that would have the effect of causing the change of a following *s* into *ṣ* by P.8.3.65. as in *su ṣiktaṃ bhavatā*. In this sentence *su* has not the characteristic of a *karmapravacanīya*, because it does not specify a relation, but modifies an action. And yet the name is given to it in order to explain why a following *s* does not change into *ṣ*. So we get *su siktam* and not *su ṣiktam*.

The *Vṛtti* points out that *su* and *ati* do not have the characteristic (*pravṛttinimitta*) which would justify the name *karmapravacanīya* being applied to them. And yet, it has been applied to them in P.1.4.94, 95. on the basis of their form (*svarūpa*) only in order to prevent the names *upasarga* and *gati* being given to them. The name *upasarga* would result in loss of *udātta* accent and the change of *s* into *ṣ* : *tena gatyupasargasaṃjñāśrayanighātādikāryaṃ na pravartate*, concludes the *Vṛtti*.]

203. Once the relation of cause and effect has been specified by *anu*, the third case-ending would result but that is prevented by special teaching.

[The special teaching referred to is P.1.4. 84. *Hetu* (cause) is of two kinds : it is either that which brings about something or that which makes known something. By P.1.4.90, *anu* gets the name *karmapravacanīya* when the idea of *lakṣaṇa* is to be expressed. Lakṣaṇa stands for both kinds of cause. In *vṛkṣam anu vidyotate vidyut*, the second kind of cause is ex-

pressed. The tree is what makes the lightning known. In such a case, *anu* gets the name *karmapravacanīya* by P. 1.4.90 and takes the second case-ending by P. 2.3.8. But *lakṣaṇa* can mean the first kind of cause also and that takes the third case-ending by P. 2.3.23. But as there is a separate *sūtra*(that is, P.1.4.84.) giving the name *karmapravacanīya* to *anu* when the first kind of cause is to be expressed, the third case-ending is set aside and the second case-ending comes according to P. 2.3.8.

The *Vṛtti* says the same thing as follows—The word *anu* has been seen elsewhere to suggest the action of hearing (*niśāmayatikriyā*) and so here it brings to the mind the action of hearing as the cause of the relation produced by it. The sixth case-ending expressive of cause should therefore be used. But the third has been taught as expressive of cause (P.2.3.23.) That would then come in place of the sixth. But then *anu* has been given the name of *karmapravacanīya* which takes the second case ending which, therefore, sets aside the third case-ending.]

204. It does not manifest an action, nor does it directly express a relation nor does it supply a verb but it specifies a relation.

[This stanza states the position in regard to the *karmapravacanīya*. In *vṛkṣam anu vidyotate vidyut*, the *karmapravacanīya anu* does not manifest an action, in this case, the action of aiming. Such an action does not come to the mind from the sentence. Nor does it directly express relation because the second case-ending does it. Nor does it bring some other action to the mind as *vi* does in *prādeśaṃ viparilikhati*. All that it does is to specify the relation, namely, *lakṣyalakṣaṇabhāva*.

The *Vṛtti* explains this verse on the basis of the sentence : *Śākalyasya saṃhitām anu prāvarṣat*. Here the word *anu* does not bring the action of 'hearing' to the mind. Nor does it imply an action as *vi* does in *viparilikhati*. Nor does it express an action because the case-ending in *saṃhitām* would become a *Kārakavibhakti* which it is not. Nor does it express a relation created by the action of hearing. So it specifies the relation created by the action of hearing. It specifies that the relation is that of cause and effect. As it performs this special function,

it is regarded as a separate part of speech by some. The concluding words of the *Vṛtti* are worth quoting—*Tasmād anyaprakārāsambhavād ayaṃ niśamayati kriyopajanitaṃ sambandham avacchinatti. Hetuhetumatsambandho' yam, nedaṃ sambandhāntaram iti. Etasmācca vṛttibhedāt pañcamaṃ padajātaṃ karmapravacanīyāḥ kaiścid ācāryaiḥ pratijñāyante.*]

The author again speaks about the indivisibility of the sentence and of the sentence-meaning.

205. A collection of meaningless phonemes is either with meaning or without meaning. It is the individual word which is endowed with meaning. There are no parts in a word.

[The doctrine of indivisibility is challenged as follows—If the individual word is a collection of phonemes, if the phonemes have a meaning, if the word has a meaning, if the sentence is a collection of words and if the collection has a meaning, how can indivisibility be maintained? The *vārttika—Saṃghātārthavattvāt* (Vā. 12, *M.Bhā.*I.p. 30, l. 24.) seems to imply this objection.

It is answered thus—The phonemes are never felt to be meaningful. Nobody has the feeling that the meaning of the word is made up of the meanings of phonemes, just as one seems to recognise in the meaning of the sentence the meanings of individual words. If phonemes have no meaning, they cannot be parts of words because division of the sound part of a word must correspond to the division of the meaning part.

The *Vṛtti* which is none too clear contains a reference to the *Saṅgraha* which is said to speak about ten kinds of meaningfulness: *tad ubhayaṃ parigṛhya daśadhārthavattā svabhāvabheditā iti Saṅgrahe. . . .*]

206. A collection of meaningful words, on the other hand, is different, being expressive of a meaning different from that of the component words (when there is connection between them)

and because of the absence of a connection (between these words.)

[The *Vṛtti* points out that a collection of meaningful words may be of two kinds: (1) one in which the meanings of the words are interconnected, so that the collection, as a whole, has a meaning different from that of the words and (2) one in which the meanings of the words have no connection at all with one another.]

207. Some say that when a word is analysed (*bhede*) its two elements, one meaningful and the other meaningless, do not enter into any relation with each other while others declare that they do, as there is the example of the word *kuṭīra*.

[The word *kuṭīra* is analysed into two parts: *kuṭī* and *ra*. The former has a meaning while the latter has not. So they cannot be connected, according to some, while others think that *ra* suggests the idea of smallness and so the two can be joined.]

208. Taking compounds and words ending in *svārthika* suffixes respectively as their basis, some say that from elements having a meaning, a collection having a meaning is produced while others hold that such a collection is not produced.

[The word *rājapuruṣa* is an instance of a compound having a meaning and made up of elements having a meaning. From a word made up of a meaningful stem and a *svārthika* suffix, no collection having a different meaning is produced.

In the *Vṛtti* on this verse, there is a quotation from the *Saṅgraha* in which words as collection of smaller units are said to be of three kinds: (1) *śabdānvayinaḥ* = those in which the sounds of the smaller units can be traced but not their meanings, like *gaurakhara* and *aśvakarṇa*, (2) *arthānvayinaḥ* = those in which the meanings of the smaller units can be traced, but

not their sounds, like *śrotriya* and *vaidūrya* and (3) *śabdārthānvayinaḥ* = those in which both the sounds and the meanings of the smaller units can be traced, like *rājapuruṣa* and *nīlotpala*. The verse gives the views of different thinkers. One of them is called Dhyānakāra, the author of the *Dhyāna*(graha). See Bhartṛhari, p.29.]

209. Some collections are made up of separately meaningful parts. When divided, each element is separately recognisable and meaningful. Some (on the other hand) have to have their denotative power inferred by means of agreement and difference.

[*Śamīvṛkṣa* and *Dāḍimīvṛkṣa* are examples of the first kind. *Saṃjñu* and *Prajñu* are examples of the second kind. *Saṃjñu* is explained as *saṁgate jānunī asya* = one whose knees are joined together. The word *jānunī*, though seen in the analysis, is not easily recognisable in the compound word.]

210. It is only a meaning current in the Science of Grammar which is shown to prove that phonemes are meaningful. Pure roots, stems etc. have no recognised meaning in the world.

[The *vārttika*: *Arthavanto varṇā dhātuprātipadikapratyayanipātānām ekavarṇānām arthadarśanāt* (*Vā*. 9. *M.Bhā*. I. p.30,l.2.) is considered here. The question whether single phonemes have a meaning or not is considered in the *M.Bhā* on the *pratyāhāra sūtra*: *ha-ya-va-raṭ*. The conclusion reached there is that they have a meaning only when they happen to be roots, stems, suffixes or particles. Even this meaning is obtained by the analysis practised in the *Śāstra*. It is not seen in the world.]

211. The meaning of the bare *kṛt* and *taddhita* suffixes is likewise not known in the world. Similarly,

before the inflexional suffixes are added, a word ending in a *kṛt* or *taddhita* suffix has no meaning.

[The *Vṛtti* quotes *vā*. 7 on P.1.2.45. to show that bare suffixes have no meaning as against the alleged opposite view implied in the *sūtra* P. 1.1.19—*īdūdau ca saptamyarthe*.]

212. The meaning which is observed as being expressed by words ending in such suffixes is really of the same nature (that is, just assumed in grammar) because the context is that of meaningful elements.

[This has been said in answer to the objection that if words ending in *kṛt* and *taddhita* suffixes have no meaning, how is it that such words are called *prātipadika*, considering that to be a *prātipadika*, something must be meaningful. The answer amounts to saying that the meaning ascribed to words ending in *kṛt* and *taddhita* is only the result of analysis in grammar and not something seen in the world, because such words, without a case-ending, are not used in the world.]

213. If the word and the sentence are not different from the phonemes, the latter would ultimately become expressive by virtue of the power of mutual requirement.

[The view which is criticized here is that there is no such thing as the word or the sentence apart from the phonemes. If the phonemes are expressive and if the word and the sentence do not exist as distinct from the phonemes, the latter cannot be said to be expressive and that would go against the accepted view that it is they which are expressive.]

214. If a collection of phonemes, with some missing phoneme but still expressive of the meaning (of the whole collection) is not considered to be a different word, then it is the complete word which is brought to the mind by it.

[If *iṣkartāram* and *niṣkartāram* mean the same thing and if the former is not taken as entirely different from the latter, then it is the complete word which is first brought to the mind by the incomplete word and from the complete word so conveyed, the meaning is understood.

The above note is based on Puṇyarāja. The *Vṛtti* is not clear, but it also speaks about remembering the complete word through the incomplete word in connection with the Vedas :— *Chāndaseṣvapi lopeṣu prasiddhivikalāni yāni śabdāntarāṇi tair anyūnā avaikalyayuktāḥ prasiddhāḥ samudāyāḥ smaryante.* It also quotes words from the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* I, 8.10.1. and IV. 1.10.2.]

215. Such an incomplete word, due to a particular reason (here the grammatical tradition) reminds one of the really expressive word (that is, the complete word) and conveys, as though directly, the meaning which is a step removed from it by the real word.

[It is one step removed from the meaning because it first reminds one of the complete word and then expresses its meaning.

Whether the incomplete word is looked upon as the same or as different from the complete word, it is clear that the parts have no meaning. Even if the incomplete word is looked upon as a different word, as long as it can convey the meaning only after bringing the complete word to the mind, the conclusion is that the incomplete word which is a part has no meaning.

The *Vṛtti* points out that through habit and practice listeners think that they understand the meaning from the comlete word:—*tatra paricayāt pratipattāraḥ sākṣādivāvikalāvayavaśabdajanitam abhimanyante.* It also compares the understanding of the meaning from the incomplete word to the understanding of the meaning from gestures and signs like winking (*akṣinikoca*) which are also supposed first to bring the corresponding word to the mind.]

That the parts cannot convey the meaning of the whole is now further explained by means of examples.

216. Just as in compound words like *gaurakhara* no separate meaning exists for each term and even if any be understood, it is not understood from the whole,

217. in the same way, it is of no use to detect meanings for individual words in the apparently connected meaning that is conveyed by the different words comprising a sentence.

[From compound words like *gaurakhara* one understands an animal having a particular universal. No meaning is understood from each term and even if it is held to be understood, it is not taken note of at the time of the understanding of the meaning of the whole. Similarly, when the meaning of the sentence is understood, the meaning of the individual words does not figure in it. The sentence-meaning is like the flavour of a cool drink. It is something different from the flavour of the ingredients.

The *Vṛtti* also says the same thing and discusses the same words : *gaurakhara* and *aśvakarṇa*.]

218. If the parts and the whole have different meanings, then, in compounds such opposite attributes as differentiation and unity would result.

[This verse points out the difficulty that would arise if the meaning of each term in a compound word is considered to be real. From *gaurakhara* as a whole, an object having a particular universal is understood. From each one of its terms, another universal would be understood and these two would be different from each other. It would mean that from one word both difference and unity would be understood which is unsound.]

219. Who would think of *adhi* etc. as expressive of the means (to the accomplishment of the action)? In a *bahuvrīhi* compound, how could a

meaning belonging to no word actually used (that is, *anyapadārtha*) be expressed ?

[If the divisions are looked upon as real and not fictitious, they could become expressive instead of the whole. In *adhibhuvi* or *adhistri* the *adhi* would express location instead of the compound as a whole as it is generally believed. Secondly, if the parts are expressive, what would express the *anyapadārtha* in a *bahuvrīhi*?. The parts cannot do it and yet that is the real meaning of a *bahuvrīhi* according to P. 2.2.24.

The *Vṛtti* mentions the compounds *antastīram* and *adhistri* for discussion. One can infer that in *adhistri*, *adhi* merely conveys the power of location (*ādhāraśakti*) which is favourable to the action in question. In a *bahuvrīhi* compound, the whole conveys the meaning of a word the form of which is different from that of its parts :—*bahuvrīhau ca rūpānvayayuktam avayavapadam antareṇa padāntaraṃ tadabhidheye vartamānaḥ samudāyo dṛśyate*.

220. In the words *prajñu* and *saṃjñu*, one does not understand a meaning from the different parts. Therefore, it is the whole which conveys a definite meaning.

[Thus, four arguments have been given against the expressivity of the parts : (1) Both differentiation and unity cannot be understood as real from the same word, (2) *adhi* etc. by themselves cannot express the means (*sādhana*), (3) in a *bahuvrīhi*, the *anyapadārtha* cannot be understood from the parts (4) in *prajñu* and *saṃjñu*, *jñu* has no meaning when it is by itself.

The *Vṛtti* also discusses *prajñu* and *saṃjñu* which convey a meaning only as wholes. It is only in the *śāstra* that these words are analysed and a meaning ascribed to the parts. But that is fictitious, not known in the world. It concludes as follows—*tasmād anarthakā avayavāḥ sarvatra saṅghāta evārthavān*.]

Some objections against indivisibility are anticipated and answered. The first objection is that if individual words and their meanings have no reality, then a *dvandva* compound would

only denote an integrated object and cannot, therefore, take the plural number. It is answered as follows—

221. Just as the word *gargāḥ* is used for many belonging to the family of *garga* even though only one word *garga* is used there, in the same way, the whole called *dvandva* is expressive of many.

[From the mere fact that a *dvandva* compound denotes many things and takes the plural number, one cannot conclude that the individual words of a compound and their meanings are real.

The *Vṛtti* says that the word *gargāḥ* conveys a meaning which is grasped by a single cognition and in which parts thought of as one figure. Similarly, a *dvandva* compound seems to have parts similar to other independent words and conveys many objects grasped by one cognition.]

The second objection is that an action would have to be performed at the same time to all the objects denoted by a *dvandva* compound and that is impossible. The answer is—

222. Just as the action of feeding is applied to each part, in the same way, an action is applied separately to the things expressed by a *dvandva* compound.

[In the sentence : *brāhmaṇā bhojyantām* = 'let the brahmins be fed', the action of feeding is understood in regard to the brahmins as a whole. But when the action is implemented each brāhmin is mentally separated from the whole and fed separately. That is exactly what happens to an action enjoined in regard to the objects denoted by a *dvandva* compound.]

The reference by a pronoun, a part of a compound, to the meaning of the other part of the same compound is now explained.

223. When the meaning of one of the words in a *dvandva* compound is referred to by the word *tad*, there also, the word only resembles the pronoun.

[In the *sūtra* : *janapadatadavadhyośca* (P.4.2.124.) the word *tad* refers to the word *janapada*. The whole *sūtra* is in the form of a *dvandva* compound. If *janapada* has no separate meaning, how can the pronoun *tad* refer to it ? The answer is that the word *tad* only resembles the pronoun *tad*. Really speaking, there is no pronoun here at all. The word is a unity and so is its meaning. There is no division in it. What looks like the pronoun *tad* does not really exist at all: *tasmād vyāvṛttabheda evāyam viśiṣṭe'rthe sarvanāmaviśeṣitāvayavasarūpaḥ śabdo vartate*, says the *Vṛtti*.]

From the sentence : *dhavakhadirapalāśāś chidyantām*, one understands just one meaning which cannot be divided and in which one cannot trace any sequence. If that is so, the cutting of all the trees would have to take place at the same time, which is impossible. This objection is now answered.

224. Just as, in regard to the cutting of a *khadira* tree, the action can proceed only gradually, part by part, in the same way, there is an order in the different parts of the meaning of a *dvandva* compound.

[The idea is that order or sequence is necessary for worldly purposes but the words convey the indivisible sequenceless idea.

According to the *Vṛtti*, this verse is meant to answer the objection that if the individual word and its meaning did not exist one cannot explain how we do understand the meanings of the different terms of a *dvandva* compound in a certain sequence. The answer consists in comparing the process to that of carrying out an order to cut just one tree, say, a *khadira*. The cutting can be done only in a certain order, first the bark, then the inner trunk and so on. In the same way, the action enjoined in regard to the objects conveyed by a *dvandva* compound is carried out in a certain order though the compound does not mention any order.]

If only one among the above-mentioned trees is cut, we still consider that the order has been carried out. How to

explain this if the meaning understood from a word has no parts in it ? The answer is:—

225. Just as actions (described by a sentence) relating to the whole are applied part by part, such is the case with the elements comprising a *dvandva* compound.

[Even though the action mentioned in a sentence may relate to all the elements in a *dvandva* compound together, yet it is applied part by part as is done in the case of the different elements forming part of an *ekaśeṣa* word.

The *Vṛtti* says the same thing and concludes:—*tasmād ekadeśasambandhinyo'pi kriyāḥ samudāyam evānupatanti. Avayavadvārikaiva hi samudāyānāṃ kriyāpratipattiḥ.*]

226. While explaining the compound to the ignorant with the help of the analytic sentence (*vigrahavākya*) the teacher (that is, Pāṇini) has spoken about the relative importance of the meanings of the different terms (obtained by analysis).

[This verse is an answer to the question: if the meaning of the individual words has no reality, how does one speak about the relative importance of the first or second term in a compound. First and second terms of a compound are obtained by artificial analysis, done for the sake of teaching derivation to the ignorant. They really do not exist.

In explaining this verse, the *Vṛtti* quotes *M.Bhā.* I, p. 404, l. 3-4.]

227. Even though the meaning is a unified one, many views regarding the importance (of the different terms of a negative compound) are set forth in the *Bhāṣya*. Their limitations are due to the exigencies of grammatical derivation (*prakriyā*).

[*A-brāhmaṇa* is an example of a negative compound.

The meaning of such compounds is discussed in the *M.Bhā*, I, pp. 410-411.

The *Vṛtti* points out that in the *M.Bhā*, a preference is shown for the *uttarapadārthaprādhānya* as far as the negative compound is concerned: *tathā hi nañsamāsa etasminneva sarva-parikalpanāsambhavāt sarvapakṣopanyāsaṃ kṛtvā kaścid eva pakṣaḥ parigṛhītaḥ. Tathā hyuktam—idaṃ khalvapi bhūya uttarapadārtha-prādhānye sati saṃgṛhītam bhavati. kim ? anekam iti. M.Bhā*. I, p. 412. lines 1-2.]

228. By declaring that, according to the *jahat-svārthā* view, words entering into a compound give up all their meaning, the Bhāṣyakāra has shown that in a *bahuvrīhi* compound all the terms give up their meaning.

[This verse is an answer to the objection that if individual words have no meaning, how can one speak about the idea of the different terms giving up or not giving up their meaning when they enter into a compound word (*jahatsvārthā vṛttiḥ* and *ajahatsvārthā vṛttiḥ*). In the *M.Bhā* on P.2.1.1., Patañjali goes into the question whether a compound word has a meaning different from that of the words entering into it. The two main views on this question are represented by the two expressions given above. If, in a *bahuvrīhi*, the whole denotes a meaning totally different from that of the parts, it is a further proof that the meaning of the parts has no reality.]

229. In Grammar, sometimes, the meaning of a stem is expressed by a suffix when the former is absent while the meaning of a suffix is expressed by the root when the former is absent.

[The author wants to show that individual words and their meanings are a fiction and exist only for the sake of grammatical derivation. *Iyān* is a word where the suffix alone is seen and it expresses the meaning of the stem. The word means 'so much'. As taught by Pāṇini, only the suffix is left here, as the stem has been elided. *Ahan*='he killed' is an

instance where the suffix has disappeared, its meaning being expressed by the root.

The *Vṛtti* says the same thing with the help of other examples, some of which are taken from the *Veda*.]

230. The meaning expressed by two suffixes as in *pac-a-nti* (*śap* and *jhi*) is sometimes expressed by only one as in *ad-ti*. Sometimes, when both are absent, the root expresses it.

[According to Pāṇini, in conjugation, something may come between the root and the suffix but not always. He has divided all the roots of language into ten classes on this basis. Whether something comes between or not, the meaning is the same which shows that its meaning is unreal.]

231. Those very meanings of suffixes which are taught as their basis in some school of grammar are taken as belonging to the stem (or root) in some other school.

[The *Vṛtti* says that some grammarians looked upon all suffixes as *svārthika*, that is, they do no more than manifest the meaning of the *prakṛti*, root or stem:—*tathā hi keṣāṃ cit smartṛṇāṃ sarva eva pratyayāḥ svārthikāḥ prakṛtyarthānuvādina ityākhyāyante.*]

232. Being well-known, only shortened forms like *udvami* and *kari* are used in the *śāstra*. All grammatical derivations are meant to serve practical purposes.

[Grammar has its own conventions which do not conform to worldly usage. In grammar, one would sometimes say *udvami* for *udvamati* and *kari* for *karoti* or *karomi*, because that would serve some practical purpose. Such forms are not used in the world.]

233. It is only Nescience which is described

in the Science of Grammar through the different modes of derivation. But knowledge arises spontaneously, free from the alternatives of tradition.

[The *Vṛtti* here is not at all clear and that is a great pity because one would very much like to know what, according to the *Vṛtti*, Bhartṛhari means by *Avidyā* and *Vidyā* here. According to Puṇyarāja, what is stated here is that *avidyā* is the means of attaining *Vidyā*. *Śāstra* is all *avidyā*, but through it, one ultimately attains *Vidyā*.]

But 'ιow can *vidyā* come through *avidyā* ?

234. Just as the effect is not related to the cause in a definite manner and, is therefore, indescribable, in the same way, knowledge, even though unconnected with any special means (*anākhyeyā*) is still thought of as coming from the *śāstra*.

[The fact is that knowledge does not really come from *avidyā*, that is, from the *śāstra*. Looking upon *vidyā* as an effect, it is like all other effects. No effect is related to its cause in a definite form. But it comes out of it in a definite manner and so seems to be wonderful. *Adbhutena rūpeṇa upajāyate*, says Puṇyarāja. In the same way, the understanding of the word and the sentence as unity is *vidyā* and their division into stem and suffix is *avidyā*. Their understanding as a unity takes place when *avidyā* in the form of division disappears. It disappears really because of the rise of awakening, but as awakening takes place after the study of *śāstra* which stands for *avidyā*, one thinks that *vidyā* comes from the study of *śāstra*.

The *Vṛtti* also describes this rise of *vidyā* from *avidyā* as something wonderful: *Tathā vidyā . . . . kuto' pyadbhutayā vṛttyā prādur bhavati*. Puṇyarāja's *adbhutena rūpeṇa* is an echo of the *Vṛttis—adbhutayā vṛttyā*. In fact, the expression *adbhutā Vṛttiḥ* occurs already in the *kārikas*. Once in III. Sambandha—81 and again in III. Kā. 17. In all these occurrences, there is a similarity of context. The expression is used in connection with the appearance of the effect from the cause, with the

appearance of many from the one and with the realisation of unity from plurality. Here, emphasising the wonderful character of this process of *vidyā* arising out of *avidyā*, the *Vṛtti* concludes as follows—*tasmād anyatrābhyāsaḥ kriyate, nāntarīyakatayānyad eva prādur bhavatīti* = one studies one thing, namely, the *Śāstra*, that is, *avidyā* and what results from it is the opposite of it, namely, *vidyā*. That is why it is a wonderful process.]

235. The word conveys a meaning according to long grammatical usage. This long wrong usage appears to be natural.

[The *Vṛtti* here points out that the wrong usage of words only reflects our wrong understanding of the world around us which is unreal, the only reality being the ultimate one.]

236. The ignorant person sees parts in the primordial atom. Likewise, he sees its parts also as wholes endowed with parts.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that, due to our experience of all objects as having parts, some think of the atom also as having parts and indulge in discussions as to whether an atom is connected with objects through one of its parts or through all its parts : *paramāṇur ekadeśena vā sambadhyete, sarvātmanā veti.*]

237. By our seeing jar and other objects, the universe also seems circumscribed. Due to the fact that objects are created, even the eternal Brahman appears to have had a beginning.

238. These *śāstras* which are a means (of attaining knowledge) are really misleading to ignorant people. But by following the unreal path, one attains truth in the end.

[The *Vṛtti* reminds one that the unreal is the means of attaining the real. Similarly the meaning obtained by analysis

(*apoddhāra*) is the means of understanding the integrated meaning :—*Vināpoddhāreṇa nāsti sthitalakṣaṇasyārthasya pratipattir iti.*]

The author again denies the reality of the individual word and its meaning.

239. As the words are (gradually) grasped, one understands the meaning in one particular way but when the whole sentence is grasped the same meaning appears to be quite different.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that this verse only states a general idea and that its illustrations are given in the following verses. The general idea is that one sets aside at the sentence stage a meaning understood at the stage of the individual word. If the latter were real, that could not happen, the relation between the word and the meaning being eternal : *nityatvācca śabdārthasambandhasya yadupāttaṃ śabdena tasya punaraśakyaḥ parityāgaḥ kartum iti.*]

240. Those sentences in which, after many meanings (are conveyed by the individual words) a negation follows, (in these sentences) these meanings are discarded and should not be taken as real.

[In the sentence *dhava-khadira-palāśāś chedanīyā na*, the meaning understood until the last word is heard is that the trees *dhava, khadira* and *palāśa* should be cut. But as soon as the last word is heard just the opposite meaning is understood which shows that the meaning of the individual word is unreal. It is better not to take it seriously even before the last word is heard.]

241. The sentence : 'tree, there is not' is the cause of our understanding a particular kind of absence. There is no connection in our mind between the negative particle and the object.

[If each word has its own meaning, the first word 'tree' (in the sentence 'tree, there is not' = *vṛkṣo nāsti*) conveys the tree as something which exists and the negation which follows denies its existence. If the tree exists, its existence cannot be denied. If it does not exist, its negation is unnecessary. In either case, the word expressing negation is useless. If the sentence is taken as a whole, this difficulty does not arise.]

242. If it is maintained that the idea of the existence (of the tree) takes place in isolated understanding (*vicchedapratipattau*) how can an idea not conveyed by a word disappear (simply because of its connection with negation)?

[The idea which is refuted here seems to be this :— The idea of the existence of the tree arises when the sentence is split up, that is, apart from any word and that is set aside by the negative particle. It is said in answer that the negative particle can set aside only an idea conveyed by a word. An idea which arises apart from any word is not conveyed by the word and such an idea cannot be set aside by the negative particle.]

243. If it be held that the idea (of the existence of the tree) is declared false (by the negative particle and does not disappear) then the negative particle performs a new function and how can one understand the non-existence of the tree (from the sentence *Vṛkṣo nāsti*)?

[The new function of the negative particle *na* is to declare a certain idea false and not to set it aside. The non-existence of the tree cannot be understood if this new function is accepted. Puṇyarāja points out that the new function attributed to the negative particle would be possible only if its function is *paryudāsa* and not *prasajyapratiṣedha*. If *vṛkṣo nāsti* is *paryudāsa*, the negative particle would be connected with *Vṛkṣaḥ* and the sentence would mean : not a tree, but some-

thing similar. If the sentence is *prasajyapratiṣedha*, the negative particle would be connected with the verb *asti* and the meaning would be : 'the tree does not exist'. It is clear that the function ascribed to the negative particle here is possible only if the sentence is *paryudāsa*.]

244. If it be said that the negative particle is used without reference to any substratum, then it could be used even before. If it be said that what is negated is the substratum, then the purpose of the mention (of the substratum) would be merely restriction.

[If the negative particle by itself could denote negation as well as what is negated, the separate mention of what is negated would be for the sake of restriction or elimination and not for its own sake. This is an unsatisfactory way of construing words.]

245. Or (the particles) would only suggest a restriction or they would restate (meanings expressed by other words). Only one word (in a sentence) would possess a meaning and the rest would be meaningless.

[If the view that the particles (*nipāta*) are only manifestors (of the meanings of other words) and not expressive of their own meaning is adopted, then in the present case, in *vṛkṣo na* the word itself would denote the object and its negation and the negative particle would only manifest that negation. What merely manifests the meaning of another word is useless. It would do no more than restrict the object to be negated to the tree. To interpret a word as merely restrictive is not satisfactory. Nor would it do to say that one of the two words denotes both the object and its negation and the other word only restates it (*anuvāda*), because restatement is a kind of repetition. All this is the result of looking upon

the sentence and its meaning as divisible. Therefore, it is better to look upon it as indivisible.]

246. In the sentence *udahāri* etc. one understands a contradictory relation between the words. But once the whole sentence is finished, a quite different meaning is understood.

[The sentence : *udahāri* ! *bhagini* ! *yā tvaṃ śirasānaḍvāhaṃ vahasi sā tvaṃ prācīnaṃ kumbham abhidhāvantam adrākṣīḥ*, referred to in the verse, quoted by Puṇyarāja and the *Vṛtti* is probably older. Here, once the sentence is finished, a quite different meaning is understood : As the *Vṛtti* puts it— *vākyasamāptau arthāntaropādānam arthāntaraparityāgaśca dṛśyate.*]

247. From sentences the chief meanings of which are praise, blame etc. a different meaning is understood than the one obtained from the individual words.

[Sometimes, when the meanings of individual words are considered, it consists in condemnation, but the sentence as a whole denotes praise. Sometimes, it is vice versa. Puṇyarāja quotes illustrations. In the first one, the verse as a whole is meant to praise some king by saying that his glory has whitened the whole world whereas the parts of the verse enumerate four things which continue to remain dark even after the king's glory has spread everywhere. The four things are : (1) The spots on the moon, (2) the neck of *Śiva*, (3) *Murāri*, (4) the temples of the elephants of the regions, soiled by the flow of their dark liquor. How can one accept the existence of these parts of the sentence if they denote the opposite of what the whole sentence denotes ? The second verse, as a whole, is meant to blame the ocean. But each part of it seems to praise it. Another proof that the parts, namely, the meanings of the individual words, are unreal.]

The author now expresses the view of the defender of the individual word.

248. From each word (in a sentence) a meaning not connected (with the meanings of other words) is understood which ultimately becomes the means of our understanding one single meaning from the whole sentence.

[After understanding the unconnected meanings of the individual words, we connect them together and get the sentence-meaning which is thus in the nature of connection (*saṃsarga*).]

This view is now refuted.

249. The meaning which is first unconnected and later joined on to others and thus accumulates becomes something quite different, because it is like putting together broken pieces.

[The translation is according to Puṇyarāja's commentary. His text does not seem to have had *na* in it. There is no *na* in M. either. It is a pity that the *Vṛtti* on this verse is not clear because there are two gaps in the text of it. Though र (R) has *na* in the verse, the commentary *Ambākartrī* explains it as though it was not there.]

The author now begins the topic of the distinction between the primary and secondary meanings of words.

250. Some thinkers have declared that the word which has many meanings is the same word. Its power to convey all meanings is differentiated according to circumstances.

[Once the sentence is analysed and we get the individual words, consideration of the meaning of the latter begins. Twelve views are mentioned :—(1) That the word is the same in all its meanings, (2) that it is different with each meaning, (3) that the individual word and its meaning are

unreal, (4) that they are real. Each one of these four views can be differentiated according to *śabdopacāra* and the two kinds of *arthopacāra*. *Śabdopacāra* means : the application of a word to an object primarily, as the application of the word *go* to a cow or figuratively, as the application of the same word to a *vāhīka*, because of his resemblance to a cow in dullness. In both these cases, the word *go* is applied to an object which has *gotva*, really or figuratively. *Arthopacāra* is of two kinds :—When the form of the word, whether applied primarily or figuratively, is considered to be its meaning, it is one kind. When an outside object is its meaning, whether applied primarily or figuratively, it is the second kind. When each of the first four views is combined with each of the next three views, one gets twelve views in all. But speaking broadly, there are two main views, designated as *ekaśabdadarśanam* and *anekaśabdadarśanam*. The present verse begins the consideration of the former. See, on this topic, my paper on "Bhartṛhari on the primary and the secondary use of words." Indian Linguistics, Vol. 29, 1968, pp. 97-112.]

251. Therefore, due to purpose or context or contact with another word, a word gives up its power of denoting many meanings at the same time and conveys them one by one.

[If it is the same word which has many meanings, how is it that it does not convey all of them at the same time ? The answer is that purpose, context and contact with another word determine which meaning is conveyed by the word on a particular occasion. In verses 315-316, other factors for determining the meaning of a word will be mentioned. Here only those three factors are mentioned which help one to decide which is the primary meaning and which the secondary one. The other factors mentioned later help one to decide what is expressed and what is implied.

The *Vṛtti* says the same thing with examples and adds that sometimes words convey more than one meaning at the same time: Examples : *śveto dhāvati, alambusānāṃ yātā*. See *M. Bhā*. I. p. 14, line 14.]

252. Just as the word 'cow' denotes an object endowed with dewlap etc. so does it denote a *vāhīka* also.

[All this is being said according to *ekaśabdadarśana*, the view that when a word denotes different things, it is still the same word. The word cow denotes a particular class of animals through its power called *abhidhā*. When it is applied to a *vāhīka* who has not the physical characteristics of a cow, it denotes that object through the same power and not some other.]

253. The primariness or secondariness of a word having many attributes, that is, the power to denote many things, depends upon frequency of usage.

[Therefore the word *gauḥ* primarily denotes the cow and secondarily an object like *vāhīka* because of more frequent usage in the former case. It is the same word which denotes both. So this is *ekaśabdadarśana*.

Commenting on 252 and 253 together, the *Vṛtti* says : the same word *gauḥ* sometimes denotes the universal as in *gaur anubandhyaḥ*. Sometimes, it denotes the individual or substance in which the universal inheres, as in the sentence *gaur ānīyatām* or *gaur duhyatām*. Sometimes it denotes a particular individual as when one asks a cowherd seated in the midst of a herd of cattle: do you see a cow in this herd of cattle? (*astyatra kāñcid gāṃ paśyasi*)? Sometimes it is applied to a totally different object like *vāhīka* because of the presence in him of qualities like suffering everything, and eating a lot. Where it is used primarily and where secondarily depends upon whether it requires the help of other factors like context for conveying its meaning.]

Another effect of the *ekaśabdadarśana* is now being shown.

254. One and the same sacred hymn is accepted, without any confusion, as having many meanings and different powers according as it is consider-

ed from the point of view of the *ātman*, or of the gods, or of the ritual.

[A sacred hymn remains the same even if it is used for different purposes such as meditation, muttered prayer and sacrifice. On each occasion, it would have a different meaning but the mantra is looked upon as the same.]

So far, *śabdopacāra* according to *ekaśabdadarśana* has been shown. In *śabdopacāra*, the word now denotes one meaning and now another. That affects the eternality of the relation between the two. So he now considers the question from the point of view of *arthopacāra*.

255. Some hold that due to special circumstances (in this case the dullness and slowness of the *vāhīka*) the quality of being a cow is traced in a *vāhīka*. There has been a change in the external object but the word expresses its own meaning.

[In this context, two views have been put forward : *ekaśabdadarśana* and *anekaśabdadarśana*. The first view means that when a word has many meanings, it is the same word. The second view means that it is not but that it becomes as many words are there are meanings. In the former view, there can be *śabdopacāra* and *arthopacāra*. When the word *gauḥ* is applied to a cow primarily and to a *vāhīka* secondarily, it is the same word. This is *śabdopacāra*. Within *ekaśabdadarśana*, there can be *arthopacāra* also and that has two aspects : the meaning ofa word can be the form itself or an outside object. Whether the word *gauḥ* is applied to a cow or to a *vāhīka*, its own form is understood first in any case. Whether applied primarily or secondarily, *gotva* is understood in both applications. Thus, the form and the meaning are the same in both cases. These are the two aspects of *arthopacāra*. As, in *śabdopacāra*, the word is applied now to one thing and now to another, the eternality of the relation between the world and and its meaning is affected.

The *Vṛtti* points out that a word is really never used in a meaning other than its own. When the word *gauḥ* is applied to a *vāhīka*, it is because some qualities associated with a cow are attributed to a *vāhīka* : *ekeṣām ācāryāṇāṃ mukhyāt svaviṣayād anyatra śabdasya vṛttir nāsti.*]

256. The same form of a word is superimposed on all its meanings. It is the object that changes. The word is unchangeably fixed to its form.

[The point mentioned here is that a word never deserts its meaning consisting of its external form, namely, a particular pattern of phonemes.

The *Vṛtti* attributes to some *Ācāryas* the view that the form of a word, specifically its own and internal to it, invariably associated with it and normally never shared with other words, is its first meaning. It is superimposed on the object which it denotes. The two are identified : *Anye tvācāryā manyante svarūpe śabdo nityaṃ vartate. Sa eva tasyāntaraṅgo savyabhicārī śabdāntareṇāsādhāraṇo'rthaḥ. Tatra cānupadeśapratipattiḥ sarveṣām. rūpaṃ tu śabdānām artheṣvadhyāropyate.*]

The *anekaśabdadarśana* is now explained.

257. Those who follow the path of difference maintain that though the primary and the secondary words are different from each other, they appear to be the same because of resemblance in their form.

[Here Puṇyarāja points out that those who follow the path of difference declare that a word used in a secondary meaning is different from the same word used in its primary meaning. This is the result of accepting identity as the relation between a word and its meaning. Once a word has been identified with its primary meaning, it cannot again be identified with another meaning. One wants a totally different word for it.

A similar question is discussed in the *M. Bhā* on *vā.* 4-10 and 11-12 in the second *āhnika*. The question discussed is

whether a phoneme occurring in different contexts is the same. Here the question relates to words having different meanings.]

258. It is thus that a Vedic hymn for kindling the fire becomes different by mere repetition. In the same way, a Vedic *mantra* that is the object of usage or guess also becomes different.

[It is prescribed in the Vedas that a certain number of *mantras* should be recited for kindling the sacrificial fire. The number is sometimes eleven, sometimes thirteen and sometimes seventeen. Repetition of a *mantra* is also taught in this connection. It follows that a *mantra* repeated becomes a different *mantra*. It is by repetition that the required number is obtained. In the same way, a word used in a secondary meaning should be considered to be different from the same one used in its primary meaning.

What is interesting to note here is that the question of sameness or difference is thought of in connection with phonemes, words and whole *mantras*. The same phoneme comes in different contexts and becomes the object of grammatical operations; the same word denotes different meanings in different contexts; the same *mantra* is repeated in the same context and is counted as a different *mantra*. All this has been said to strengthen *anekaśabdadarśana*.]

259. They (the hymns thus repeated) are also Veda. For, it is only some that have been handed down. Or rather what is actually handed down is meaningless whereas the rest is really subsidiary (to the ritual).

[The *mantras* which are actually handed down in the *Vedas* are only illustrative. They stand for others also which have not been handed down but which are also nonetheless *Veda*. As long as the sequence of the words is the same as that of the *mantra* actually handed down, it is also *Veda*. Not everything is actually handed down.

Another way of looking at it is that what is actually handed down has no meaning other than its own form. So it is not *mantra*. Only that which has a meaning other than its form and brings to the mind what is connected with the actual ritual is *mantra*. It is only then that it is subsidiary (*śeṣa*) to the ritual.]

260. Some maintain that the outward form itself is the purpose of the transmission of the Vedas, so that everything possessing the form is different while those that are used in the ritual are different on account of their connection with what is actually handed down.

[If the outward form is the meaning of the *Vedas*, the *mantras* are different from one another because their outward form is different. Not only the *mantras* which have been handed down but the others also have an outward form and as that is always different, the mantras are also different. As far as the outward form is concerned, a word conveys it through *śakti* and not through *lakṣaṇā*.

261. The *sāvitrī mantra* is different according as it is used at the sacrament of initiation or at a Vedic ceremony or at low recitation. But it is taken to be the same.

[The *sāvitrī mantra* used on different occasions is a different *mantra*, but due to similarity in the sequence of the phonemes, it is looked upon as the same. Similarly, according to the *anekaśabdadarśana*, the word *gauḥ* is different according as it denotes the cow or the *vāhīka* but identity is superimposed and so, in regard to the cow, it is said to be expressive (*vācaka*) on the basis of *prasiddhi* and in regard to the *vāhīka*, it is said to be *lakṣaka* on the basis of *aprasiddhi*. If there is no superimposition, it is a different word and so each is expressive in regard to its meaning. Neither is *lakṣaka*. To look upon the two different words *gauḥ* as the same is *śabdopacāra*.

A *mantra*, used on different occasions, is a different *mantra*, says the *Vṛtti*. Used in the *upanayana* ceremony, the *sāvitrī* is called *saṃskārasāvitrī*. When one who has already had his *upanayana* uses it at some other ceremony, it is a different *sāvitrī* altogether. When recited a definite number of times as part of an expiation ceremony, it is again different. In other words, a *mantra* differs according to application. It is looked upon as the same for practical purposes only. As the *Vṛtti* says : *vyāvahārikam ekatvam*].

262. It is on account of the particular form of words that they denote their object and so also a sentence denotes its meaning by virtue of its own form and not of anything else.

[The *Vṛtti* seems to say here that to look upon the form only as the basis for the application of a word to an object is *avyu'pattipakṣa*. In the *vyutpattipakṣa*, on the other hand, there is some circumstance (*nimitta*) besides the form which is the basis of the application : *uyutpatti pakṣe tu nimittāny eva prayojakāni*.

263. According to those who hold that one and the same word has many meanings, the distinction between primary and secondary is based on established usage or lack of it.

[Really speaking, the question of primary and secondary in regard to meaning cannot arise if the word becomes different with every meaning. As there are as many words as there are meanings, each word has one meaning only and that is its primary meaning. It has no secondary meaning at all. But the question does arise in the *ekaśabdadarśana* and then long usage or the lack of it is the basis for the distinction between primary and secondary.

What the *Vṛtti* wants to say here is not clear as the text is doubtful here and there. The point raised is : When a word has many meanings, what is the criterion for regarding one as the primary one and the others as secondary ? The verse

says that the criterion is *siddhi* or *asiddhi*. The *Vṛtti* concludes thus :—*tathā paryāyena yasmim vākye prasiddhārthaḥ śabdas tatra mukhyaḥ. Anyatra tu gauṇaḥ.*]

264. Others declare that word to be secondary which denotes a meaning with the help of the context or the presence of another word.

[The help of the context or of the presence of another word makes the meaning understood from a word secondary. This test is said to be common to both *ekaśabdadarśana* and *anekaśabdadarśana.*]

The author now wants to express the same idea in the words of the author of the *Saṅgraha.*

265. A word which, when uttered by itself, denotes its well-known meaning is the primary one, being dependent on its own form only.

[Just before the Verse, the *Vṛtti* says *Saṅgrahakāraḥ paṭhati* and then follow 265, 266 and 267 on which there is a common *Vṛtti*. Does it mean that all these verses are quotations from the *Saṅgraha* ? Puṇyarāja seems to regard 265 only as a quotation from the *Śaṅgraha.*

266. A word which finds its application through the use of another word and by means of a special effort as it were is declared by others to be secondary, conveying as it does, the secondary meaning.

[By 'special effort', the context is meant here, according to Puṇyarāja.]

267. In a case where a word takes its chief meaning as the basis for application (to another object) the chief meaning is the cause and the secondary one the effect.

[That meaning is the primary one to which the word can be applied without any impediment or hitch. That meaning is secondary to which the word is applied after some incompatibility is felt. When the word *go* is applied to a *vāhīka,* there is first incompatibility but it becomes alright when *gotva* is attributed to the *vāhīka*. This is *arthopacāra*. This takes place when the word *go* is supposed to be the same in both cases. Though the same, it is looked upon as different on the basis of *śaktibheda* and so it is alright.

The *Vṛtti* here concludes by saying that when a word conveys a meaning on the basis of its form only, without depending on the context or some other word, it is said to be primary in regard to that meaning. If it does depend upon these other factors, it is said to be secondary.]

The author now points out the difficulty in trying to take purpose or context as the guide for determining what is primary and what is secondary.

268. The words *purā* and *ārāt,* are used in mutually conflicting meanings and it is by context that we determine what the meaning is on any particular occasion.

[The word *purā* denotes both the future and the past. Similarly *ārāt* means both near and far. Only the context can tell what the actual meaning is. If the meaning determined by the context is the secondary one, the meaning of these words would become secondary but that would be wrong. Both the meanings of these two words are primary. Therefore, context is not the correct basis for determining which meaning is the primary one and which the secondary one.

The text of the *Vṛtti* is doubtful in places but it says the same thing and gives other examples besides *purā* and *ārāt*. The point which it makes is that in the case of such words, the question of primary and secondary does not arise at all. Nor does it arise in the case of pairs like *vāyuḥ vāyuḥ*, *aśvaḥ aśvaḥ*, *tena tena* in which one is a noun and the other is a verb, though the two have the same form. Both the meanings

are primary here also as in the case of *purā* and *ārāt* :— *tathā vāyur vāyuḥ, aśvośvaḥ, tena tena iti nāmākhyātānāṃ tulyarūpatve viṣayāntarasyāsaṃsparśān na gauṇamukhyavyavahāro'sti.*]

How can the question of primary and secondary arise if the words and word-meanings are unreal and only the sentence and the sentence-meaning are real ? This question is never raised in regard to the sentence-meaning.

269. Once the analysis of the meanings of the individual words from that of the sentence is done, the meaning of one word so obtained can be connected with another, also so obtained.

[When the sentence and its meaning are considered indivisible, there are no individual words and their meanings and so the question of primary and secondary cannot arise. And yet for practical purposes the sentence is split up into words by a process of abstraction (*apoddhāra*). When this is done, the distinction of primary and secondary is based on long usage or lack of it.]

But then a word is sometimes used without being linked to another word. That means that the individual word is real.

270. When a word is sometimes used by itself with the verb *asti* (understood), it is really a sentence. That is why it is not connected with any other word.

[What is meant here is that the verb 'to be' is understood and added on mentally to a single word when it is used. Thus, it is really a sentence and so no other word is connected with it.]

271. When the word 'cow' or 'horse' is uttered as an answer to the question *ko' yam*? (what is this?) there is some action like seeing hidden in the question itself.

[The question *K'yam* ?=What is this ? really means : What is this that is seen ?=*Ko'ym dṛśyate* ? in which the action

of seeing is understood. Or it may be some other suitable action. In the same way, the answer 'cow' really means: 'it is the cow which is seen' or some other suitable action is implied in it. An action is implied both in the question and in the answer.

[The *Vṛtti* also points out that a single word is never used. Whether it is a question or an answer, it always implies an action :—. . .*iti kriyāviśeṣam abhyantarīkṛtya praśna-prativacane bhavataḥ.* If the question implies an action though it is not openly mentioned, it is natural that the answer also should imply it :—*tatra ca praśnakāla evāntaritāyāṃ kriyāyāṃ prativacane'pi tadviṣayaḥ caritakriyaḥ śabda upādīyate.*].

Some have taken the presence of the original properties in a greater or less degree as the basis of the distinction between primary and secondary.

272. Nor can abundance or deficiency in the attributes be the basis of the distinction because some consider even abundance to be deficiency due to long usage.

[Dullness is associated with the cow. When the word cow is applied to the animal, it is a case of primary application because, in the cow, dullness is found in a greater degree. When the same word is applied to a *vāhīka*, it is a case of secondary application because dullness is found there in a lesser degree. But this criterion is unreliable as abundance and deficiency are relative terms. The *vāhīka* may be really duller but long usage considers that dullness exists in him in a lesser degree.

The *Vṛtti* discusses, besides the above example, *siṃho māṇavakaḥ* also :—*sampūrṇāśca śaktyādayaḥ siṃhe, nyūnā māṇavake. gavi ca sampūrṇā jāḍyādayo nyūnāstu vāhīke.*

The author now speaks about similarity as the basis of the distinction between the primary and the secondary.

273. When a word expressive of the universal is applied to something in which the universal is absent

but a similar attribute is present, that word is said to be used in a secondary sense.

[According to this view, the word cow denotes the universal 'cowness' (*gotva*). It exists only in the cow. But when the word is applied to a *vāhīka*, it is not because there is *gotva* in him, but because he resembles the cow in being dull. Resemblance in some attribute is, therefore, the cause of the secondary application of the word.

As the *Vṛtti* puts it:—*tatra rūḍhasambandhasya prasiddhasāhacaryasya dharmāntarasya darśanād atajjātīyeṣu jātiśabdaḥ prayujyamāno gauṇa ityucyate.*]

The author now speaks about *viparyāsa*, misapprehension on the basis of the distinction between primary and secondary.

274. When an object appears like another as though by misapprehension, then words like cow expressing the latter are said to be in a secondary sense.

[One can apply a word expressive of one thing to another, either through misapprehension or deliberate superimposition. To call mother-of-pearl (*śukti*) silver after misapprehension in the dark is an example of the first case. To apply the word cow to a *vāhīka* on seeing some resemblance between the two and not because of misapprehension is an example of the second case. Here there is no wrong identification because one clearly sees the difference. That is why the word *iva* is used after *viparyāsa*.]

The author now speaks about shape and power as the basis of the distinction between primary and secondary.

275. Just as a plough or a sword or a pestle, being endowed with a particular shape and power, is understood as the fixed accessory (*sādhana*) of a particular action,

276. (Just as) these things have no power connecting them with other actions but are invariably under-

stood as meant for the performance of particular actions because of their shape,

277. In the same way, a word endowed with a form and power from the very beginning has its purpose fixed. Through some power, it can also be applied to other things.

[These instruments and tools perform their particular actions on account of the particular shape with which they are endowed. One cannot cut grass with a plough nor fight a battle with it. In the same way, the power of a word to denote its meaning is fixed from eternity. This is the view not only of the grammarians but also of the *Mīmāṃsakas*. See Jaimini, Mī. Sū. I. 1.5. Also Vāk. III. Sambandha. 29.]

278. The meaning which is understood to be the purpose (that is, the main one) of a word as soon as it is heard is considered to be the main meaning whereas the one to which it is applied by a special effort is the secondary one.

[If a word like *go* has many powers and it can be applied to a *vāhīka* also, how is one to decide which is the primary meaning and which the secondary one? The answer is : that which is understood directly from the word without the help of the context, by merely hearing the word is the main one. That which is understood with the help of the context and other words in the sentence is the secondary meaning.

Commenting on 275-278 together, the *Vṛtti* points out that certain tools and instruments, by virtue of their shape and power, are associated in the world with particular actions. Not that they cannot be used for doing other actions, but normally, they are meant for particular actions. They are not associated with nor called by the other actions : *loke te tu karmāntareṣūpādīyamānāḥ sādhayanto'pi tamartham tadaṅgatvena vypadeśaṃ na labhante.* Similarly, words have normally the power to convey particular meanings, but they are sometimes used to convey other meanings secondarily but

they do not become known in the world as being expressive of these meanings : *pratyāyanaśaktimātraṃ tūpādāyānyatra prayujyamānāyāḥ pratyāyayanto'pi tānarthānstatsambandhitvena loke vyavasthayā prasiddhiṃ na labhante.*]

279. When the words *go*, *Yuṣmad* and *mahat* have the suffix *cvi* at the end and are used in a meaning other than their own, what was not so becomes so secondarily and sometimes also primarily.

[In the expressions : *agaur gauḥ sampadyate, go'bhavat, atvaṃ tvaṃ sampadyate, tvad bhavati*, the quality of being a cow and of being 'thou' is superimposed on what is not a cow and what is not thou. What is not a cow does not really become a cow. It is onlya superimposition. In *amahān mahān bhūtaḥ, mahadbhūtaś candramāḥ*, what was not big does actually become big. This case is therefore different from the two previous cases. The word *mahat* is used in its primary meaning in *mahadbhūtāḥ*, but in *go'bhavat, go* is used in a secondary sense, because it is applied to something which does not really become a cow. Being used in a secondary sense, the *o* in *go* is not considered to be *pragṛhya*. For the same reason, there is no second person suffix in *tvadbhavati*. There is no real *yuṣmad* here. It only exists secondarily. In the words of the *Vṛtti*—*agaur gaur abhavat, go'bhavat iti pragṛhyasaṁjñā na bhavati. Atvaṃ tvaṃ sampadyate, tvad bhavati madhyamo na bhavati.*]

But, says the objector, this is alright in such expressions as *go'bhavat* and *tvadbhavati*. But in *mahadbhūtaś candramāḥ*, the use cannot be called a secondary one as the moon does really become big (*mahat*) on full-moon day. That being so, the long ā, taught in P. 6.3.46, at the end of *mahat* should come in. To show that even in *mahadbhūtaś candramāḥ*, the use is a secondary one, the author says—

280. The original state is changed into magnitude or whiteness. Considered as something different, it (the original state) is the cause of secondariness.

[In *mahadbhūtaś candramāḥ*='the moon has become big', and *śuktībhavati paṭaḥ*='the cloth has become white' also, there is secondary usage. The moon remains the same, but it is thought of as having two different states. The former state is considered as the original one and the later state as the modified or secondary one. It is a question of the speakers' intention. When the former state is thought of as the original one, the later state appears as the superimposed one and then secondary usage results. On account of this secondary usage, the final of *mahat* does not become ā by P. 6.3.46. The presence of secondary usage here also is stated by the *Vṛtti* as follows—..*pūrvottarayor avasthayor āśritayoḥ savyāparatvāt pūrvasyā avasthāyā vivakṣāyāṃ satyāṃ vikāraśabdasya tadupagrāhi gauṇatvaṃ vijñāyate.*]

281. The proper nouns Agni, Soma, etc., which are united with their names on the basis of their external forms are really used in a secondary meaning in phrases like *Agnisomau māṇavakau*) because these words (as applied to *māṇavakau*) are not well-known.

[Words like *agni*, and *soma* are names of deities which are their primary meaning. When they are applied to human beings on the basis of some resemblance such as brightness, it is a case of secondary usage based on superimposition. When they are given as names to new-born individuals, they are again used secondarily, but this secondary usage is not based on resemblance but on the mere fact that these words are not known as the names of new-born infants. In other words, *aprasiddhi* is the basis. That is why there is no *sattva* in Agnisomau according to P. 8.3.82.]

It is now stated that when there is superimposition, the usage is, of course, secondary.

282. When Agnidatta is called Agni, the word makes its primary meaning (of god Agni) subordinate and, therefore, the usage becomes secondary, as it also stands for *datta*.

[When Agnidatta is referred to by the word Agni, the primary meaning of the latter word, namely, the god Agni, is made subordinate and it now denotes a person called Agnidatta by superimposition (*adhyāropa*). This is also secondary usage.]

It is now explained how the augment *suṭ* in Hariścandra is justified even when the word is only the name of a student (*māṇavaka*).

283. In the derivation of words which is based on different circumstances, the presence or absence of *suṭ* in such words as *Hariscandra* are regulated.

[There is the augment *suṭ* in the word Hariścandra and it is correct when it is the name of a *ṛṣi* (P. 6.1.153.) When we make a compound word in the sense of *Hariścandro yasya*, the resulting form would be *Haricandra*, that is, there will be no *suṭ*. The circumstance being different, the form is also different.

The *Vṛtti* points out that sometimes the form with *suṭ* can be correct when it is the name of the *Ṛṣi* :—*tathā sati Ṛṣer anyatrāpi sasuṭkasya sādhutvaṃ vijñāyate.*]

284. A word which attains its correct form as the name of a *Ṛṣi* and is then applied to denote something else does not lose its inner correctness of form when applied to a different object.

[A word gets its correct form before it enters into a sentence and it keeps that form even after entering into the sentence in a secondary sense. As the *Vṛtti* puts it :—. . .*tadā svaviṣaye siddhaḥ saṃskāro bahiraṅgārthaprādurbhāve na nivartate.*]

Some deny the distinction between primary and secondary meanings. They are answered as follows—

285. Whenever a meaning, however contradictory it may be, is understood from a word, then according to that understanding, that is its primary meaning.

[Whatever meaning figures in the mind when a word or sentence is heard is its meaning, however unusual or contradictory it may be. This is based on the *Mīmāṃsaka* principle, expressed in the following Mī. Sū :—*śabdavattūpalabhyate tadāgame hi dṛśyate tasya jñānaṃ yathā' nyeṣām.* (Mī. Sū IV 1.6.15)

The *Vṛtti* gives the example of the mirage. The mirage looks like water from a distance. So it is mistaken for water and the word water applied to it. This application should be looked upon as a primary one because it is based upon the well-established meaning for the application of the word water :—*jalanirbhāsāyāṃ hi mṛgatṛṣṇikāyāṃ buddhāvutpannāyāṃ mukhya eva jalaśabdaḥ prayoktavya iti. Tulyaṃ hi pravṛttinimittaṃ sarvatra śabdasya prayojanam bhavitum arhati.*]

It is now shown that even if the meaning is what figures in the mind, there can be a distinction between what is primary and what is secondary. To show this, the author says something about what is real and what is not.

286. Even though the determination of an object depends upon our understanding of it, still all understanding of it does not go in vain (or, all understanding of it is not as in the case of the well-established object, if the correct text is *prasiddha iva*, instead of *asiddha iva.*)

[The *Vṛtti* seems to point out that even though the determination of an object depends upon our understanding of it, still our subsequent experience in regard to such objects brings out a distinction between the primary and the secondary :—'*pratyayādhīne*' *pyarthasyāvadhāraṇe kvacit tadviṣayāṇāṃ pratyayānām avyabhicāreṇa yā pravṛttir loke* (*sā*?) *gauṇa-mukhya-bhāvaṃ vyavasthāpayati.*]

287. The perception of (real) water and of such things as a mirage is the same. In spite of the similarity of perception, mirage is not water.

[The point here is that mere cognition is not enough

for determining the existence of an object. We take a mirage to be water, but there is no water there.

The *Vṛtti* points out that our perception of real water and our perception of mirage as water resemble each other. But the difference becomes clear when we go to the place and try to touch the water in the mirage, drink it and have a bath in it. So the use of the word 'water' to the water which we see in a mirage is only secondary usage. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*tathāpi sparśana-snāna-pānādīnām abhāvāt taddeśaprāptau cādarśanān nedaṃ salilam iti . . . tāsu mṛgatṛṣṇikāsu nāsti mukhyasya śabdasya pravṛttiḥ.*]

288. Even though there is similarity in the perception of a serpent and that of a rope, still their difference is obvious from their well known special activities (that of biting in the case of a snake and that of binding in the case of a rope.

[We can conclude that the objection is non-existent if we do not see its special activity, even though it may figure in the cognition. The snake may figure in our cognition of the rope, but as the rope does not bite, we can conclude that it is not a snake. Further, that our perception of it was wrong.]

289. Whatever difference is perceived as a result of any circumstance causing a contrary perception, that they call a false perception.

[A defect in the senses or in the object itself may cause a false perception. What is seen because of such a defect is said to be false.

The *Vṛtti* mentions the following as possible causes of wrong perception :—*Santamasa timiropaghāta*, *madya*, *viṣapāna*, *anyadeśāvasthāna*. When, due to these causes, the wrong perception takes place, it can be corrected by comparison with perception under normal conditions and by verification through touch etc.—*tattu sparśanādibhir yathābhūtamavadhāryate. timiropaghātād darśanabhede dvitīyasya vastunaḥ sparśābhāvādaparicihinnacakṣuṣo yā pratipattiḥ saiva nyāyyetyavasīyate.*]

More examples follow to show that two cognitions may be similar if their objects are similar and refer to their special property but that they are really different.

290. Even though one sees ups and downs in a picture, similar to those of mountains (*nimnonnataṃ citre*) still it does not cause obstruction etc. (as a real mountain)

[R and RP have *nimnonnate citre* but *nimnonnatam* is a better reading. The *Vṛtti* and the *Kārikā* text of M. have it.]

291. Just as it is possible to have continuous contact of the hand with the wheel, that is not possible in the case of the torch-wheel which can be touched only with interruption.

292. While it is possible to have contact and protection in the case of cities by means of forts, walls and turrets, it is not possible to have these in the case of imaginary cities.

293. As much work as it is possible to get from real animals cannot be got from earthenware images of them. That is why the affix *Kan* has been taught by Pāṇini after (words expressive of imitations).

[It has been shown so far that the distinction between primary and secondary on which some grammatical operations are based depends upon the reality or unreality of the objects denoted by the words in question. One can tell whether the objects are real or not from the nature of their cognition which, though similar, may be different because of difference in their nature. Now the author speaks about difference between primary and secondary words, the basis for the use of the suffix *Kan*. P. 5.3.96. teaches the suffix *Kan* after words expressive of images of objects. One thus gets

forms like *aśvaka*, *uṣṭraka*, *gardabhaka*. As the objects are not real animals but ouly their images, the suffix *Kan* can be added. Mere resemblance is not enough. It must be an artificial image. There is, of course, secondary usage here also. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*Tasmāt. kasyacid eva sadṛśasya dharmasya bhāvād upamānopameyabhāva sambandhe sati 'ive pratikṛtau'* (P 5.3. 96). *ityetatprakaraṇavihitānām pratyayānāmutpattau nimittaṃ labhante.*]

294. Mountains and other well known objects cover a wide area but their reflection covers only a small area.

[The use of the word *Parvata* in the sense of the reflection of a mountain is secondary usage and so it takes the suffix *Kan* and we get the form *parvataka*. To call an earthenware image of a horse *aśvaka* is secondary usage based on similarity of shape. To call a reflection of a mountain *parvataka* is also secondary usage based on resemblance but resemblance due to the relation of original and reflection.].

295. 'While real poison and other such things are the cause of death, the same things seen in a dream are not capable of causing the same.

[The implication is that the suffix *Kan* can be added to words expressive of things seen in a dream, because they do not have the effect which the same things have in real life.

The *Vṛtti* says :—*Viṣabhojanādayo hi yathā prasiddhā maraṇakṣutpipāsāpratighātahetutvena vyavasthitā loke na tathā svapnonmādamūrcchādiṣu. tasmān na te mukhyaviṣayatvaṃ labhante*].

296. Things that seem to be otherwise as a result of changes relating to time, place or the senses are, however, understood rightly by following worldly tradition.

[Whether a thing is distant or near is due te difference in place. The rays of the sun shining in summer and thus causing

sing the illusion of water in a desert is due to time or reason. One who suffers from an eye-defect sees two moons instead of one. This is an instance of an object looking different due to a defect in the senses.

The *Vṛtti* gives other examples which unfortunately are not clear due to gaps in the text.]

297. The world does not regulate its verbal usage on the basis of knowledge arising from defective senses or which is of a supernatural character. Words are based on worldly tradition.

[Knowledge due to some defect in the senses is the opposite of truth and is illustrated by mirages and the seeing of two moons. Supernatural knowledge is that of *Ṛṣis*. Neither of them is fit for worldly transactions.

Though the *Vṛtti* has gaps here also, the following relevant sentences may be noted—. . . *yogināṃ sarvajñānāṃ ca jñānaṃ śabdavyavahāreṣu tair api nānugamyate. Prākṛtalokadṛṣṭinibandhanatvācca śabdārthasambandhasya sarveṇārthābhidhāne yatnaṃ kurvatā lokaḥ prathito nugantavyaḥ.*]

298. Just as a lamp reveals, in an object like a jar, through association (or proximity) other things than that for the illumination of which it was employed,

299. In the same way, a word conveys, from among the things which are connected together, those that are different from the one to convey which it was used.

[When a lamp is used to illuminate an object, it illuminates, not only that object but whatever else is invariably associated with it. If a lamp is lighted to see a jar, one sees not only the jar but also the properties which are inherent in the jar. This is inevitable. The jar itself is the main thing, its properties are the invariably associated things. In the same way, when a word is used to convey a particular property from among the many

which are connected with one another, it conveys not only that property but also others which are always associated with it. Puṇyarāja takes the word *bhāva* as an example. On the basis of its derivation, it can convey several connected notions such as the fact of being something finished (*siddhatva*), the masculine gender, singular number and so on. If it is used for conveying the idea of being something finished, it will not stop there. It will also convey the masculine gender, singular number etc.

The illustration of the lamp and of the word *bhāva* go back to the *Vṛtti*. The former, of course, is mentioned in the verse 298 itself. The *Vṛtti* contains several references to the *Mahābhāṣya* on the sūtra : *Bhāve* (P. 3.3.18.)

The lamp and the word *bhāva* were *jñāpaka* examples. The author now takes a *kāraka* example.

300. Though the churning of the ignition sticks (*araṇi*) is done for producing fire, it also produces the unintended smoke in the same process.

301. In the same way, a word also, when a particular meaning is meant to be conveyed, denotes by association, an unintended meaning also.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that neither the unintended smoke which is produced nor the unintended meaning which is conveyed plays any part in the action :—*aprayojakatvāttu pratīto'pyarthaḥ kriyāsādhanabhāvena na parigṛhyate. agniprayuktena hi nirmanthanenaikasādhano'pi dhūmasannipātaḥ pākādiṣu ca dṛṣṭaphaleṣvartheṣu agnivannopādīyate.*

That a lamp should illuminate not only the intended object but also what is next to it is natural. A word, on the other hand, is used to convey a particular object. Why should it convey something more than that?]

This objection is now answered.

302. Just as one cannot abandon (while taking a thing) something which is very closely connected with it, in the same way a word cannot but denote

what is intimately connected with its primary meaning.

[Puṇyarāja, following the *Vṛtti* explains that this is like one's not being able to avoid bones when one buys fish or meat. Similarly, a word not only conveys its primary meaning but also its gender and number—*tathaikavacanādir api śabdo vināpi tena prātipadikārthasyāpratyāyakatvādāśritasaṃsargaḥ tyaktuṃ na śakyate.*]

303. Even when the unintended meanings are present and they are conveyed, it is still the meaning which led to the use of the word that is the accepted one, even though there is no difference in the form of the word (with which the others are also connected).

[The word which conveys the main meaning, that is, the one which led to its use is the very word without any difference in form which conveys the other meanings also.

The *Vṛtti* points out that even though it is the same word without any change in its form that conveys all the meanings, it is always possible to distinguish between the one which leads to the use of the word on a particular occasion and the others:—. . *tulyaśrutir api śabdastenaiva rūpeṇa pravartamāna iha viśaye prayojakenārthenārthavān ihāprayojakeneti sāmarthyād avadhārayituṃ śakyate.*]

304. Sometimes the meanings are not meant to be primary or secondary, sometimes even proximity is not the cause of a meaning being conveyed.

305. Sometimes a meaning not belonging to the word actually used is conveyed and sometimes it is the chief meaning which conveys another.

[Even when the meaning which is the cause of the application of the word is the expressed meaning and not what is necessarily understood, there are four possibilities:—

(1) reversal of what is primary and what is secondary, (2) part of a meaning is not meant, (3) the whole of the meaning is not meant, (4) the conveying of another meaning without giving up the first meaning. These possibilities are now explained one by one.]

The following is an example of the reversal of what is important and what is secondary.

306. (In the *sūtras* setting forth the meanings of words ending in *taddhita* suffixes) the verb just says something about the meaning of the *taddhita* suffixes (and does not insist on action as it usually does) One sees a reversal of the relation of primary and secondary meanings.

[The following is an example. P. 4.4.2. teaches the meaning in which certain suffixes are added to stems. As the verb is the most important word in the sentence and as a verb like *dīvyati* primarily expresses action, the word ending in the suffix concerned should primarily express action. But, in fact, the usual relation of primary and secondary between action and accessory is not meant here. In *dīvyati*, the action is primary but in *ākṣika* the word formed according to that *sūtra* P. 4.4.2., (*akṣair dīvyati = ākṣikaḥ*), the agent is primary and not action. In the *sūttra Bhāve* (P. 3.3.18) the masculine gender and the singular number are not significant.

While Puṇyarāja explains this verse on the basis of P. 4.4.2, the *Vṛtti* does it on the basis of P.4.2.59 and P. 5.2.84 where also the meaning of the suffix is indicated by means of a verb. The word formed by the suffix concerned, however, expresses the agent primarily and action secondarily : *sarvadhātūpasarjanībhūtākriyāparicchinnam ākhyātāpratyavamṛṣṭarūpaṃ prādhānyena sādhanam abhidhīyate.*]

Now follows an illustration of a part of the meaning being not meant:—

307. (ab) Proximity is not the cause of the gender and number being conveyed in the *sūtras* teaching meanings of suffixes.

[In the *sūtra Bhāve* (P. 3.3.18). the masculine gender and the singular number are not significant. Words formed by the suffixes concerned can be in other genders and numbers like *paktiḥ, gamanam, pākau, pākāḥ, etc.*]

307. (cd) From the word *hrasva*=short (in P.1.2.32.) it is the unmentioned measure which is understood.

[In P.1.2.32. the word *ardhahrasva* means half a *mātrā*.

The *Vṛtti* points out that in P. 3.3.18 the word *bhāva* cannot convey its meaning without some case-ending or other which brings about the correctness (*śabdasaṃskāra*) of the word which is its only purpose and not to convey the masculine gender and the singular number as significant items ; *bhāva ityevamādiṣu svārthasyānyathā vaktum aśakyatvāc chabdasaṃskāra-nimittatvācca sannihite pi liṅga-saṃkhye pratyayānte samudāye vācyatvaṃ na pratipadyete*. Similarly in *ardhahrasva* in P. 1.2.32, the word *hrasva* has no significance. It means one *mātrā* and nothing more. *Ardhahrasva*, therefore, means half a mātrā and nothing more:— *na hyatra hrasvenāsannihitena vā prayojanaṃ kiñcit. . . . hrasvasyārdhopalakṣaṇatvenopādānam.*]

308. Half of a short syllable is really what is meant even though the short syllable itself may not be mentioned because short is meant to include everything that has the duration of one *mātrā*.

309. The words 'long' and 'protracted' may qualify 'half' (so that it means half of the *mātrā* belonging to the long or the protracted) or *mātrā* may quality 'half' so that the whole means half a *mātrā*. Or the word *ardhahrasva* may refer figuratively to the universal of half a *mātrā* just like *saptaparṇa*.

[The word *ardhahrasva* in P. 1.3.32 may be understood in three ways : (1) *hrasva* means *mātrā*, so *ardhahrasva* means half a *mātrā*. (2) *hrasva* stands for all the three ; *hrasva, dīrgha,*

and *pluta* and *ardha* means a part, equal or unequal When added to *hrasva*, it would stand for equal part, because the total duration of *hrasva* is one *mātrā* and half a *mātrā* would be an equal division of one *mātrā*. As *hrasva* means half a *mātrā*, when added to *dīrgha* or *pluta*, it would mean an unequal part, the other part in *dīrgha* and *pluta* being 1½ and 2½ *mātrās* respectively, (3) the word *ardhahrasva* is indivisible and it stands for the universal (*jāti*) of half a *mātrā*.

The above interpretations are all found in the *Vṛtti* as the following relevant sentence shows—*sa hi tadavayavopalakṣaṇatvād dīrghacaturbhāga iti vocyate, plutaṣaḍbhāga iti vā mātrārddham iti vā. Tat sarvathā tasya parimāṇāvasthā vyākhyātā bhavati.*]

It is now shown that, sometimes, it is the chief meaning that indicates another.

310. 'One has to go, look at the sun' though this sentence says something about the sun, it really indicates time, because it says, with a hint at the means (*upāya*) that time should be ascertained.

[The main meaning of the sentence relates to the sun but that is only a means to an end which is the ascertainment of time.]

311. In the sentence *vidhyaty adhanuṣā* 'he pierces with something else than a bow' the particular weapon stands for weapon in general or for anything that can be the substratum of the power of being a weapon.

[This is an example of the particular standing for the general taken from the *vyākaraṇaśāstra*. It is an example of *kvacit pradhānam evārtho bhavatyanyasya lakṣaṇam* (v. 305), because the word *dhanuḥ*, without giving up its main meaning 'bow' stands for any weapon.

The *Vṛtti* is not clear because of gaps in the text but it seems to say that in P. 4.4.83, the word *adhanuṣā* is a *paryudāsa* kind of negation and means 'something else than a bow'. But

in this verse it is taken as standing for weapon in general. The idea is that by negating a particular weapon, weapon in general is conveyed.]

A similar example from the world is now given.

312. When a boy is told : 'save the butter from the crows', he does not refrain from protecting it from dogs etc. knowing that the order refers to destructive agents in general.

The *Vṛtti* says:—*Kākebhyaḥ kākād vā sarpiḥ saṃrakṣyatām ityukte upaghātahetusāmānyamātropalakṣaṇatvāt kākajāter yāvān upaghātahetuḥ sa pratīyate.* By saying that *kāka* in the verse stands for any destructive agent *yāvān upaghātahetuḥ*, the *Vṛtti* makes it clear that in worldly verbal usage also, the particular stands for the general.]

313. (When an order for feeding somebody is given) the washing of the dishes and plates, though not actually mentioned, is also understood because it is part of the action of feeding.

[The point made here, is that what is invariably concomitant with the chief meaning is also conveyed even though no word expressive of it is used.]

The factors which enable us to decide which meaning is primary, which secondary and which implied are now enumerated.

314 The meanings of words are determined according to the sentence, situation, meaning, propriety, place and time and not according to mere external form.

[The following examples are given by Puṇyarāja. By sentence is meant the fact of construing together several words occurring in the same sentence or taking together several sentences occurring in different contexts. For example: in the

sentence *kaṭaṃ karoti bhīṣmam udāsaṃ darśanīyam*, the connection of the verb *karoti* is with the word *kaṭam* but as there cannot be a substance without qualities and as qualities must have a substratum in which to inhere, the other words like *bhīṣmam* ending in the second case-ending are taken as qualifying *kaṭam* and so a mat having those qualities is made and not any other on the basis of interconnection within the sentence, when someone is asked to fetch *saindhava* in the context (*prakaraṇa*) of battle, he would fetch a horse but when the same word is uttered in the context of eating, he would fetch salt. Thus context helps to determine the meaning of a word. When the same word is used in different sentences, its meaning is determined by the meaning (*artha*) of the other words in the sentence as in the following:—*añjalinā juhoti, añjalinā sūryam upatiṣṭhate, añjalinā pūrṇapātram āharati*. In these three sentences *añjalinā* means something different due to its association with the meanings of the other words. It is propriety (*aucitya*) that helps to determine, when *sīra, asi* and *musala* are mentioned without reference to any particular action, that *sīra* is for ploughing, *asī* for fighting and *musala* for unhusking again. When one says that he comes from a town to the east of Mathurā, from the word 'to the east', one would understand that he comes from Pāṭaliputra. When one only says 'the door' in winter 'the listener' would understand that it has to be closed and when the same thing is said in summer, he would understand that it has to be opened. Here it is time or season which helps to determine the meaning.

In the *Vṛtti*, some examples are the same while the others are different. But the text being corrupt, the meaning is not clear.]

The author now gives two verses giving a more complete list of the factors which help to determine the meaning of words. These may be quotations from some unknown work.

315. Connection, separation, association, opposition, meaning, context, indication, the presence of another word,

316. Suitability, propriety, place, time, gender and accent etc, these are the causes of our determining the meaning of a word when there is no definiteness in it.

[The *Vṛtti* and Puṇyarāja record that it is always *sāmarthya* = ability or capacity of the word which helps to determine its meaning when there is indefiniteness. The so called factors enumerated only reveal this capacity : *Tatra kecit sāmarthyamevaikaṃ bhedāvadhāraṇanimittam iti manyante. yasyārthaprakaraṇābhyāṃ svābhāviko bhedaḥ samadhigamyate so'pi sāmarthyād eva. sāmarthyaṃ hi bahudhā pravibhajyate.* (*Vṛtti*).

As for the examples of the different facts, the *Vṛtti* and Puṇyarāja give the same ones mostly. It is obvious that the latter has taken them from the former. Here and there the *Vṛtti* gives examples which are ignored by Puṇyarāja. It also raises some points for discussion which are ignored by Puṇyarāja. It is anxious to give an idea of the variety of views which existed in its day on some of the points raised. That is why the expressions : *anye, anye tu, anyetvāhuḥ, kecit, kecidāhuḥ, yeṣām, teṣām, keṣām-cit* occur in the *Vṛtti* in v. 315 and 316. The examples common to both are as follows—*Saṃsarga* = connection:— *sakiśorā dhenur ānīyatām*. Here on account of the connection between *dhenuḥ* and *kiśora*, a mare is understood from the former word and not a cow. *Viprayoga* = separation— *akiśorā dhenur ānīyatām* = 'let the *dhenu* without its *kiśora* be brought.' Here also, by *dhenu* a mare is understood because it is only a mare which can be without *kiśora*. *Sāhacarya* (association) — *Rāmalakṣmaṇau*. Because of association with *Lakṣmaṇa*, Rāma here means son of Daśaratha, *Virodha* (opposition) — *Rāmārjunau*. Here Rāma means Paraśurāma because of his well-known opposition to Arjuna. *Artha* = meaning and *prakaraṇa* = context have been illustrated under the previous verse. *Liṅga* = indication—*aktāḥ śarkarāḥ* = sugar mixed with grease. From indications found elsewhere it is understood that butter is used for mixing. *Rāmārjunau* can be taken as the example of the determination of meaning through the presence of another word. *Sāmarthya* = suitability, *abhirūpāya kanyā deyā* = the girl must be given in marriage to a

good-looking person. Through suitability, one understands a good-looking bridegroom. *Auciti* = propriety, *deśa* = place, *kāla* = time have already been illustrated under v. 314. It is well known that in the Veda, the meaning of a word is often determined by its accent (*svara*).]

317. Even if it is held that a word having many meanings is different in each case (*bhedapakṣe*), the external form being similar, confusion arises and it is with the help of context etc. that difiniteness in meaning is arrived at.

[Whether one holds the *nānātvapakṣa* or the *ekatvapakṣa*, one has to take the help of the context in determining the meanings of words having more than one meaning. If the word is different with each meaning, the form being the same, one cannot decide which meaning to take and the help of the context is necessary. If the view is that it is the same word, the help of the context is all the more necessary.]

Sometimes a word has more than one meaning, because from its form only, it can be a verb or a noun. Then also context alone can determine the meaning.

318. When words have the same form as nouns and as verbs and are to express a different meaning as each, then the meaning cannot be understood from the external form only.

[The word *aśva* as a noun means a horse but it can also be a verb. From the root *ṭu o śvi gativṛddhyoḥ* one would get the form *aśva* in the aorist second person singular (*luṅmadhyamapuruṣaikavacana*). In the same way, *ajāpayaḥ* can mean goat's milk or the word can be the causative form of the root *ji* = to conquer. In such cases, only the context can be the guide.]

319. An enlightened hearer knows that praise and blame, meant to promote action and abstention from action respectively, are really unreal.

320. The praise of a prescribed action having a visible or invisible fruit only serves to prompt the agent thereof.

[These verses are meant to show that the individual word and its meaning do not really exist. Only the meaning of the sentence is real. The chief meaning of a sentence is action and though a part of it may consist of praise of this action, it has no real existence. In the same way, the condemnation of an action contained in a sentence meant to keep people away from it has no real existence, that sentence being meant only to keep people away from that action.

The *Vṛtti* gives the following example of praise—*brahmacaryeṇaivehānantam āyur avāpnoti, ghṛtena pāpmānam apahantīti. tatra brahmavrataṃ caritavyam, ghṛtaṃ pānīyam ityetāvān upadeśaḥ.*]

321. Just as a crying child is put off when he is threatened that a tiger would eat him, in the same way, some bad consequence though unreal, is held up (before one who does some prohibited act).

322. Therefore, a learned man does not undertake an action prohibited by the *śāstra* after having arranged for averting its bad consequence.

323. One should not violate the injunction that 'one should not touch it (the sacrificial cake) with the teeth while eating it, for, if one does so, serpents would destroy him' after having first provided some antidote to serpent poison in the form of some *mantra* or medicine.

[The eating of the sacrificial cake by letting the teeth pierce it is prohibited as follows—*na dato gamayet, yad dato gamayet, sarpā enaṃ ghātukā bhavanti.*

324. Even if, sometimes, the truth is told in connection with praise or blame, the object is always to teach action or abstention from action.

Having thus shown that individual words and their meanings are unreal and that only the sentence and its meaning are real, the author wants to point out that the sentence is the source of the individual word.

325. The meaning of all individual words has its source or basis in the meaning of the sentence. If the meaning of any sentence is incomplete, it is on a level with the meanings of the individual words.

[The *Vṛtti*, echoing what is going to be said in v.419-420, compares the relation between the meanings of words and that of the sentence to the relation between the senses and the body as a whole: . . . *tathāpi indriyāṇāmiva śarīropanibandhanārtha-kriyā vākyoparibandhanaiva sarvapadārthānām arthavyavasthā.*]

326. If a single word (a noun) is pregnant with the idea of action then, that also, they say, is a sentence, devoid of a verb, because (the understanding of action) is seen to take place from a sentence only.

[The translation is based on the *Vṛtti* text of the verse, the second half of which is : *antareṇa kriyāśabdaṃ vākyād eva hi darśanāt.* This second half is missing in R and RP gives it in the footnotes with the remark that it is found in the manuscript *gha* and numbers the first half together with the first half of the next verse, though not for the purpose of translation. Though the *Vṛtti* on 326 is by no means clear because of several gaps in it, it certainly seems to take this half as the second half of 326. I have translated the verse accordingly.]

326(a) So is a mere verb said to be a sentence if a definite means for the accomplishment of the action denoted by it is understood and its meaning thus becomes complete.

[It is a pity that the *Vṛtti* has gaps here also. It seems to give examples of bare verbs which we mentally complete by supplying the necessary means for the accomplishment of the action denoted by them. *Parjanya* and *Mātariśvan* are mentioned as substrata of the *śakti* (*kārakaśakti*, *kartṛśakti*)? This verse is also numbered as 326, (a) being added to distinguish it from the previous one, in order to maintain uniformity of numbering with R and RP.]

Here the Mīmāṃsaka objects as follows—

327. It is a certain completeness of idea, separated by and depending upon the words that are not used, which through inference, appears to be the cause of our understanding the meaning (of the words not used).

[When we hear the bare noun *vṛkṣaḥ* tree we understand a complete meaning from it such as: 'the tree stands' or 'the tree is seen'. It means that we supply the word *tiṣṭhati* or *dṛśyate* mentally. This is *śrutārthāpatti*. The point of the Mīmāṃsaka is that a single word cannot convey a complete meaning. We supply some word or other mentally to complete the sentence and the sentence-meaning. In other words, the understanding of the complete meaning is separated from that of the incomplete meaning of the word actually used by the unused word coming to the mind...... *asminneva śabde viśiṣṭarūpe yā buddhir utpadyate tayā vyavahitaṃ buddhyantaram buddhau prāptasannidhānaṃ tadarthapratipattinimittaṃ bhavati.*]

The objection is answered as follows.

328. Whatever meaning is understood whenever a certain word is uttered, that meaning belongs to that word (and to that word only). There is no more correct definition of meaning than this.

[The point of the grammarian is that no part of the meaning should be attributed to any word supplied mentally. In other words, he does not admit *śrutārthāpatti*.]

[The *Vṛtti* begins its remarks on this verse with the words:—*anye tu manyante*. It obviously means somebody other than the Mīmāṃsaka. It can very well be the grammarian and the author himself is one. His remark *neha kaścit śabdārtha-sambandhasyā kartā vidyate* also confirms that the grammarian is meant.]

That being so the *sūtra* :—*kriyārthopapadasya ca karmaṇi sthāninaḥ* (P. 2.3.14) is unnecessary, but it is based on *śrutār-thāpatti*=supplying a word mentally.

329. That being so, in cases where a verb denoting an action meant for something else is the proximate word, the action denoted by the unused verb is understood and so does the mere preposition like *niḥ* express the meaning of *krānta* etc. in a complex formation.

[The purpose of this verse is to show that the supplying of non-existent word mentally is unnecessary. In the sentence *edhebhyo vrajati*, the verb expresses an action meant for some other action, the word for which is not mentioned but is understood from the word *edhebhyaḥ*='for fuel', that is, for bringing fuel. The action of bringing is understood from the word for fuel itself. That is why P.2.3.14 has been declared to be unnecessary, as the fourth case ending in *edhebhyaḥ* can come by *tādarthye catuarthī*. Similarly, in *niṣkauśāmbiḥ*, *niḥ* by itself can express the idea of *krāntaḥ*.

The *Vṛtti* remarks as follows:—*edhebhyo vrajatītyasmin vākye edhebhya ityevamādinā gatārthatvād āharaṇakriyārthaṃ pṛthak śabdo na prayujyate.*]

If half a sentence can express the meaning of the full sentence and both are sentences, what is the use of ever using the full sentence?

330. They are separate expressions and are like synonyms. The meaning of sentences consisting of single words is determined by purpose and the context.

[When the sentence consists of a single word only, noun or verb, how to complete it mentally would depend upon purpose and context.

The *Vṛtti* points out that *Vṛkṣaḥ* and *Vṛkṣas tiṣṭhati* are both complete sentences and not that the former is the latter devoid of the word *tiṣṭhati*. Both convey a meaning. They are like the pair Vṛṣa and Vṛṣabha, or *Yāva* and *Yāvaka or praparṇa* and *prapatitaparṇa* in which each of the two is complete and not that the former is an incomplete form of the latter:—*tāni tvaprayujyamānapadaikadeśasarūpāṇi samudāyāntarāṇi vṛsavṛṣabha—yāvayāvaka—praparṇa prapatitaparṇavad*]...

If only the sentence is real, what is the use of analysing it into words ?

331. The means whereby the meaning is understood and which differ in the case of each person are not in any way connected with the thing to be known from the sentence.

[The idea is that the artificial divisions are the means of understanding the integrated sentence.

332. Even when no meaning is understood or when a wrong meaning is understood words are still eternally connected with their meaning.

[The relation between word and meaning is eternal. That is not affected by the fact that the listener may not understand the meaning due to absent-mindedness or due to ignorance.]

333. When the word *dvāram* (—the door) having the second case-ending is heard, then, according to the context one understands either 'shut' (*badhāna*) or 'give way' (*dehi*).

[This is said in support of *śrutārthāpatti*. According to the context, one is entitled to supply mentally some word or other

in order to complete the sentence. Otherwise, one would not understand meaning and the relation between the word and the meaning would be affected.]

The opponent points out a disadvantage in not accepting *śrutārthāpatti*.

334. A word expressive of a finished thing (*sattva*) and standing for the means (whereby an action is accomplished) cannot also express the main meaning of a sentence, namely, the action to be accomplished.

[The point sought to be made is that to avoid the disadvantage, the required word must be mentally supplied. In other words, *śrutārthāpatti* must be resorted to.]

335. Therefore, when a sentence consists of a single word (whether that word is a noun or a verb) it does no more than express its own meaning and retires incomplete. Its meaning suggests the proximity (of the other meaning required for completeness through the medium of the word to which the meaning belongs.)

[In this way, *śrutārthāpatti* is justified by the *Mīmāṃsaka*.

The upholder of indivisibility now criticizes the *Mīmāṃsaka*.

336. As there is no difference in the matter of being meant for something else, the word (actually uttered) cannot bring another word to the mind, nor can its meaning bring it nor can the uttered word bring the meaning (of the non-uttered word) to the mind.

[The word actually uttered cannot bring the word not uttered to the mind, because its function is to convey its own meaning.

Nor can its meaning bring the unuttered word to the mind, because there is no relation between the two. Nor can the uttered word bring the meaning of the non-uttered word to the mind because there is no relation between a word and the meaning of another word. A fourth possibility is that the meaning of the uttered word brings the meaning of the non-uttered word to the mind, but that would be a case of inference. The conclusion is that when a word, noun or verb, is uttered, it brings to the mind without the intervention of any other word but with the help of the context another meaning which is required to complete it. In this way, the Mīmāṃsaka view is rejected.

The *Mīmāṃsaka* replies:—

337. If the word expressive of the object (of an action, *dvāram* in the present case) makes the verb non-existent as it were (*naṣṭarūpam iva*) and (therefore) unnecessary, then both action (*bhāva*) and the finished thing (*sattva*) would acquire equal importance.

[The Grammarian himself believes that both action and the finished thing cannot be equally important in a sentence. If the actually uttered word *dvāram* conveys the meaning of the verb also which is not used, then both action and the finished object would be conveyed by it on an equal footing which is impossible.

Now the Grammarian says:—

338 (ab) They describe it (the word *dvāram*) as a verb similar in form to a noun.

If that is so, how to account for the second case-ending in the word ?

(cd) Usage is regulated by the positive and the negative reasoning (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*).

[The word *dvāram* is really a verb similar in form to a noun. Like other verbs, therefore, it also denotes action

primarily. If one sees the second case-ending in it, it is only by analogy. In sentences like *bhāṇḍaṃ pidhehi*, *dvāraṃ pidhehi* where both noun and verb are present, one sees that the verb denotes action primarily and the noun denotes substance and takes a case-ending. Where only the noun is used but both action and substance are understood, the word takes a case-ending because it denotes substance also.

Here the *Mīmāṃsaka* asks a question : If the word *dvāram* denotes more than one thing, is not its expressive power thereby lost as there might be a doubt as to which meaning to take?

The grammarian answers—

339. Even though doubt arises on account of (similarity) of form, still its expressive power does not disappear as in the case of the expression *ardhaṃ paśoḥ* (=half of the sacrificial animal) where competence decides what the meaning is.

[In *ardhaṃ paśor iva*, because of the word *iva*, a doubt arises as to whose half is meant, of the animal or of Devadatta, but the doubt is resolved with the help of context and appropriateness. Similarly, where only the word *dvāram* is used, context and appropriateness would help one to decide whether it should be taken as a noun or as a verb.]

Mīmāṃsaka objection:—

340. If, when a word expressive of *sattva* (concrete object) stands by itself it is to be considered as being expressive of a process (*bhāva*), if, when they come together the word expressing *sattva* is considered to have a different meaning and if the verb does not have its own separate meaning,

341. Then, the statement (of old thinkers like Yāska) that a verb expresses chiefly a process whereas a noun denotes a concrete thing (*sattva*) and that there are four parts of speech would be contradicted.

[There is a reference here to Yāska's definition in his *Nirukta* of the verb and the noun : *bhāvapradhānam ākhyātam, sattva-pradhānāni nāmāni.* It is also in the Nirukta that one finds the earliest mention of the four parts of speech : *nāmākhyātopasarganipātāḥ.* See Yāska—Nirukta I. 1.]

The Grammarian answers—

342. Having seen the eternality of the sentence in the mind and its connection in the world with its meaning, Vārttākṣa and Audumbarāyaṇa have declared that there are no four parts of speech.

[When the hearer grasps the indivisible sentence, he is not conscious of any parts in the form of individual words. Nor is he conscious of word-meanings when he grasps the sentence meaning consisting of *pratibhā*.

As the sentence is indivisible the individual word does not exist and so the question of the different kinds of words or parts of speech does not arise. Those who believe in *śrutārthāpatti* would naturally accept divisions within the sentence and their being brought under four classes.

What then is the function of the śāstra ?

343. Both in the world and in the Science of Grammar, the easy and very comprehensive treatment of sentences on the basis of individual words is resorted to by convention for the sake of convenience.

The Mīmāṃsaka objects—If the individual words and meanings are non-existent, how is it that action and abstention from action based on them take place in the world ? The Grammarian answers—

344. In the world, traditions of men are not always based on reality. Therefore, there is nothing beyond the sentence which is not a mere creation of the world.

[The point is that when we are trying to understand the truth, we cannot rely on the practice of the world. In the world, one sometimes reaches the real through the unreal. We can understand what kind of animal a cow is by looking at a picture of it. That does not mean that the picture of a cow is a real cow. Similarly, we sometimes act on the basis of word-meanings but that does not mean that they are real.]

345. Even when the meaning of a sentence is made clear by means of indications, found in other sentences, that meaning is its own. It was not clearly noticed on account of identity of forms.

[The *śruti* says : *aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhāti*=he places sugar mixed with grease.

It is not clear from this sentence whether the sugar is to be mixed with oil or clarified butter. But another *śruti* says : *tejo vai ghṛtam*='clarified butter is indeed lustre'. That is a clue, an indication that the sugar is to be mixed with clarified butter. The first *śruti* thus means : 'he places sugar mixed with clarified butter' and this meaning belongs entirely to the first *śruti* in spite of the fact that the clue is found in the second one.]

Something is now being said about the relation of *bādhya* and *bādhaka* (what is set aside and what sets aside) between the original rules and their exceptions.

346. Whatever is excluded implicitly, if not explicitly, from the operation of the general rules, is explicitly mentioned in the special rules of exception and that is really part of the meaning of the general rule.

[A general rule does not really cover special cases though there is nothing in the rule itself to tell us so. But when the author of the general rule framed it, he knew about it.

An example of the same from the world is now given—

347. The injunction regarding the serving of

curds to Brahmins operates by excluding Māṭhara. The word Māṭhara (in the subsequent sentence *takraṃ māṭharāya*) because of its connection with butter-milk, only confirms the correctness of the meaning of the previous sentence (*brāhmaṇebhyo dadhi dīyatām*).

[What is pointed out here is that the sentence *takraṃ māṭharāya* does not set aside the giving of curds to Māṭhara because that was never envisaged by the first sentence *brāhmaṇebhyo dadhi dīyatām* which enjoins the giving of curds to Brahmins excluding Māṭhara. So there is no question of contradicting something which was enjoined before. Serving of curds to Māṭhara was never enjoined.

Thus what is called *bādha* of the first sentence by the second sentence is nothing more than the inferential understanding that curds were never meant to be served to Māṭhara *aprāptyanumāna*.

What was said in the previous verse was based on looking upon the two as two separate sentences. It is thus that *bādha* amounts to *aprāptyanumāna* : The second sentence becomes the cause of our inferring that the injunction in the first sentence was never meant to apply to Māṭhara.

If the two sentences are treated as one what would be the nature of *bādhyabādhakabhāva* ?

348. Even though there is more than one verb, some look upon the original injunction and the exception to constitute one sentence which appears to be divided.

[If they are looked upon as one sentence, the exclusion, of the sphere of the exception and the application of the original injunction to the rest would take place at the same time and so there would be no need for *aprāptyanumāna*.

Just as an exception is supplementary to the original injunction, in the same way, restrictions and prohibitions can be looked upon as supplementary to original injunctions.

349. That being so, restrictions and prohibitions are also supplementary to the original injunction. The *aluk* (which is taught in P. 6.3.1) has been declared to be supplementary to the *luk* (which is taught in P. 2.4.71).

[Exceptions, restrictions and prohibitions are looked upon as making one sentence with the original injunction on the basis of either *vākyaikavākyatā* or *padaikavākyatā*. The former is defined thus :—*upakāryopakārakabhāvāpannabodhajanakatvam.*

Without using these technical expressions, the *Vṛtti* explains the same ideas in its own words : *vidhikāla evotkṛṣṭasya punaḥśruter aprāptir anumīyate* = At the time of the original injunction itself, it is inferred that it would not apply to what would not come within its scope. Similarly when P. 2.4.71. teaches the elision of the case endings of words which are to enter into a *samāsa*, it is understood that this elision does not take place when particular words become the second term in a compound. In other words, the original injunction and the later exception or restriction or prohibition are understood as one sentence and so understood together : *yaśca supo dhātuprātipadikayor iti dvitīyena lug anvākhyāyate tasya tasminnevāvadhivākye uttarapada-viśeṣaṃ varjayitveti prathamameva vidhinā prakalpitaḥ śeṣo'numīyate.*]

Those who are against looking upon them as one sentence argue that the sentences in question are complete in their meaning and so there is no relation of primary and secondary between them.

350. The sentences in question are independent as they do not require one another when they convey their meaning. As they do not serve one another, how can they constitute one sentence ?

[The *Vṛtti* points out that two separate sentences can make up one sentence only if there is some kind of dependence or mutual requirement between them. If each is self-sufficient it is concerned with itself only. If they cannot render service

to each other, there is no question of their making up one sentence:—*Iha sākāṅkṣāṇāṃsaṃsargāt parasparam upakāre vartamānānāmekavākyatvam upapadyate. Pradhānāni tu pṛthagātmanirvṛttau vyāpṛtāni. Teṣāṃ nirākāṅkṣatvād asatyupakāre nāstyekavākyatvam.*]

The upholder of the single sentence argues as follows—

351. (As the original injunction) requires the special injunction, the latter is taken to be supplementary to it. The special injunction also requires the other in the matter of determining what is excluded by it. Therefore, mutual requirement is similar in each case.

[What is pointed out here is that the original and special injunctions (*niyama, apavāda* or *pratiṣedha*) require each other in order to determine their own meaning. As their mutual requirement is equal, it is better to look upon them as constituting one sentence. Each requires the other in order to exclude the scope of the other from its own scope.

While explaining this verse the *Vṛtti* takes a different kind of example altogether. It takes the *sūtra* P. 3.1.96, that is, *tavyat-tavya-anīyaraḥ*= 'After a root occur the suffixes *tavyat*, *tavya* and *anīyar*. It says that according to some, the verb 'to occur' is one though it has three different agents. The verb being one, there is only one sentence here :—*bhavater ekatvād ekavākyatvam.* According to others, the action denoted by the verb becomes different with each different agent. With each agent, the action is self-sufficient and so there are as many actions as there are agents and so as many sentences. Those who uphold the view that there is only one sentence say that each of the three suffixes is separately the agent of the verb *bhavati*, while mutual requirement does exist. The agent-power (*kartṛśakti*) is one, but it exists in three different suffixes : *ekavākyavādinastu manyante—satyām apekṣāyāṁ tavyadādayaḥ pṛthak pṛthag bhavateḥ kartāro vijñāyante. Bhinnādhārā vā tavyadādīnāmekaiva kartṛśaktir iti.*]

The question whether individual words can also be analysed into parts is now discussed:—

352. There is no elision of the part of a name. A name with a particular sequence of phonemes has been given to something and that does not disappear.

[Devadatta is a name. Some people say only *Deva* or only *Datta*. That may happen in the world but the *śāstra* does not teach the elision of either Deva or Datta. As the *Vṛtti* puts it :—*katham ca viśiṣṭarūpāyām kṛtāyām samjñāyām nirjñāta-pravṛtti prasiddhaprayogam rūḍharūpam punar anyathā śakyam kartum*.]

353. From *Datta* etc, a different name altogether, another name (Devadatta) cannot be understood. Nor can Datta bring to the mind the named (individual) Devadatta, because it is the named of some other name.

[A part of a name can neither bring the full name to the mind nor bring the named of the full name to the mind. The *Vṛtti* says the same thing in its own way. *Iha yo'rthena kṛta-sambandhaḥ śabdaḥ śabdāntaram tasya vācako na bhavati* = When there is a relation between an object and a word, another word cannot be expressive of that word, that is, another word cannot bring that word to the mind. All this has been said in answer to the suggestion, that Datta first brings Devadatta to the mind and, from the latter, the individual Devadatta is understood. The possibility of this process is denied here.]

Others believe that the 'named' is connected not only with the full name but also with parts or abridgements of it.

354. Others are of the view that there is a relation between the named and all the parts of the name as with the full name.

[In other words, a part of the name can bring the 'named' to the mind as well as the full name can. Or rather, the whole and the parts bring the 'named' to the mind at the same time.

As the *Vṛtti* says . . . . *iti tatra samjñākāle sarva eva samjñino yathaiva samudāyais tathāvayavair api sambadhyante* = at the time

that the name is given, the named individuals are connected with the full name and parts of that name at the same time.]

Two defects are pointed out in this view:—

355. In this way, even the phonemes which are parts of the name would become expressive of the named. Nor does one see the expressive power of the part once it is separated from the whole.

[The two defects are : (i) If a part of a name can denote the 'named', why not each phoneme of it ? (2) Whatever expressive power a part has exists only as long as it is part of the whole, not when it is separated from the whole :—*sambaddheṣu vāvayaveṣu saṃjñātvaṃ pratipadyamāneṣu kevalā dattādaya uccāryamāṇāḥ saṃjñātvaṃ na pratipadyeran dvirvacanavad eva iti*, says the *Vṛtti*.]

356. If the whole name, together with its parts, is expressive of the 'named', then it is not possible for what looks like parts to be expressive of it.

[What is emphasised here is that what looks like a part is really not a part. It only looks like it.

The *Vṛtti* points out that the parts which depend upon the whole cannot perform the same function apart from the whole :—*na hi samudāyatantrāṇām avayavānām ekārthakriyāyāṃ hitvā pradhānaṃ pravṛttiḥ sambhavati.*]

Another view is now given.

357. According to some, from the part the whole is remembered. From the whole thus remembered, the meaning of the whole is understood.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that it is not merely a word that is actually heard which can convey a meaning. A word which is regularly inferred can also, like the word which is heard, convey a meaning :—*Kecit tu manyante—nāvaśyaṃ śrūyamāṇa eva śabdaḥ pratyāyakaḥ. niyamenānumīyamāno' pi śrūyamāṇavad eva pratyayam utpādayati*. From the parts, perceived apart from the

whole, one does remember the whole and the whole thus remembered, does cause the cognition of the object named :—*tathā ca smaryamāṇaḥ sa eva kṛtasambandhaḥ samudāyaḥ saṃjñinaṃ pratyāyayati.*

That view is now refuted.

358. How can there be remembrance from the part of the whole which is different from it ? How can a word which is only understood (and not heard) be expressive of its meanings;

[The whole is different from the part. So, on seeing the part, one cannot remember the whole. Even if one does remember it, it cannot convey the meaning because the whole has not been uttered or heard. To believe that what has not been heard can convey a meaning would result in undesirable conclusions.

The *Vṛtti* points out that what looks like a part can be a part of many wholes having different meanings. Which whole would one remember on seeing the part ? :—*sādhāraṇo'asāv ekadeśas tulyena rūpeṇā nekasaṃghātānupātī. Tatra bhinneṣu saṃghāteṣu niyamāt kathaṃ smṛtiḥ* ?]

Now the *siddhānta* is set forth.

359. (When names are applied to objects) words similar to their parts and endowed with their different characteristics arise later and are applied as names to the same object.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that when full names are given to objects, other names, similar in form to parts of the full names, come into existence as by-products. The process is similar to the coming into existence of by-products when we try to obtain any main product; *Keṣāñcittu samudāyasvarūpe saṃjñātvena prakalpyamāne saṃjñāntarāṇyeva parikalpitaikadeśarūpāṇi ekasādhanānyanuniṣpadyante. Niyatā ceyam apauruṣeyikasarvasaṃjñāsaṃjñini sambandhaviṣayā śabdāntarāṇāmekadeśasarūpāṇāmanuniṣpattir iti.*

What is pointed out is that these words which arise later (*anuniṣpattiḥ*) are not really parts of the name, but only look

like them. According to the doctrine of indivisibility, they cannot be parts.]

These words which arise later and look like parts of names sometimes cannot invariably convey the individuals expressed by the names themselves. *Deva* which looks like a part of Devadatta can mean a god or the person whose name is Devadatta: The form is the same in both cases and so a doubt can arise. How the doubt is resolved is now stated—

360. The form being common, their meaning is doubtful and their substratum (in the form of meaning) is determined through competence (*sāmarthyāt*). The *śāstra* teaches elision etc. in the case of those which are grammatically correct.

[Of the words which arise later, some like *Deva* and *Datta* are grammatically correct and the *śāstra* teaches elision (*lopa*) etc. in their case. Others like *jye*, *drā*, *khā* are grammatically incorrect. It is in the case of the former that the meaning can be doubtful because of similarity of form. The doubt is resolved through context taken in its widest possible meaning. The *śāstra* also says something about their derivation. But not about the derivation of *jye*, *drā*, *ghā* etc. which are therefore rejected. As the *Vṛitti* puts it—*tatra sādhavo lopaśāstreṇānvyākhyāyamānarūpaparicchedāḥ parigṛhyante. Tato' nye tyajyante.*]

361. Though there is similarity as far as arising later is concerned, *jye*, *drā*, *khā* are incorrect. Therefore, in the *śāstra* which explains derivation, they are not mentioned as *Datta* etc. are.

[According to the *Vṛtti*, the incorrect forms are *jye*, *drā* and *khā*, abbreviations of *jyeṣthā*, *ārdrā* and *viśākhā*, all names of stars. But these abbreviations are mere collections of phonemes and not words and, therefore, meaningless. Therefore, the *śāstra* takes no notice of them: *Tatra ye nānvākhyātāḥ śāstreṇā tulyāyāmanu niṣpattau jyeṣṭhārdrā viśākhā ityevamādiṣu jye-drā-khā ityasādhavo vijñāyante. Na hi te 'nvākhyāyake smṛtiśāstre*

dattādivat smaryante. There were apparently some who believed that once the whole is taught as a name, its parts are also automatically taught as names. In other words, it is not necessary to derive the parts separately as names:—*Tathāsyāpi tantreṇa prasaṅgena vā samudāyasya saṃjñātvenopādāne tadavayavānāmapi saṃjñātvaṃ vyavatiṣṭhate.*]

A doubt as to the eternality of the relation between names and the named is removed as fellows—

362. Names like *kharaṇasa* have *ṇ* instead of *n* eternally and as they denote a particular individual, they have been declared to be correct.

[The word *kharanasa* has this form when it is not a name but it becomes *kharaṇasa* when it is a name. They are really two different words. It is not that the word *kharanasa* becomes *kharaṇasa* when it is to be used as a name. So the question of the non-eternality of the relation between the name and the named does not arise at all.

The *Vṛtti* quotes a verse stating the doubt to resolve which the present verse has been given. The doubt is: If the word *kharaṇasa* is formed before it was a name then how did it get *ṇ* which depends upon its being a name ? If the word was *kharanasa* when it was formed and it was changed to *kharaṇasa* when it became a name, the eternality of the relation is affected. To resolve the doubt, it is stated that forms with *na* and forms with *ṇa* are both eternal. One is not a transformation of the other:—*kṛtaṇatvāscākṛtaṇatvāśca nityāḥ samudāyā vidyante. Tatra kṛtaṇatvāḥ samudāye niyuịyamānāḥ sādhavaḥ. Anyatrākṛtaṇatvāḥ sādhavaḥ.* Whether with *n* or with *ṇ*, they are both incorrect if used outside their scope:—*ubhayeṣāṃ ca viṣayaviparyaye sādhutvaṃ na vidyate.*]

363. These words (like *kharaṇasa*) are names of individuals because the power to be a name inheres in them. In such cases one does not necessarily look for the presence of the corresponding characteristic (*nimitta*) in the named.

[What is meant here is that even though the word *kharaṇasa* means 'one who has a sharp nose', one does not look for a sharp nose in a person before giving him that name. It can be applied to any body. The power to be a name exists in that word because of the *ṇ* in it. A word having a particular form is given as a name to an object irrespective of whether that object has any feature corresponding to the meaning of the name: *Kānicit tu nimittasyābhāve viparyayeṇa svarūpamātra-nibandhanāni sannipatanti* says the *Vṛtti*.]

The fact that names are given to objects by persons according to their *wish* does not mean that the relation between the names and the named is not eternal.

364. For the sake of worldly transactions some names are restricted to particular objects in particular places. But the relation in the case of a name like *Ḍittha* is as eternal as in the case of the name *go*.

[Even though we see persons giving names to objects, it is not they who create the relation between these names and the objects. That relation, being eternal, was already there. Persons only make use of it in particular places and times.

The *Vṛtti* points out that all names have the capacity to denote all objects and all objects can be called by all the names : *saṃjñānāṃ sarvasaṃjñipratyāyanaviṣayāḥ śaktayo vidyante. Saṃjñinām api pratyekaṃ sarvasamjñāpadaviṣayatākhyāḥ śaktayo vidyante.* It is only for the sake of convenience that particular names are given to particular objects in particular places.

In the *śāstra* also, names are restricted to particular things in order to facilitate grammatical operations.

365. In this *Śāstra*, the non-artificial relation of names like *Vṛddhi* (with the named) consists in restricting their power to particular objects. This relation is like the relation of the qualifier and the qualified.

[All words are capable of being the names of all things and

all things are capable of being named by any word. But in the *śāstra*, a particular name is restricted to a particular thing. In other words the relation of the name and the named is eternal. All that human beings can do is to restrict it in particular cases for the sake of convenience. The person who says blue jar does not create the relation between the blue and the jar. The expression *nīlo ghaṭaḥ* only states a relation which was already there: *tad yathā nīlam iti sarvāśrayaviśeṣaṇaśaktir utpalādiviṣayā parigṛhyate. Utpalādināpi sarvaviśeṣaṇaviṣayā viśeṣyaśaktir nīlādiṣu niyamyate*= when one says *nīlam utpalam*, the power of blue to qualify any subtance is presented as relating to the lotus and the power of the lotus to be qualified by any quality is here restricted to the blue, says the *Vṛtti*.

Something is now said about the two kinds of names.

366. A name is given on the basis of its own form, sometimes when there is some circumstance in the object corresponding to the form and sometimes when there is not.

[Both in the world and in the *śāstra* names are given mainly on the basis of their form. Sometimes, a name is said to be *anvartha* when there is some circumstance in the object corresponding to the form of the name as when a person who is good at destroying his enemy is called *śatrughna*. But there is no need for it: for example, the name *Ḍittha* in the world and the names *ti*, *ghu*, *bhā* etc. in the *śāstra*.

Not only small names consisting of just one syllable but also big names are given in the *śāstra* on the basis of form only.

367. In the *śāstra*, a big name is based on its form but when some circumstance is present in the object, that is also inferred to be the basis of the name.

[When the form only is the basis of the name, the meaning of its parts is not considered to be the basis. But when there is some circumstance in the object and it is expressed by

the parts of the name, then the meaning of the parts also becomes the basis of the name.]

How it is inferred is now stated.

368. Because of repetition of form, its repetition is inferred. Or it is understood as another word altogether or a difference of power is understood.

[In the case of the long names found in the *śāstra*, three possibilities are envisaged : (1) it should be taken twice, once as a whole having a particular form and again as a whole made up of parts through the meaning of which it denotes the object, (2) it should be taken as two separate words, (3) it should be taken as one name having two distinct powers. Both the *Vṛtti* and Puṇyarāja speak about these three possibilities, the former in a somewhat obscure language and the latter a little more clearly.]

It is now shown that there are four possibilities in the matter of names in the *śāstra*.

369. Sometimes, a technical name is applied differently in different contexts. In the case of the name Saṃkhyā, both the technical and non-technical meanings may be applicable in the same text.

[In P. 1.3.14, the word *karma* has a non-technical meaning, namely, action, but in P. 3.2.1, it has its technical meaning namely *karmakāraka* = the object of an action. In P. 5.1.22, the word *saṃkhyā* has to be understood in both its technical and non-technical meanings.]

370. Sometimes, a worldly name when used, covers the field of the technical name also, as the word *saṃbuddhi* in P. 1. 2. 33, where it should be taken both in the technical and non-technical senses.

[*Saṃbuddhi*, in the world, means calling or addressing somebody. Technically, it is the vocative singular by P. 2.3.49. In P. 1.2.33, both the meanings apply according to this verse.

Compare, however, the following remark of the *kāśikā* on P. 1.2.33—*Dūrāt sambodhayati yena vākyena tat sambodhanaṃ sambuddhiḥ. Naikavacanaṃ sambuddhiḥ.* The *kāśikā* seems to exclude the technical meaning here but it does not really do so. All that it means is that while understanding the *sūtra*, the non-technical meaning should be taken and not the technical one, though the latter is also included in it. The *Vṛtti* with a little correction in the text, makes this point clear—*Dūrāt sambuddhāv ityatra laukika eva kriyāśabdaḥ kṛtrimāyā api viṣayaṃ sannidhānād vyāpnoti.* If the *sūtra* is understood by taking the technical meaning of the word, it would not cover all cases:—*kṛtrimā tu na śaknoti vyāptuṃ sarvakriyāḥ śabda-viṣayāḥ.*]

It is the sentence which is being discussed in this part of the text. One point which is discussed is whether the action conveyed by the sentence is carried out individually or by the group.

371. Scholars declare that when expressions relating to the class are used or when there is retention of one or when the *dvandva* compound is used, the actions are related to each one of their substrata because of the nature of the word itself.

[By substrata (*āśraya*) of the action, the agents are meant. The examples of the three cases envisaged are: (1) *brāhmaṇā bhojyantām* (*saṃgha*=class). (2) *brāhmaṇo bhojyatām* (*ekaśeṣa*), and (3) *Devadatta-Yajñadatta-Viṣṇumitrā bhojyantām* (*dvandva*). In all these sentences, the action of feeding has to be applied to each agent separately.]

It is now stated why an action like eating cannot rest in many at the same time.

372. The action of eating, consisting of a particular form and a particular result, rests in each person separately. Otherwise the meaning of the root *bhuj*=to eat, would not be carried out.

[The action of eating is not like the action of dramatic

representation (*nāṭya*) which is a name applied to the different actions of many taking place at the same time. The name 'eating' is applied to a particular action of a person, resulting in his satisfaction (*tṛpti*). If its parts and its result are found in different individuals, it would not be called eating at all. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*Yadi hi bhinneṣu bhoktṛṣv anyatra rūpaṃ rūpaikadeśo vānyatra dṛśyate, anyatra phalaṃ phalaikadeśo vā vyavatiṣṭheta bhujir evāsau na syāt.*]

373. All eaters individually perform the act of taking the food and so on and attain the result namely satisfaction and not (collectively) as in the case of dramatic representation.

[The different subsidiary acts which constitute a dramatic performance are meant to be performed by different individuals and it is only when they do so that it is said to be well-done: As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*Tathaiva ca sā nirvartyamānā samyaganuṣṭhitetyucyate.* This is not true of eating where each individual has to do all the acts like taking the food, moving the jaws etc. himself, right till final satisfaction: *Annādānahanucalanarūpo hi bhujis tṛptiphalo bhoktṛbhiḥ pravibhaktaḥ parisamāptarūpaphalo nirvartyate.*]

Another illustration is now given.

374. It (the action of eating) is like the water for washing the feet of guests; by its very nature (*sāmarthyāt*) it is arranged separately for each person. The action of eating does not produce its effect (satisfaction) for several at the same time as a lamp does.

The difference between the action of eating and the action of seeing is now pointed out.

375. An action like seeing is one and without being repeated in each case it can cover all its objects which are suitably situated at the same time.

[An action like eating can cover many agents only if each agent performs that action separately. But the action of seeing can cover many objects at the same time, provided they are situated in the right place. Of course each object can be seen separately also but the point here is that they can be seen at the same time also. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*Vanaṃ dṛśyatām, saṅgho dṛśyatām iti dṛśirūpasyobhayathā darśanasambhavād ekaṃ vā darśanaṃ samudāyakarmakaṃ nirvartyate, pratyavayavaṃ vā krameṇa bhinnadarśanamāvartate.*]

The question now arises as to whether the name 'cooking' is applied to one particular act or to a series of acts understood as a whole.

376. The perception of the different accessories (*kāraka*) with their different activities when one observes worldly transactions makes one conclude that the action (of cooking) covers the activities of the different accessories taken together.

[Two views are mentioned about the action of cooking. One view is that it stands for the softening of the material that is cooked, that is, for *viklitti*. Another view is that it stands for all the activities taken together of the different accessories which play a part in the cooking, such as the cook, the fuel, the pot and so on.]

It is now shown that in the *śāstra* also sometimes the sentence-meaning is applied to each case separately.

377. As the form to be derived is well-known in the world and as there are indications in the *śāstra* itself (for separate application) and as each item requires application, one applies the name *Vṛddhi* to *ā*, *ai* and *au* separately.

It is now shown that sometimes the meaning of the sentence is applied to the group as a whole.

378. As the taking of one hundred is the main thing in an order relating to the realisation of a fine

of hundred, even though the persons to be fined are many the amount of fine to be realised by the authorities does not vary.

[According to the order : *Gargāḥ śataṃ daṇḍyantām*=Let the Gargas be fined a hundred, all of them are collectively fined hundred and not each one hundred separately. Because the total amount to be realised is hundred and that is the main point in the order. If each one is fined a hundred the total would exceed hundred and the order would be violated. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*Tatrādānasyāpi śatārthatvāt tādarthyena śataṃ pradhānaṃ na guṇabhedād bhidyate . . . Yathaiva śataṃ daṇḍyantām ityukte na sahasraṃ daṇḍyante tathā pratyekaṃ śataṃ na daṇḍyante.*]

It is now stated that in the *śāstra* also, the meaning of the sentence is applied to the whole.

379. As, in order to teach some grammatical operation, it is the name of the whole that is taught, the names *samāsa* and *abhyasta* are connected with them (the wholes) by *tantra*.

[*Tantra* means the power of a word, uttered only once, to convey more than one thing. The *sūtras* : *saha·supā* (P. 2.1.4.) and *ubhe abhyastam* (P. 6.1.5.) teach the names *samāsa* and *abhyasta* respectively. The words *saha* and *ubhe* show that the names are to be applied to all the items together.]

It is now stated that sometimes the meaning of a sentence is applied to the whole as well as the parts.

380. When a word standing for a certain property denotes many things in relation to a certain action, it does so severally and collectively.

381. According to the order : *Śūdras* should not enter this house, their entrance is prohibited severally and collectively.

The same idea is now expressed differently.

382. When a collective prohibition in regard to earning and the like is expressed, merely because the prohibition is not stated severally, its application severally is not contradictory.

[What is pointed out is that the use of the singular or the plural number in prohibitory orders is accidental. In either case it can apply severally or collectively.

The *Vṛtti* points out that when the prohibition is collective, it is the collection or the group which is the object of the prohibition. As to the individuals, it is left to them to do what they like. . . *Saṃhananātmadharmasya śrutyā prakrāntatvāt saṅghāta eva lipsatikriyāsādhanabhāvena pratisiddhyate. Pratyekaṃ tu kāmacāraḥ.*]

An illustration from the *śāstra* is now given.

383. In the same way, as in P. 8.4.2. *aṭ*, *ku*, *pu*, *āṅ* and *num* are causes of separation (*vyavāya*) whether they do so severally or collectively, they do not prevent the change of *n* to *ṇ*.

[P. 8.4.2 does not say in so many words that aṭ etc. do not prevent the change of *n* into *ṇ* when they come between the *nimitta* and the *nimittī* individually or collectively. The fact is that either way they do not prevent the change. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*Tathā ca pratyekaṃ samastair vā vyavāye ṇatvaṃ bhavatyeva.*]

Whether the action of eating is one or many is now considered.

384. When the act of feeding is done for favouring those who eat, then, if there is no difference in time, place, etc. it does not favour them.

[The idea seems to be that it is not by feeding them irrespective of time and place that one favours them. One would

favour them either way, by observing difference of time and place and by not observing it :—*Bhedena tu pratyekaṃ prakrame sarvo'nugṛhyate*, says the *Vṛtti*. If the feeding is for favouring the eaters, one has to act in such a manner that they are favoured, by not observing difference or by observing difference, according to what is needed : *Yathā teṣām anugraho bhavati tathā viniyogavyapekṣā*.]

After this preliminary remark, the question is considered.

385. The action of eating which is one has been declared to be many because of difference in vessels etc. Or the action of eating which is really varied (because of difference in the satisfaction of the eaters) is thought of as one (because of identity of time, place etc).

[Thus difference of opinion on this matter has been shown.]

The final position is now stated.

386. The eaters, mentioned separately and acting together, eat their food served separately but together (that is, at the same time).

What has been said in v. 378 is now further explained.

387. The fine of hundred is to be applied to the group (of Gargas) because (1) there has been no separate mention (of the persons to be fined), (2) otherwise the amount to be realised would conflict with the other amount (that is, the amount actually realised) (3), the meaning of the sentence cannot be applied in a two-fold manner.

[*Gargāḥ śataṃ daṇḍyantām* is the order and not *Gārgyo gārgyo śataṃ daṇḍyatām*. *Gārgya* has not been repeated. Instead of that, the *ekaśeṣa* has been used. If each Gārgya is fined a hundred, the amount realised would far exceed hundred which

is the amount mentioned in the order. Lastly, the order cannot be applied in two ways, individually as well as collectively. By two ways, Puṇyarāja understands that the verb cannot be connected with the main object (hundred) as well as the secondary object (the Gargas). The conclusion is stated by the *Vṛtti* which, otherwise, is none too clear, as follows—*Tasmāt saṅghāta evaikaṃ śatam avatiṣṭhate*=A hundred has to be realised from the group (of Gargas).]

Sometimes, however, the meaning of a sentence is connected both individually and collectively.

388. Where the action of eating is ordered to be performed together with others, either through the *dvandva* compound or through *ekaśeṣa*, there also the meaning of the sentence is to be connected in a two-fold manner because the verb conveys its meaning through *lakṣaṇā*.

[Sentences like the following are here kept in mind :—*Devadatta-Yajñadatta-Viṣṇumitraiḥ saha bhoktavyam*=Devadatta, Yajñadatta and *Viṣṇumitra* must eat together. Here the action is ordered through *dvandva*. In *brāhmaṇaiḥ saha bhoktavyam* = the Brahmins must eat together; it is done through *ekaśeṣa*. Here the root *bhuj* in *bhoktavyam* conveys the action of eating in a general manner. The verb *bhoktavyam* must be repeated for fully understanding the meaning of the sentence.]

389. Some point out that major sentences apply individually (and collectively). Therefore, they include minor sentences, different from one another.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that the *dvandva* sentence ordering the action of eating quoted above should be split up into several sentences like *Devadatto bhojyatām*, *Yajñadatto bhojyatām*, *Viṣṇumitro bhojyatām*.]

It is now stated that this does not mean that the major sentence is expressive of the meanings of the minor sentences.

390. The minor sentences do not become the expressed meanings of the major sentence but when the latter is uttered, one understands the other meanings of the minor sentences.

[The *Vṛtti* elucidates the point as follows:— The major sentence does not bring about the minor sentences through the relation of *abhidhānābhidheyabhāva* = the relation of word and its expressed meaning. The minor sentences which are, after all, words cannot be the expressed meanings of the major sentences : *Na tasya vākyasya śabdapadārthakatvaṃ śakyamabhyupagantum.* All that is meant is that when the major sentence is uttered, the minor sentences, though not uttered and heard, come to the mind. Therefore, a minor sentence comes to the mind in regard to each of the eaters and thus the meaning of the major sentence is applied to each eater:—*Tasmāt pratyekaṃ vākyāntara-prādurbhāvaḥ pratyekaṃ vākyasamāptir abhipretā.*]

The upholder of the indivisible sentence criticizes the upholder of the individual word.

391. According to those who believe that the whole of the sentence-meaning is contained in that of the individual word, of what use then is the existence of the meaning of the individual word ?

[If the whole of the sentence meaning is contained in the meaning of (any) individual word in the sentence, of what use is the meaning of the remaining individual words . . . *teṣām evaṃbhūte pratipadam avasthite'rthe kimavaśiṣṭenāpareṇa padārthena vikalpitena,* says the *Vṛtti.*]

The upholder of the indivisible sentence criticizes both the possibilities in the opposite view.

392. If the sentence meaning, produced by the meanings of the individual words exists in each one of them, it is either opposed to it or it co-exists with it.

393. If the particularised and the non-particularised co-exist, there would be opposition between the two. If the meaning (of the individual word) is abandoned, then the relation becomes impermanent.

[What is meant here is this : The individual words ultimately convey the sentence-meaning after having first conveyed their own meaning. If, once the sentence-meaning is understood, they abandon their own meaning, then the relation between the word and the meaning becomes temporary which is against the opponent's own belief. Therefore, according to this view, there cannot be real individual words and their meanings.

The *Vṛtti* points out that the meaning of the individual word is of a general nature and it can become particularised only when its general nature ceases to be : *Sāmānyarūpanivṛttyaiva hi viśeṣa ātmānaṃ labhate.* But if the general meaning which is first conveyed is abandoned, then the relation between the word and the meaning cannot be considered to be eternal and that would go against the accepted view of both sides:— *Atha tu pūrvam upāttārthaḥ* (*am* ?) *parityajati nityatvaṃ sambandhasya hīyate.*]

If the sentence attains completion in the collection, is the sentence-meaning the meaning of the collection of words or is it the meaning of the individual words also?

394. The one sentence-meaning is the common expressed meaning and it is related to each individual word. It is related to the collection and to each unit in the collection and it is understood when all the words are there.

[The *Vṛtti* here brings in the analogy of the relation called *saṃyoga*=contact. When two things are united by the relation called contact, does this relation exist in each of the two objects or in both of them together ? Some think that it exists in both ways :—*kecin manyante yathā saṃyogasañjnā dvayor*

dvayoḥ samudāye cāvatiṣṭhate tathā pratyekaṃ dvayoḥ samuditeṣu ca sa evaiko'rthātmā vyavasthita eva. In this connection, the *Vṛtti* reminds us of the *dvandva* compound. When two words together form a *dvandva* compound, they stand for the group and that group is expressed by each one of them. Each word in the compound expresses the group in which the parts are also manifested. Each word conveys at the same time all the things meant to be conveyed by the *dvandva* compound as a whole. This principle is called *Yugapadadhikaraṇatā*. (See Bhartṛhari, p. 371ff). The *Vṛtti* says:— *Yathā tarhi dvandvavācyo bhedānugataḥ samudāyaḥ pratibhedaṃ samāpto'bhidhīyate, dvandvasaṃjñakasya samudāyasya sa evārthaḥ.*

Saṃyoga and *dvandva* were brought in only for the sake of analogy. The point that has been sought to be made here is that both the sentences as a whole and the individual words become meaningful with the meaning of the sentence.]

An illustration is now given.

395. Just as all have the feeling of ownership towards common property and all enjoy the fruit of charity (given out of the common property) and all feel the same amount of joy, in the same way, the meaning is related to its words (the individual words and their collection.)

An illustration is now given from the *śāstra*.

396. Even if the phonemes are expressive of meaning and the stem having the phonemes also has the same meaning, the case-ending expressive of the singular number comes after the stem which is a collection and not after each phoneme.

[This verse is based on *M. Bhā*. I. p. 220, l. 10-24. The particular sentence in the *M. Bhā*. referred to here is : *Saṅghātasyaikārthyāt subabhāvo varṇāt*=As it is the whole group of phonemes which is expressive of meaning, the case-ending is not added to (each) phoneme.

The *Vṛtti* has a gap, but the relevant passage is this= *Samudāyasya tadarthayogād ekatvam, samudāyād ekenotpadyamānena supā vyaktam ityekatvāntarābhāvāt prativarṇaṃ vibhaktyutpattau nimittaṃ na bhavati.*]

The same idea is explained by an illustration.

397. Just as everybody sees common property by means of the same lamp, in the same way, by means of one case-ending the number is understood.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that the one case-ending added to the stem as a whole expresses the singular number and there is no need for another case-ending : *Tathaikena supā prakāśitam ekatvaṃ sarvasambandhigate tasminnarthātmani pratīyamānaṃ na subantareṇābhidhīyate.*]

398. As far as meaningfulness is concerned, there is no difference between the individual word, the phoneme and the sentence. This procedure based on practice (tradition) is different and appears to contradict the accepted doctrine.

[It was stated in v. 396 that the case-ending added at the end of the stem indicates the meaningfulness, not only of the stem but also of the phonemes and of the individual words if, any, included in the stem. This seems to go against the accepted doctrine of the grammarians that only the indivisible sentence is real and expressive of meaning. Really speaking, there is no contradiction. It has already been said that the meaningfulness of the individual word is accepted for the sake of convenience. But as this question of convenience comes up on so many occasions, it appears to be taken seriously but it is not so. It is accepted only for the sake of convenience. Convenience includes also accommodation to other *śāstras* because *Vyākaraṇa* is *sarvapārṣada*=common to all schools of thought, as so often repeated by commentators like Helārāja and Puṇyarāja.]

The function of the word in conveying its meaning is now considered.

399. Without its application, a word does not convey its meaning. That is why it has been declared that the relation between a meaning and the word is through *ukti*, that is, application.

[The following are the points in the *Ambākartrī* on this verse. The power of a word to convey its meaning is called *abhidhā*. Some consider this *abhidhā* to be different from *pratibhā*, others not. *Pratibhā* when conveyed by the words *ukti* and *viniyoga* is a *vāgdharma*, a property of words. When conveyed by the words *anusandhāna* and *abhisandhāna*, it is a *manodharma*. When conveyed by the word *praṇidhāna*, it is a property of the vision. Here the word *pratibhā* is used in a sense different from its usual one. It only amounts to the conscious use of a polysemic word in one of its meanings. In other words, it becomes a synonym of *ukti* and *viniyoga*. What is conveyed in this verse is that when a polysemic word conveys a particular meaning in a particular context, it is due to the deliberate application of that word in that meaning by the speaker. This is called *viniyoga* or *ukti*.

Two new words are used in this verse: *ukti* and *viniyoga* and they seem to have the same meaning, namely, the use, by the speaker, of a word deliberately in a particular meaning. Puṇyarāja understands them in this way and for him, *ukti* or *viniyoga* is necessary in the case of words having more than one meaning: *Iha eka eva śabdo bahvarthaḥ*, he says at the beginning of his all too brief remark. The *Vṛtti* also seems to speak about the deliberate use of a word in a particular meaning by the speaker. The relevant words of the *Vṛtti* are: *Tatrānenāyaṃ vaktavya ityubhayor vācyavācakayoḥ parigrahaṃ kṛtvā buddhisthaśabdo buddhisthe yatra viniyujyate pravaṇīkriyate satyapyanekārthatve tatrāsya sāmarthyam avacchidyate.* What the *Vṛtti* says amounts to this: when a word has more than one meaning, the speaker mentally chooses one of them and decides that it should be expressed by the word: *anenāyaṃ vaktavyaḥ*. The word

in the mind is applied to the meaning which is also in the mind: *buddhisthaśabdo buddhisthe yatra viniyujyate.* Then the capacity of the word to convey that meaning is brought out fully: *tatrāsya sāmarthyam avacchidyate.*]

The fact that conscious and deliberate application of a word to a meaning is necessary does not make the relation between word and meaning man-made. It is eternal.

400. Just as it is when the eye is directed towards an object that it perceives it, in the same way, a word denotes an object when deliberately applied to it.

[The power of the eye to see the object is natural and eternal but it does so only when it is consciously directed to an object. Similarly, the power of the word to convey its meaning is natural but it has to be deliberately applied to it especially when it is a polysemic word.

Puṇyarāja uses the words *abhisandhāna*, *pratibhā* and *pracāra* in his commentary on this verse. The word has the power called *abhidhā* but unless the speaker has the desire to apply a word to a particular meaning, this *abhidhā* of the word will not function. So some identify the *abhisandhāna*, the deliberate application by the speaker, with the *abhidhā* of the word. This *abhisandhāna* of the speaker is nothing more than *pratibhā*. It is this very *pratibhā* which becomes *praṇidhāna* when we direct our eye to a particular object.

The analogy of the word to the eye is already given in verse. While explaining it, the *Vṛtti* concludes: *Tathā śabdo'pyanekārthapratyāyanayogyo yamarthaṃ pratyabhisaṃhito bhavati tam upasaṃgṛhṇāti svātmani sanniveśayati prakāśayati* = In the same way a word, even though capable of conveying many meanings, whatever meaning it is directed at by the speaker, it embraces it, it becomes one with it and it illuminates it.]

Something is now said to explain the use of new words like *viniyoga*, *ukti*, *abhisandhāna* and *abhidhā*.

401. One sees that the relation between the object and the instrument is through action.

Similarly, the relation of expression and expressed between the word and meaning is through the function called *abhidhā*.

[It is this function called *abhidhā* which is called *ukti. viniyoga* and *abhisandhāna*. The words may be new but they denote a well-known function.

The *Vṛtti* makes the following points:—The accessories of an action, like the steps of a ladder, are not directly connected with one another. But they are directly connected with the action and through the action indirectly connected with one another. In the process of the word conveying the meaning, the word is the *karaṇa*, the meaning conveyed is the *karma*. There can be neither *karaṇa* nor *karma* except in regard to an action or process: *karaṇakarmaṇośca kriyām antareṇa(na) prakḷptiḥ*. It is the action or the process which brings about the result and not anything else: *Phalavatī ca kriyaiva, nānyasyārthasya phalavattā*. The process can be compared to that of unhusking grain in which the mortar and pestle are the *adhikaraṇa* and *karaṇa* respectively and the grain is the *karma*. Raising and lowering the pestle is the action which produces the result, namely, unhusking: *udyamana-nipātanarūpo' vahantiḥ phalaprasavanimittam*.]

402. When many things are denoted by a word and all of them can be equally well-connected, with an action, that thing, which the speaker intends to convey, is conveyed by the word.

[The purpose of the verse is to emphasize the speaker's intention in the process by which words convey their meaning: As the *Vṛtti* puts it:—*Tatra yat prayoktābhisandhatte tadvacanatvam avyabhicāreṇa śabdasya pratīyate*.]

403,404. Some scholars who believe in the sameness of the word (in all its meanings) declare that at the time of the practice (of learning the words of the Veda) they are without a meaning, that they stand

for their form only when they are taught to others but that (at the time of the performance of a sacrifice) they are expressive of different meanings because of difference in expressive power based on difference of intention.

[*Niyogabhedāt* = *Abhisandhānabhedāt* = due to difference in intention. *Abhidhānakriyābhedāt* = due to difference in expressive power.

The same Vedic passage is put to different uses and therefore, functions differently. As the *Vṛtti* concludes—*Ekaśabdatve hi nimittabhedād ekasyaiva tathā tathā vyavasthā manyante.*]

All this has been said according to the view that a word having many meanings is the same word. What particular meaning it conveys in a particular context depends upon *abhisandhāna*, *pratibhā*, the intention of the speaker and not the context itself.

Something is now being said according to the other view, namely, that the word is not the same. There are as many words as there are meanings.

405. Those who believe in difference declare that the word is absolutely different in each case, like the words *akṣa* etc. though it appears to be the same because of the presence of sameness (that is, the same sequence of phonemes.).

[The word *akṣa* can mean a kind of fruit, or playing dice, or the axle of a cart and so on; but it is a different word in each case, according to this view.]

406. In such cases, there is no intention beyond utterance. As the power of the word is restricted to a particular meaning, it is attached to it.

[In the other view, the intention of the speaker was given as the factor which makes a polysemic word convey a particular

meaning in a particular context. In this view, that factor is eliminated. As the form of the word resembles that of others having other meanings, only the context can tell us which meaning is to be understood.

The *Vṛtti* points out that undue importance should not be given to the speaker's intention because, sometimes, meaning is understood from words uttered by children who do not know the many meanings of a word and who cannot, therefore, have the intention of conveying one of them: *Tathā hi bālenāpyartham aviduṣā prayuktena śabdenānabhisaṃhitenāpi bhavati śrotṛṇāmarthapratipattiḥ*. In this view, there is no such thing as one word having many meanings. What looks like the same word is really a different word. So each word has one meaning only which is invariably linked to it: *Yasya śabdasya yo viṣayaḥ sa tatrāvyabhicāreṇa vyavasthita eva*. As the word may look another because of the sameness of the sequence of the phonemes, the help of context may be needed to get at the meaning invariably linked with it.

407. From the fact that the meaning is determined with the help of the context (*artha* and *prakaraṇa*), one understands that it is a different word. A word which has a certain meaning cannot express another.

[What is pointed out here is that the very fact that one has to have recourse to the context to determine the meaning shows that it is a different word : *Yat tu tat svābhāvikam asaṃkīrṇam arthāyattaṃ nityaṃ śabdānāṃ svenārthena nityasambandhān nānātvaṃ tatpratipattāraṃ pratisandehanivṛttyarthaṃ prakarṇādibhiḥ pravibhajyate*. The relation between the word and the meaning being eternal and not man-made, a meaning once conveyed by its word, cannot be abandoned nor can a meaning not conveyed by it be ascribed to it : *na tu kadācid upāttasya svaśabdena punastyāgo' sti, anupāttasya vopādānam. Apauruṣeyo hyautpattikaḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ*.]

If context can determine the meaning of a word and if such a word is different from another having the same sequence

of phonemes, the established doctrine of the indivisibility of the sentence and the sentence-meaning seems to be affected. But that doctrine stands.

408. These considerations apply to a sentence consisting of a single word with the verb *asti* mentally supplied and not to an individual word which is part of a sentence (and which has been obtained by analysis).

409. Just as it is stated by others (the *Mīmāṃsakas*) that the meaningless phonemes manifest the expressive word, in the same way, the meaningless individual words manifest the sentence having a particularised meaning.

We do seem to understand word-meanings before the sentence-meaning is understood. How is that ?

410. The cognition of the meanings of the individual words which takes place in the middle is only a means (to the understanding of the sentence-meaning) because the sentence-meaning is not understood at the beginning.

[As illustrations of the process of understanding something in the middle, the *Vṛtti* takes the words *bhavati* and *brāhmaṇakambala*. In the first case before we understand the meaning of the full word we may understand something from *bhava*, but that is not real. In the second word we may understand something from *brāhmaṇa* but in the meaning of the full word it has no reality : *Tadyathā bhavatīti bhavaśabdamātrasyārtham brāhmaṇakambale ca brāhmaṇaśrutimātrasyārtham.*]

The nature of the sentence-meaning according to *anvitābhidhānavāda* in now stated.

411. Just as (according to *abhihitānvaya*) the meaning of each succeeding word particularised by

the meaning of the preceding word is the sentence-meaning, in the same way, the connected meaning, present in the very beginning, made clear when the meanings of the subsequent words are understood, is the sentence-meaning.

[It is a connected meaning from the very beginning. Each succeeding word-meaning makes this connection clear. It is in the nature of an action associated with its accessories. The very first word of the sentence conveys this connected meaning but not sufficiently clearly. The grammarians' view is that it is in the nature of intuition, without inner sequence and indivisible.

The *Vṛtti* makes the same idea clear as follows—*Tathā saṃsargasya prakrāntatvāt prathama eva śabdaḥ ṣaṣṭyartham upādāya pravṛttaḥ, sa tu nityo viśiṣṭo nitya eva padāntarasannidhānāt pratipattṛṣu vyaktiṃ labhate.*]

412. According to some, once the need for the accessory is accepted because of the action to be accomplished, the accessories are again actually mentioned in order to specify the substrata of the power of the accessories.

[Those who hold the *anvitābhidhānavāda* are referred to here. If, from the very beginning a connected meaning involving an action and its accessories are understood, why the accessories are again mentioned in the sentence is explained in this verse. It is for specifying the substrata of the powers of the accessories.

The *Vṛtti* points out that action is a process, something to be accomplished (*sādhya*) and the accessories which help in the accomplishment are already there (*siddha*) and they exist for the sake of the action (*parārtham upādānāt*) and they are *śeṣa* (secondary) in regard to the action (*śeṣabhāvenāṅgīkṛteṣu sādhaneṣu*) and they assume the form of the action so to speak (*kriyārūpa-manupraviṣṭeṣviva*). This conncetion between

action and the accessories is understood from the very beginning and if the accessories are actually mentioned, it is in order to make clear what the substratum of the power of the accessories is : *ādhārapratipattyarthā dravyaśrutiḥ*.]

413. As the substratum is not specified it is not understood. In the nature of things, there is the possibility (of a specific substratum) and the actual mention is for excluding others.

[The *Vṛtti* says :—An action may bring to the mind all the possible powers which can help in its accomplishment but not any particular substrata of these powers : *kriyā sambhavinaḥ śaktiviśeṣān sarvān ākṣipati, naivam asyā dravyaviśeṣāpekṣā pratibandho rūpalābhe*. But it brings the substratum of the power of the accessory in a general manner to the mind and if any particular substratum is mentioned in the sentence it is in order to exclude others : *Dravyasāmānyaṃ tu sādhanādhāratvena sāmarthyaṃ gṛhītam. Tatra viśeṣaśrutir ādhārāntaranivṛttyarthā pratīyate*, says the *Vṛtti*.]

414. An action with specific accessories as its substrata and (therefore) different from other actions, is understood from the very beginning and its specifications (*bhedāḥ*, mentioned in the sentence) are for the sake of the understanding of the listener.

[This is also *anvitābhidhānavāda*.]

415. According to others, the sentence and the sentence-meaning, indivisible and devoid of the sequence of the words shine from words having a sequence.

[By *anyeṣām* the grammarians are meant here. They include, of course, Bhartṛhari himself. Another example of Bhartṛhari giving his own views as though they were those of others.]

According to Puṇyarāja, the purpose of the following verse is to state that the meaning of the real word, that is, the sentence, is the real conditioned by the unreal.

416. That which has a form, its essence is indefinable. That which has no form, it is the essence of that which is definable.

[Couched in very general terms the meaning of this verse is not too clear. Puṇyarāja understands the first half as relating to the meaning of the individual word and the latter half as relating to the meaning of the sentence. The meaning of the individual word is said to have a form *svarūpaṃ vidyate yasya*) because the object meant by it can be perceived. But it does not thereby become fit for verbal usage. That is why it is said to be indefinable (*tasyātmā na nirūpyate*). The meaning of the individual word, isolated from the meanings of the other words, especially the verb, is unfit for verbal usage. It is at best a means to the understanding of the sentence-meaning, the essence of which is interconnection of the meaning of the individual words and which is, therefore, fit for verbal usage and thus real.

It is a pity that the *Vṛtti* on this verse is obscure. It has gaps in several places. As usual, Puṇyarāja's commentary seems to be based on it. Sentences like *taccāsāṃ vedyaṃ vyavahārātītam* in the *Vṛtti* have obviously influenced the wording of Puṇyarāja's commentary. But one cannot ignore the strong impression which one gets while reading the *Vṛtti* that its analysis is deeper and that it contains some points not found in Puṇyarāja at all. Unfortunately due to the unsatisfactory nature of the text, it is not possible to note down those points.]

417. Others think that the meaning (of a sentence) cannot be determined through the word. A remembrance resembling the experience of the object takes place through the words.

[Some think that words are not the means of understand-

ing the meaning of a sentence which is in the nature of an interconnection (*saṃsarga*). According to them, this interconnection is understood by means of an integral cognition by the mind, (*nirvikalpakaikasamadhigamyam*—Puṇyarāja) and not through the meaning of individual words. Individual words do no more than cause a remembrance similar to the experience of objects. Thus they are too far away from the sentence-meaning. This is the gist of Puṇyarāja's commentary.

The *Vṛtti* comments on this and the next verse together, more on the next verse than on this one. The only point which it mentions relating to this verse is that the idea which we get of an object from its word is far removed from the real nature of that object. The next verse explains this very point by means of an example : *Sarvatrāśabdam arthānāṃ svabhāvāvadhāraṇaṃ, śabdavṛttaṃ tvanupatad dūrībhavati tasmād ityekeṣāṃ darśanam* = The understanding of the nature of an object takes place everywhere through other means than the word, what the word brings is far removed from them, such is the view of some.]

418. One who gets burnt experiences the burn through contact with fire in one way and one experiences it in another way through the word burn (*dāha*).

[The word *artha* in Sanskrit denotes both the external object and the 'meaning' of the word for that external object. The big difference between the two is pointed out here. As the *Vṛtti* puts it : *Anyathā hyagnihimaśastrādisannipātād dāhādayo 'vasthāḥ pratyavabhāsante. Anyathā dāhādibhiḥ śabdaiḥ pratyāyyante.* The rest of the *Vṛtti* is unfortunately not clear.]

419. Just as the senses which have each their own essential nature and their own field of operation, cannot perform their function without the body.

420. In the same way, the individual words

though expressive of their own meaning, have no meaning at all if they are isolated from the sentence.

[Puṇyarāja says that the understanding of the meaning of the individual word is an error and as such it is either *viparītakhyāti* or *asatkhyāti*, two well-known interpretations of error in Indian philosophical circles. In any case, if they have any meaning at all, it is only as long as they are within the sentence and not in isolation. This is what the *Vṛtti* also emphasises in its concluding sentence :—*Tathaiva pṛthagarthānāmapi padānāṃ vākyopanibandhanatām antareṇārtha pratyāyanaśaktir na vidyate.*]

421. The meaning in the nature of an inter-connection is grasped when the things are connected together. (When the word meanings are in isolation) the essence (of the sentence-meaning) does not become clear because it is seen to be different from the word-meaning.

422. Even knowledge (or consciousness) does not appear in its true (pure) state. It is formless but appears as coloured by the object.

[Knowledge or Consciousness is brought in here for analogy. Just as pure consciousness is formless but always appears as coloured by the form of some object or other, in the same way, the sentence and the sentence-meaning are indivisible and undifferentiated but appear as the inter-connection between words and meanings. The isolated word and word-meaning are unfit for communication and that is why they are said to be unreal (*asatya*).]

423. Inasmuch as even the meaning of a single word is expressed as connected with existence or non-existence, it is the sentence which is used (for communication).

[Only the sentence and its meaning are real because only they are fit for communication. That is why, when a communication is made by means of a single word, it is completed by adding mentally the word or atleast the idea of existence or non-existence.

The text of the *Vṛtti* is doubtful at the beginning but becomes clearer later. After having said that like existence or positive activity, non-existence or absention from activity is conveyed by the sentence. That is why it is the sentence with the verb actually present in it or inferred which is used in all communication :—*Pravṛttivacca nivṛttisaṃsargo'pi vākyadharma eva. Tasmācchrūyamāṇa-kriyāpadam anumīyamānakriyāpadam vā vākyam eva sarvavyavahāreṣu avatarati.*]

424. No word-meaning, whether real or unreal, is understood in communication except as connected with some action. Therefore, it does not really exist.

[Explaining this verse, the *Vṛtti* says that one cannot predicate the truth or otherwise of the meaning of a single word: . . . *kevalapadaprayoge satyatvaṃ viparyayo vā na prakhyāyate.* It is only when it is completed by a verb that the listener understands it as true or untrue : *kriyāpadopasaṃhāre tu satyāsatyabhāvena pratipattṛṣu vyavahāro'vatiṣṭhate.* Without connection with some verb, the completion of the meaning can be done in one of many possible ways, in a way that would come under any one of the six transformations of Being=*ṣaḍbhāvavikārāḥ*. That is much too vague : *so'rthaḥ pariplavamāno'pi hy asau ṣaḍ bhāvavikāraparyāyeṇānu dhāvatīti.* That is why, the isolated word-meaning is beyond the scope of communication and is said to be unreal : *Tasmāt kevalapadārtho vyavahārātītatvān nāstīti vyapadiśyate.*]

425. Even a sentence having the form of the single word *sat* (=it exists or existent) cannot be so understood without connection with some word expressive of action such as 'it was' (*tad abhūt*), or

it is (*tad asti*), or it was not (*tan nā bhūt*) or *it is not* (*tan nāsti*).

[The point here is that action and accessory require each other. So where only one is mentioned, the meaning is incomplete and the other is mentally supplied to complete the meaning. Once that takes place, there is a sentence which is fit to be used for communication.

Without some process or action being mentioned or mentally supplied, what an isolated noun brings to the mind is too vague and not firm says the *Vṛtti—Atrāpi sādhyābhidhānam antareṇa pariplavamāna ivārtho na vyavatiṣṭhate.*]

426. The requirement (that is, the incompleteness) which is felt in the meaning expressed by the verb which depends upon an accessory is not removed unless the thing which can be the accessory is also mentioned.

427. It is the action which is first analysed from the meaning (of the sentence) because it is the main thing. The accessories are employed for the sake of the action to be accomplished. As for the action, it is the result aimed at that sets it in motion.

[If the action requires the accessories and if the accessories require the action, there is equality in dependence. Why should the dependence of the nouns expressive of the accessories be emphasised? *yāvatā yathaiva nāmnāṃ kriyāpadam ākāṅkṣāṃ vicchinatti tathaivākhyātānāmapi vinā sattvābhidhānapadenākāṅkṣā na vicchidyate*, asks the *Vṛtti* and answers as follows—*Sādhyastv arthātmā svaphalaprayuktaḥ prādhānyāt sarvasya vākyopasaṅgrahārthasya pūrvaṃ pravibhajyate* = The process or action, set in motion by the result to be attained is the most important element and it is, therefore, analysed out of the sentence-meaning first. Once that is obtained by analysis, the accessories on which depends its coming into being, are automatically understood,

Tena tu pravibhakte(na) sādhanapralabhyatvād ātmalābhasya sāmarthyākṣiptāni sādhanāni pratīyante. This is not the case with the accessories which are all already there (*siddha*) and are set in motion by the process (*sādhya prayukteṣu—Na tu sādhaneṣu siddhatvāt sādhyaprayukteṣv etat sambhavati.*]

It is now stated that all this conception of process and accessory and their mutual relation is artificial and relative and not real.

428. It is the speaker who thinks of something as a process and something else as its accessory and it is he who thinks of the relation between the two.

[The point here is that there is nothing fixed about these three things: that which is to be accomplished, that which helps in its accomplishment and the relation between the two. It is a matter of the speaker's choice. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*Yogyaśaktinibandhanayā vivakṣayā śabdapramāṇakaḥ prayoktā śabdaśaktim anugacchann api vivakṣantaṃ tamarthaṃ tathā tathā samīhate. Na hi vastutaḥ sādhyatvaṃ siddhatvaṃ vā śabdapravṛttinimittam. Kiñcāvyavasthitam aniyataṃ vidyate.*]

If these were fixed, nobody would be able to change them. But we see that the same thing is presented differently by different speakers.

429. The action of cooking is expressed as the object in the sentence : I do the act of cooking (*pacikriyāṃ karomi*). But the actual doing (of the act of cooking) is understood as a process (*sādhyatvena*).

[The point here is that the action of cooking, taken as an example, is presented now as a process and now as the accessory (*sādhana*) called *karma*=object of action, according to the wish of the speaker. There is no pre-determined fixity in this matter. The *Vṛtti* also emphasises this very point : *Pacikriyāṃ karotītyubhayor aviśiṣṭe sādhyātmakatve paktiḥ sādhyatvena vivakṣitā siddharūpeṇa sādhyarūpeṇa vābhidhīyate.* It is not clear

what is meant by *ubhayoḥ*. The reference may be to the two actions mentioned in *pacikriyāṃ karoti*: (1) The action of cooking expressed by the noun *pacikriyām* and (2) the action of doing expressed by the verb *karoti*. The former is presented by the noun as a thing (*siddha*) and the latter as a process (*sādhya*) by the verb. Apart from presentation by words, an action is really a process and it is so meant in *karoti*, : As the *Vṛtti* puts it : *karaṇaṃ tu sādhyatvenaiva vivakṣitatvād* (*vi* ?) *prakṛtāvasthāṃ na jahāti*.]

430. As an object has all powers, it is presented as rendering whatever service the speakers think of.

[An object is as the speaker sees it and wishes to present it in words and so it is presented differently by different speakers. The simple act of cooking can be presented differently as in the following expressions : *pākaṃ karoti*, *pacati*, *pākasya nirvṛttiṃ karoti*. Irrespective of what it is in reality, an object follows the intention of the speaker and appears to be as he presents it. As the *Vṛtti* says : *Vastu-sambandham anapekṣamāṇaḥ prayoktur vivakṣām anupataṃs tathaiva vyavatiṣṭhate*.]

431. Sometimes objects which are far from one another are presented as being connected and those which are near one another are presented as being apart.

432. Separation of what is united and union of what is separated; what are many are presented as one and what is one as many.

How the same thing is presented in different ways is now explained.

433. Because every object is everything (as it has all powers) or because it has no essence at all. This can be explained. In all this, the word, the power of which is extremely restricted, is the basis.

[In the previous verses, the author has been speaking about the great variety and the consequent lack of fixity in the way in which objects are presented by words. It has been pointed out that much depends upon the intention of the speaker and his ability to make use of the capacity of words to present the same thing in different ways. In this verse, two alternative ways of looking at the matter are mentioned. In the first way, the object is endowed with all powers, it is *sarvātmaka* but the speaker, urged by his own purposes and intentions, cognises and determines some aspect of it and presents it through words which have the capacity to express that aspect. In the alternative way, the object has no essence of its own (*nairātmyāt*). It is as the speaker cognises it and expresses it through words whose expressive power is fixed. This is the gist of what Puṇyarāja says.

He is only putting in his own words what the *Vṛtti* had already said before in what is to us to-day a more obscure language. It begins by saying that the sentence-meaning is very comprehensive and includes everything that the speaker might want to convey and has all powers. Or it might be looked upon as having no essence at all. The *Vṛtti* says much about the speaker's intelligence and intention in all this, but what it says is not too clear].

434. The word is only an adventitious mark of an object (*upalakṣaṇa*); it does not express the service which it renders, it is not capable of touching (that is, of expressing) the powers of the object.

[The point here is that a word really does not touch the essence of an object. It stands far from it and does no more than somehow bring it to the mind, so that it can be talked about. There is no real relation between the two.

The *Vṛtti*, following, of course, the verse, also emphasises that the word can at the most denote the object, that is, bring it to the mind but it cannot express the powers of the object. It is the powers which distinguish an object from others and

enable it to render service, but the word is not capable of denoting all that :—*Sa hi vastumātrasaṃsparśitvād bhedakānyupakāriṇi śaktirūpāṇi na saṃspṛśati.*]

Even the relation of expression and expressed (*vācyavācakabhāva*) between word and meaning cannot be maintained.

435. The relation called contact is expressed as that which is related (*sambandhin*) by its own word (namely, *saṃyoga*); similarly, inherence is also expressed as that which has inherence.

[In the expression; *bhūtale ghaṭaḥ*=the jar is on the floor; the relation of contact between the floor and the jar is understood as a relation but in the expression *dravyayoḥ saṃyogaḥ*= 'the contact between the two substances' where the word *saṃyoga* (contact) is itself used, the relation is not presented as a relation but as a *sambandhi*=that which is related. In other words, its own word does not present it in its true nature. It presents it as the related whereas it is really a relation. The same is true of the word *samavāya* which means the relation called inherence.]

436. Objects are presented in some capacity or other and not in their real nature. One and the same object is understood as the basis of some service or other.

[Words never present an object in its true nature. They pick on some capacity or function of it and present it in that form. So what the word presents has no fixity. It is not real. It is always relative. The *Vṛtti* ends its comments by bringing in the illustration of the same woman being daughter, sister, wife or mother in relation to different persons. *Tad yathā ekā strī duhitā bhaginī bhāryā mātetyapekṣāviśeṣaiḥ pravibhajyate.*]

It is now stated that the sentence-meaning, being always new, is real.

437. The essence of the sentence-meaning which is in the nature of inter-connection does not

rest anywhere. In communication (*vyavahāre*) it is the soul of the word-meanings.

[The idea here is that the sentence-meaning, like knowledge or consciousness is difficult to be grasped except as coloured by the word meanings. As it connects together the word-meanings and makes them fit for verbal usage. It is their soul. It exists in the meaning of each word or in all of them together.

The *Vṛtti* points out that the meaning of the individual word is of a very general nature and it is only when it is connected with the meanings of the other words that it becomes particularised. The particularisation of the meaning is the chief feature of the sentence-meaning and even if one accepts division within the sentence, one has to admit that this particularised meaning exists in the meaning of each division : *Tatra bhedadarśanam āśritya kaiścid ucyate pratipadārthaṃ tasyātmā vyavasthita iti.*]

438. In reality, it does not rest in the word-meaning or in all of them together or anywhere else. However its essence is differentiated on the basis of the artificial differentiation in word meanings.

[The form of the sentence-meaning as distinct from that of the word-meanings cannot be indicated. Its form is determined in terms of the word-meanings. In its own pure form, it is beyond worldly usage.

The *Vṛtti* points out that when the individual words are used, particularisation of meaning takes place and from this particularisation, one infers that a power, different from the power of individual words to convey their general meaning, exists which is responsible for the particularisation : *Tasya tu kevalapadaprayoge yo viśeṣo nirdhāritaḥ tena viśeṣeṇānumānena sambandhāt sā pṛthak śaktiḥ pravibhajyate.*]

439. The division of it which is made in order

to explain it is the means of knowing it. In that division, the parts are incomplete and require one another. Through this means, something different from it is defined.

440. Of the sentence which has many powers, a division is understood (on the basis of the differentiation of word-meanings). The unity of the sentence-meaning is understood even from slight indications.

[For the understanding of unity from slight indications, Puṇyarāja gives the following illustration. There is the *sūtra* *Ig yaṇaḥ saṃprasāraṇam* (P. 1.1.45) = The *ik* which comes in place of *yaṇ* is called *saṃprasāraṇa*. The two words *ig yaṇaḥ* convey a connected meaning, namely, the relation of original and substitute (*sthānyādeśabhāva*). It is a sentence-meaning because it comes from two connected words. But this sentence meaning can be conveyed by the single word in the singular number, namely, *saṃprasāraṇam*. This is the slight indication (*mātrayā*).

What the *Vṛtti* says may be briefly, indicated as follows:—

Those who uphold the unity and the eternality of the word believe that the sentence conveys action, particularised by time, special accessories, substance, person, aspect etc. That One indivisible word is analysed for practical purposes into parts, but it stands for one indivisible meaning, involving qualifying and qualified elements. By analysing the unified powers of the sentence, practical divisions are obtained. But without this practical division, words like *saṃprasāraṇa* are conveying a sentence-meaning. The relevant words of the *Vṛtti*, though doubtful in places, are as follows—*Tena vākyārthastvekaḥ saṃprasāraṇādiprakārayā mātrāparimāṇayā vibhāgoddeśam antareṇa pratyāyyate. Vākyārthasya hi saṃprasāraṇasaṃjñāvibhāgoddeśena vinā sambandhini vijñāyate.*]

441. From the sentence-meaning which is of the nature of cognition, a word meaning having or

not having something external corresponding to it but appearing to have it is analysed. The analysis consists in abstracting the powers capable of conveying the word meanings.

[This verse says that the sentence-meaning is something mental, not having anything corresponding to it in the external world. As it has nothing corresponding to it in the external world, it has not been seen and that is why it is looked upon as something new. It is in the nature of a connection and connection is something mental. That is why it cannot be a real part of the sentence-meaning. Anything which appears to be a part is unreal. As the sentence is mental, its parts, if any, can also be only mental, but it appears to be external or it is identified with the real external object.]

441 (a). The powers relating to the mental objects (*pratyayārthātmānaḥ*) are not clearly determined. Nor are their forms obtained elsewhere (than in the sentence-meaning).

This verse is not found in Puṇyarāja's text but it is found, in some manuscripts of the verses only and it is there in the only manuscript of the *Vṛtti* which shows that it is not a recent interpolation. It is older than Puṇyarāja, for some reason, the manuscripts of Puṇyarāja's commentary, utilised for this edition, do not have it. I have included it as it is authenticated by the *Vṛtti*. As it is connected in meaning with 441 and in order not to disturb the numbering of the following which agrees with R and RP, I have numbered it 444(a) verse.

The *Vṛtti* on this is not too clear. In one place, there is a gap also. It seems to point out the difference between the external object and the idea of it which figures in the meaning of the individual word. The latter is only an imitation of the former and yet that is all which we have in order to understand the sentence-meaning. Through it a division is made in the sentence-meaning and this division is the means of understanding the sentence-meaning : *Tatra bāhyārthaviṣayāṇāṃ*

śaktīnām abhāvād anukāramātram upādāya bhedaḥ prakramyate. Ayam eva hi bhedaḥ pratipatterupāyaḥ.

What is said in 441 and 441 (a) may be briefly stated as follows, though the idea is not too clear—"The meaning of the individual word, understood as a constituent of the sentence-meaning, is something mental only, but it appears to be external. There is, of course, the external object, but it figures in the mind as the meaning of the individual word. Then it is only mental and it appears to be identical with the sentence-meaning which is wholly mental. After the sentence-meaning is understood, it is analysed out of it. The powers of the sentence meaning, favourable to the understanding of the word-meanings, are analysed out of the former. These powers are not clearly determined. According to the view that the sentence-meaning is mental and indivisible, it can have no powers leading to division. How can they be then analysed out of it? If they exist anywhere, it can only be in the external object and they are only inferred. Without looking upon the external object and the one figuring in the mind as endowed with powers, worldly transactions cannot take place. The latter is identified with the former and this is what is meant by *bāhyīkṛtya* in 441. Because of the identification of powers, this analysis of the mental sentence-meaning is possible. If the mental object, identified with the external object, is unreal, then the external object is real. Otherwise, the mental object is real and not the external object.]

Another question is raised. When there are several phrases, each having a verb and each incomplete and requiring the others, do they make up one sentence or should they be looked upon as many sentences?

442. Even when there are many verbs, they constitute one sentence, if they require one another. In this way, the prohibition of loss of accent after verbs would be meaningful.

[There is a reference here to the difference of opinion between Pāṇini and Kātyāyana. According to the former,

there can be more than one verb in a sentence, provided one of them is the main one and the others, subordinate to it. According to the latter, more than one verb means more than one sentence. See *M. Bhā.* III. p. 373, l. 10 and p. 374, l. 23-25.]

443. According to him who holds that the fixed definition of the sentence is that it should have only one verb, there would be a different sentence if there were more than one verb and, therefore, the mention of *atiṅaḥ* would be useless.

[According to the author of the *Vārttikas*, there should be only one verb in a sentence. More than one verb would result in more than one sentence. So the other words in the sentence should be non-verbs. In P. 8.1.28, a verb coming after a non-verb is said to lose its *udātta* accent. Loss of *udātta* accent can take place only if the non-verb and the verb are both in the same sentence. If the sentence can have only one verb, there is no need to say coming after a non-verb (*atiṅaḥ*) in P. 8. 1. 28, because the other words in the sentence are necessarily non-verbs. So the verb would come necessarily after a non-verb or after nothing at all if it happens to be the first word in the sentence. If there is another verb in the sentence, there cannot be loss of accent at all. Thus the mention of *atiṅaḥ* in P. 8.1. 28 serves no purpose according to this view.]

According to some, even where there are many verbs, there may or may not be difference in sentence depending upon circumstances.

444. In sentences like *mṛgaḥ paśyata, yāti* = 'Look! the deer is going'. Where there is more than one verb one being connected with another which is already connected, there cannot be unity and difference.

[The sentence *mṛgaḥ paśyata yāti* is understood differently by different people. First *mṛgaḥ* is connected with *yāti* and that

makes one sentence, meaning 'the deer goes'. Then *paśyata* is connected with *mṛga*, changed to *mṛgam* with the meaning of *yāti* transformed into an adjective. That makes the second sentence *yāntaṃ mṛgaṃ paśyata* look at the deer that is going. In each sentence there is a verb with its own accessory, agent in the first sentence and object in the other. This is one way of understanding this sentence.

The other way is : *mṛgo yāti* makes one sentence and that sentence becomes the object of the verb *paśyata* and as *yāti* and *paśyata* require one another, the whole thing remains one sentence. Thus, in the first view there is *bheda* and in the other view there is *abheda*. In spite of this, one can hold the view that there is no difference of opinion between the *sūtrakāra* and the *Vārttikakāra*. When the author of the *vārttikas* says that there should be one verb in a sentence, all that he means is that there should be only one main verb. The presence of other subordinate verbs will not lead to *Vākyabheda*= plurality of sentences.

All that the *Vṛtti* does here is to say that there would be loss of accent (*nighāta*) if the whole thing is looked upon as one sentence and that there would be no *nighāta* if one sees two sentences in it.]

The point now to be discussed is : when is a meaning to be considered complete and when incomplete.

445. Where the mode of performance of the action (denoted by the sentence is desired to be known because of its very nature (*sāmarthyāt*), that sentence containing no verbal incompleteness is said to be complete in meaning.

[The point here is that the incompleteness must come out of the words themselves before the sentence can be considered incomplete. When one says : 'Devadatta cooks', the sentence is complete, though how and what he cooks is not mentioned. From the word 'cooks' an average listener will understand a complete meaning. But when one says 'Devadatta cooks his', one feels at once that the words themselves are incomplete.

The *Vṛtti* gives the sentence *vrīhayo'vahanyantām* as an example of a complete sentence though no details are mentioned in it. It is complete because there is no verbal incompleteness : *śabdalakṣaṇāpekṣāyogād iti*, as Puṇyarāja says.]

446. Where there is a bare statement of fact and its implications are understood from its expressive power (*śruteḥ*) without the use of words to express them, then the sentence is complete.

[In other words, the incompleteness must come from the words themselves. Otherwise, the sentence must be considered complete, even if the listener understands more than what the words actually say. The words used do not require other words for yielding a complete meaning :—*parisamāptameva śabdanibandhanāyā ākāṅkṣāyās tatrābhāvād vākyaṃ vijñāyate.*]

Two sentences may say the same thing, and yet there may be difference of emphasis in the two statements.

447. 'Study while moving around' 'move around while studying'. In these two sentences what is enjoined is the same but there is a difference due to difference in verbal presentation.

[The purpose of both sentences is to tell somebody to study or pray while moving about. The first sentence presents the study through a verb and the moving about through the present participle and the second sentence does it vice-versa. What is presented through a verb is the more important element verbally. But in reality the purpose of the speaker is the same in both sentences, namely, to tell somebody to study (*adhī*) or to pray (*jap*).]

448. Varieties of action, having their fruit and involving many minor actions and infinite in number because of different modes of performance and different aims are expressed by the same verb.

[It is stated in this verse that though the verb denoting he action may be the same, the action may differ because of difference in the mode of performance and in the results.]

449. The verb always denotes an action without any inner variation. From the mere word, all the variations cannot be imagined.

450. In the sentences : 'the kings will perform the *aśvamedha* sacrifice 'the Brāhmaṇas are holding a sacrificial session', the variations are not understood because of difference in the verb.

[In 450, two distinct verbs are used: *yakṣyante* and *sattraṃ āsate* but it is not because of difference in the verbs that difference in the ritual is understood but because of inherent difference in the actions themselves (*arthasāmarthyāt.*)

Commenting on 449, the *Vṛtti* points out that variations in the action conveyed by the verb are brought about by differences in the *sādhana*, the accessories to action (*sādhanabhedena tadbhedasya caritārthatvāt*). The verb itself does not convey the variations. Commenting on 450, the *Vṛtti*, the text of which is doubtful in several places, points out a difference in the action denoted by *yaj* in *yakṣyante* and that denoted by *ās* in *sattram āsate.*]

451. The action in regard to the seventeen *prājāpatya* animals, though mentioned only once and not repeated, becomes diversified because of the nature of things.

[By *sāmarthyāt*, what is meant is that, as there are seventeen different animals, the same action necessarily becomes diversified, though the word denoting the action is not repeated.]

452. The action of eating relates to Devadatta etc. separately. Or the sentence itself is applied, to each agent (*pratisvatantram*) separately.

[In the sentence *Devadatta-Yajñadatta-Viṣṇumitrā bhojyantām* the meaning of the sentence is the action of feeding which is connected with Devadatta etc. separately. That is what the first half of the verse says. The second says that alternatively, the sentence itself is split up into three different sentences, each having one of the three agents as the subject and the verb *bhojyatām* as the predicate. According to the second alternative, one verb becomes many verbs and therefore, one sentence becomes many sentences. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*Pratikartṛ ca vākye bhidyamāne bahavaḥ kriyāśabdā upaplavante. Tasmādekopanibandhanāni bahūni vākyānyupajāyante*:— If a separate sentence is made for each agent, many verbs would arise and thus many sentences based on one sentence would come into existence.]

453. At the time of utterance of the sentences, a separate form is not heard but at the time of the understanding of their meaning, the form of different (sentences) is understood.

[In the sentence under discussion, only one verb denoting one action is heard, but at the time of understanding its meaning, the verb or its meaning is construed with each agent separately.

The *Vṛtti* points out that according to some, it is in the nature of words that they are uttered in one way and understood in another way: *Śabdapravṛttidharma evāyam anyathoccāraṇaṃ anyathā pratipattiḥ*. At the time of understanding the meaning of a sentence, it becomes diversified when many sentences arise out of it:— *Pratipattikāle tu vākyāntareṣūpajāyamāneṣu pravibhaktaṃ rūpāntaraṃ pratīyate.*]

This happens in the *śāstra also.*

454. An all-embracing sentence (*grahaṇakaṃ vākyam*) like *kartari* (*kṛt*) (P. 3.4.67.) is enunciated in a general manner and then it is applied separately to cases like *paśu*.

[P.3.4.67. says that a *kṛt* suffix is added to a root in the sense of the agent of the action. This general statement is applied

to particular cases as in P.3.2.25 according to which the *kṛt* suffix *in* is added to the root *hṛ* when the preceding proximate word (*upapada*) *is dṛti* or *nātha* and the agent is an animal. Thus we get the form: *dṛtihariḥ* (*paśuḥ*). If the agent is not an animal, this suffix cannot be added to the root. The form would be *dṛtihāraḥ* with the suffix *aṇ* (P.3.2.1.]

455. If, once the general rule is uttered (with some special rule) and its incompleteness is removed, it would not be connected with the other (special rules).

[And so the required forms cannot be derived. The idea here is that a general rule should have some scope as a general rule, apart from its scope when associated with some special rule. Otherwise, some forms cannot be derived. The general rule, must not be tied up with any particular special rule, as that would take away its scope as a general rule as well as the possibility of its being associated with other special rules. As the *Vṛtti* puts it:—*Yadi tu kartari kṛdityekasminneva sūtre paśvādibhir ākāṅkṣā vicchidyeta sāmānyena sādhutvaṃ na syāt. Ekena vopādhinā kṛte'vacchede tatraivāvaruddhatvād upādhyantarasambandho na prakalpeta.*]

456. It has the same form, it has many applications and, therefore, it is the basis (*upanibandhana*) (of the subordinate rules); it is the source of the rules of elaboration (*vibhāgavākyānām*) and it appears to be one with them.

[A new point of view is discussed: how can action which is something to be accomplished and has parts arranged in a temporal sequence be looked upon as a universal and as a particular? The next verse tries to answer the question.]

457. Sometimes action renders service through its individual aspect and sometimes it is its general aspect which fulfils some purpose.

[How can action which is a process (*sādhya*) and has parts arranged in a temporal sequence be looked upon as the universal or the particular ? It is like this: where the accessories are mentioned, in prohibitions, in optional instruction, in accumulation in expressions of excellence and praise, it is its individual aspect which counts. Where the accessories or time and place are not mentioned, it is the general aspect that counts.

458. Where variations are due to time or in expressions like *uṣṭrāsikā*, it is the general aspect that works and they do not affect the form of the word.

[This stanza states where the verb denotes the general aspect of action.]

It was stated before how many actions conveyed by the same word are connected with different accessories conveyed by different words. Now how many actions conveyed by different words are connected with different accessories conveyed by the same word is stated.

459. Where actions differ from one another in their universals etc, (and are conveyed by different words) and the accessories are also of the same number but are conveyed by the same word uttered once, the former are separately connected with the latter.

[In *akṣā bhajyantām, bhujyantām, dīvyantām*, the three verbs denote three different actions unconnected with one another and are conveyed by three different words. The word *akṣāḥ* conveys three different accessories though it is uttered only once by the speaker. But the hearer connects each accessory with one of the verbs and thus gets the complete sentence.]

460. Different actions like breaking, eating and playing are connected separately with the accesso-

ries, namely, the *akṣas* even though the latter are conveyed in one utterance and simultaneously.

461. In the case of the three kinds of *akṣas* conveyed by the same word, the use of the same word is a means (of conveying them at the same time). When they are separately conveyed, there is sequence; the single utterance is for conveying them at the same time and connecting them separately.

462. There are two ways of presenting things through words : sequence or simultaneity. The world does not go beyond them.

463. Where words are used in a sequence, their form varies but not when there is simultaneity. Even when there is simultaneity (in the presentation of the accessories) the action follows sequence.

[To say that the action follows sequence means that each action is connected separately with the different accessories.]

464. Difference and unity are two powers which appear to be different from the word. Even where many (accessories) are conveyed at the same time by the same word, the latter becomes diversified (when its many meanings are construed) in usage (with different actions).

[Though the word *akṣāḥ* is one word which conveys many accessories at the same time, it becomes many when it is connected with the different verbs, each conveying a different action.]

465. Where a complex whole with its parts in a patent state is meant to be conveyed, there the

complex whole is strengthened by the property of the parts.

[The word *akṣāḥ* conveys a whole consisting of three things. The plural number in the word shows that there are several things in that whole. These several things are connected in a certain order with the verbs. The order is the attribute of the several things included in the whole.

The complex whole here is the first kind of whole mentioned in the *Vṛtti* which speaks about three kinds of wholes. In this first kind of whole, there are three distinct parts : As the *Vṛtti* puts it : *tatrākṣā ityavayavabhedānugata ekaḥ samudāyaḥ.*]

Another way of looking at the same thing is now stated.

466. When the complex whole is analysed into its parts, the meaning of the sentence is connected with each part. Or the mention of the accessories is split up into many because of the plural suffix in it, results in the splitting up of the sentence.

[What is meant is that *akṣā bhajyantām, bhujyantām, dīvyantām* becomes *akṣo bhajyatām, bhujyatām, dīvyatām.*]

467. Either each word *akṣa* can be used in the singular number or according to the original utterance, each word *akṣa* can be separated in the plural number.

[What is meant is that each word *akṣa* standing for one thing only can be used in the singular or plural number. Thus, it is shown that the splitting up of the original utterance *akṣāḥ* can take place in two ways.

Normally, one would use a separate word for every idea or object which one wants to express : *Pratyarthaṁ śabdaniveśaḥ*, as it is generally put. *Pratyartham* is explained usually as *artham artham prati.* But it can also mean *arthāu arthau prati* or *arthān arthān prati.* In the last two cases *pratyarthaṃ śabdaniveśaḥ* would mean for every two ideas or objects or for many

ideas or objects, one should use a word. It means that the same word can express more than one idea or object. Those who hold this view are *abhedavādinaḥ* = those who hold that the word is the same even when it denotes many things. According to them, the sentence *akṣāḥ bhajyantām, bhujyantām dīvyantām* is not to be split up on the basis of the word *akṣāḥ* understood as including more than one word *akṣa* each being connected with one of the verbs because, according to this view, there is only one word *akṣa* which has three meanings. That is possible only if it has three distinct powers. In other words, *abhedavādinaḥ* believe in *śaktitantra* and not in *śabdatantra*.]

468. According to those who believe in the identity (of the word) in the case of polysemic sentences, it is the power of the many-powered sentence which is split up (and not its form).

[The other view is that in the sentence in question, the word *akṣāḥ* contains three separate words, all having the form *akṣa*. These three separate words are mentioned in a condensed form but at the time of understanding the meaning, each of them should be taken out and connected with one of the verbs. This is the *śabdatantra* view.

469. Or it is a case of mentioning in a condensed form (through *tantra*) two separate words. The inter connection between the words differs according to the hearer.

470. What were two separate sentences having the same form have been used in a condensed form by the speaker for the benefit of the hearers.

The views of the *bhedavādin* and the *abhedavādin* are now put differently.

471. Even if only one of the condensed sentences is meant by the speaker, the other (being of the

same form) comes to the mind. Without any intention on the part of the speaker, the other comes to the mind as a power.

[The first half of the verse gives the view of the *bhedavādin* and the other half that of the *abhedavādin.*]

Another way of putting the view of the *abhedavādin* is this.

472. Sometimes, both the powers of the word are utilised at the same time just as fire is used sometimes both for its heat and for its light.

It is now shown that the same thing happens in the *śāstra* also.

473. The sentence, heard only once but having more than one meaning, either through repetition of the sentence or through more than one power, presents itself as more than one (*vibhāgena*) either through *liṅga* or through *tantra.*

[According to the *bhedavādins* it presents itself as more than one through *liṅga* and according to the *abhedavādins* it presents itself as more than one through *tantradharma*, that is, through its multiplicity of powers.]

An example is now given.

474. In regard to the name *Saṃprasāraṇa*, through two indications, the same *sūtra* can be understood separately as presenting either the phoneme or the sentence meaning as the named.

[The *sūtra*: *igyaṇaḥ saṃprasāraṇam* (P.1.1.45) teaches the name *saṃprasāraṇa*. What is the named ? One view is that the phonemes *i, u, ṛ, ḷ* are the named. Another view is that the

sentence-meaning, namely, the coming of *ik* in place of *yaṇ* is the named. There are indications for both in the *śāstra*.]

475. Similarly, it has been shown in the *Bhāṣya* itself that conveying of more than one thing by mentioning the word only once has taken place in the *sūtra dvirvacane aci* (P. 1.1.59).

[In P.1.1.59, even though the word *dvirvacane* is mentioned only once, it has to be construed twice in slightly different meanings by following the principle of *tantra* which is similar to, but not identical with the grammatical process called *ekaśeṣa* where a word, mentioned only once, may stand for the same word repeated. For example, in *rāmau*, the word *rāma*, occurring only once, stands for two *rāmas* and in *rāmāḥ*, it stands for three or more *rāmas*.]

The following verses relate to the history of the Grammatical Tradition in India.

476. After the *Saṅgraha* declined when it came into the hands of Grammarians who were fond of abridgements and had acquired only little knowledge.

[The *Saṅgraha* is mentioned in the *Mahābhāṣya*, I.p.6.l.12. We are told that there the question whether the word is eternal or only an effect is discussed as one of the main topics. Commenting on this, Bhartṛhari says in his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya that there were 14 000 topics discussed in the *Saṅgraha*: *Caturdaśa sahasrāṇi vastūni asmin saṃgrahagranthe* (M. Bhā. dīpikā, p. 21, l. 4-5. B. O. R. I. Post Graduate and Research Department Series no. 8.)]

477. And when the Master Patañjali who knew all the traditions (*tīrtha-darśinā*) had incorporated into his Mahābhāṣya all the arguments and principles.

478. It was found that those who were not

sufficiently equipped (*akṛtabuddhīnām*) could not arrive at proper decisions while studying that work at once bottomless because of its depth and clear because of its lucidity.

[According to Puṇyarāja, Bhartṛhari wants to say here that only his Guru Vasurāta could really understand the Mahābhāṣya properly.]

479. When that sacred work which was an epitome of the *Saṅgraha* was ruined by Baiji, Saubhava and Haryakṣa who merely followed dry reasoning.

480. The Grammatical Tradition slipped away from the hands of the disciples of Patañjali and in time, the mere text of it survived in the South.

481. Then Ācārya Candra and other followers of the principles of the Bhāṣya obtained the true Tradition from the mountain and elaborated it into many branches.

[Puṇyarāja says that by 'mountain', the Trikūṭa is meant. He also refers to the belief that there on that mountain the original Grammatical Tradition, composed by Rāvaṇa and engraved on stone, existed. Some Brahmarakṣas brought it from there and gave it to Ācāryas Candra, Vasurāta and they understood the true nature of the Science of Grammar from it and imparted it to their disciples and incessantly elaborated it. In the end it became a discipline with many branches.]

482. After mastering those principles and cultivating his own discipline this collection of traditions was composed by our Teacher.

483. Here only the gist of a few of those traditions is given. In the third *Kāṇḍa*, there will be full discussion.

484. The intellect acquires critical acumen by familiarity with different traditions. How much does one really understand by merely following one's own reasoning only ?

485. The learning of those who have not sat at the feet of the earlier scholars but flit from one idea to another does not attain complete definiteness.

— ooo —

ERRATA

page	*line*	*for*	*read*
11	4	movements	moments
21	20	aśvaṣadgavoel	aśvaṣadgava
32	21	njban	niban
45	22	śvitah	śvā itaḥ
61	13	affect	effect
120	13	of the	as the
122	13	onlya	only a
123	28	rattva	sattva
124	19	correct when	correct even when
124	19	it is the name	it is not the name
138	9	difinite	definite
164	13	pratisi	pratiṣi
169	15	sentences	sentence
171	11	vāgdharm	vāgdharma
175	15	look	look like
201	6	thbasis	the basis
203	19	abridgements	of abridgements
203	25	14001	14000

SOME IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS

	Rs.
Astadhyayi of Panini : 2 vols. (Eng. Trans.)—*S. C. Vasu*	120.00
Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Reader—*F. Edgerton*	15.00
Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary; 2 Vols.—*F. Edgerton*	150.00
Companion to Contemporary Sanskrit *H. Nakamura*	10.00
Comparative Grammar of the Prakrit Language—*R. Pischel* Eng. Trans. —*S. Jha*	Shortly
Elements of Hindi Grammar—*M. Srivastava*	15.00
Evolution of Awadhi—*Baburam Saksena*	40.00
Formation of the Marathi Language—*J. Bloch*	40.00
Grammar of the Prakrit Language—*D. C. Sircar*	25.00
Higher Sanskrit Grammar—*M. R. Kale* Student Edition	20.00
Library Edition	35.00
Introduction to the Grammar of Tibetan Language : *S. C. Das*	40.00
An Introduction to Prakrit—*Alfred C. Woolner*	30.00
Laghukaumudi (Text with Eng. Trans.)—*J. R. Ballantyne*	30.00
Language—*Leonard Bloomfield*	16.00
Linguistic Survey of India, 11 vols; 19 Pts. *G. A. Grierson*	2500.00
Nighantu and Nirukta—*Lakshman Swarup*	Shortly
Prakrit Grammarians—*Dolchi*—Eng. Tr. by *P. Jha*	25.00
Roots, Verb-Forms and Primary Derivatives of the Sanskrit Language—*W. D. Whitney*	30.00
Sanskrit Grammar—*W. D. Whitney*	shortly
Sanskirt Syntax—*J. S. Speyer*	40.00
Sanskrit Grammar for Students—*A. A. Macdonell*	20.00
Sanskrit Syntax—*J. S. Speyer*	40.00
Siddhanta Kaumudi—2 Vols. complete Eng. Tr. by *S. C. Vasu*	100.00
Structure of the Noun Phrase in English and Hindi : *M. K. Varma*	30.00
Telugu Verbal Bases—A Comparative & Descriptive Study : *B. Krishnamurti*	50.00
Vedic Metre and its Historical Development—*E. V. Arnold*	30.00
Studies in the Semantic Structure of Hindi—Vol. I—*K. C. Bahl*	100.00
Vaiyakarana Siddhanta Kaumudi of Bhattoji Dikshita—Vol. I—*P. V. Naganatha Sastry*	45.00

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
Delhi : Varanasi : Patna

The Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari

Chapter III Part ii English Translation

Prof. K. A. Subramania Iyer

Bhartṛhari stands peerless in the galaxy of Sanskrit grammarians of the Pāṇinian School. His Vākyapadīya has earned a world-wide acclaim for the philosophical and scientific exposition of Sanskrit grammar.

Among the modern Sanskrit grammarians Prof. K. A. Subramania Iyer is well known for his clear and comprehensive analysis of Bhartṛhari's ideas. Six volumes of his work have already been published by the Deccan College Research Institute, Poona.

The present Volume is an English translation of the Kārikās of the last seven *samuddeśas* of the third *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*, namely, those relating to *kriyā, kāla, puruṣa, saṃkhyā, upagraha, liṅga* and *vṛtti*. It follows the same pattern as adopted for the translation of the *Kārikās* of the first seven *samuddeśas* of the Kāṇḍa III, Part I.

The translation of each Kārikā is followed by exegetical notes which expound the notions that Bhartṛhari following Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* considered to be the basis of the forms of the Sanskrit language. The notes provide the gist of what Helārāja says in his *Prakīrṇaprakāśa*. They also contain references to the *Sūtras*, Vārttikas and the *Mahābhāṣya* passages involved in the treatment. **Rs. 60.00**

The Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari (Kāṇḍas I, II)

With English Translation and Notes

K. Raghavan Pillai

The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari comprises the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar while the works of Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali constitute the analysis of Sanskrit language. The present work is the critical edition of the Kāṇḍas I, II, of the Vākyapadīya and their English translation. Dr. Pillai has also added a critical introduction, a survey of the main ideas of the Kārikās, exegetical notes, general Index, Index of words and Kārikās. The work is very useful for the students of philosophy of grammar and has considerable relevance to the study of linguistics. **Rs. 30.00**

The Kalasamuddesa of Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya

Peri Sarveswara Sharma

The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari is divided into three Kāṇḍas : (i) Brahma, (ii) Vākya and (iii) Prakīrṇa. The Kālasamuddeśa is the ninth Chapter of the Prakīrṇa Kāṇḍa. The present treatise is an English translation of the Kālasamuddeśa and of Helārāja's Commentary thereon. In this book, the author has discussed, at length , the doctrine of the Traikālya with reference to different schools of philosophical thought. **Rs. 18.00**

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

Delhi :: Varanasi :: Patna